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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Anybody who has had any dealings with Asante chiefs has probably met, or 
most certainly heard of, a chief who is described as the “highest “, “most 
important”, or “most powerful” chief in Ghana right after the king of 
Asante. Most likely, one is also told that this same chief used to own “all the 
lands” in that particular town or district, but for some reason or another he 
does not own them anymore. Not surprisingly, the “highest” are countless in 
numbers, while it is extremely difficult to meet a chief who says that he is 
among the “lowest”. Even a chief of a very small village will declare that 
among all the village headmen in the area, he is the senior. However, in 
most cases, these people are not just showing off to an ignorant and naive 
outsider. On the contrary, when asked, they are able to produce flawless 
evidence in support of their assertion. The problem is that there are so many, 
sometimes even conflicting, grounds on which one is able to build his claim 
for precedence. Some chief is of high rank because his ancestor conquered 
all the other chiefs in the area, someone because his office is the oldest, and 
some because his ancestors were closely related to the king, and so forth. 
How is one able to determine who is higher and who is lower? And how 
does political authority relate to these various assertions?   
This is a study of how political hierarchy is constructed among the 
Asante. It explores the principles that legitimate chieftaincy and hierarchies 
among chiefly offices. Furthermore, it shows how the institution of 
chieftaincy is connected to certain aspects of social structure and cosmology 
and how it is precisely because of this connectedness that chieftaincy 
continues to be viable despite major changes in Asante (or Ghanaian) 
society. The Asante belong to a larger ethnic and language group called the 
Akan. The Akan people live in the coastal and forest areas of Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire. The Akan language and its dialects are classified under the 
Tano language family, including Asante (Twi), Fante, and Akuapem, which 
also have their own distinctive written forms. The social and political 
organization of all Akan groups is more or less uniform. It is often said that 
the Akan political order provides a classic example of a chiefdom or 
segmentary state (cf., Southall 1956, 229-263). The best known of the Akan 
polities is the kingdom of Asante (Ashanti), which is a union of a number of 
autonomous chiefdoms under one king, the Asantehene. Every Asante 
chiefdom is a distinct territorial unit centred on the chief's capital town or 
village. The chief is elected from a group of candidates eligible by right of 
membership in a matrilineal descent group in which the office has been 
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vested. He is accompanied by a queen mother and is guided by a council of 
divisional chiefs or elders who are the representatives of the resident 
matrilineages of the chiefdom. Together they form a legislative and 
executive body, and most importantly function as a judicial court. Each 
chiefdom is composed of several matrilineages that are established on the 
basis of common matrilineal descent from a known female ancestor. The 
anthropologists have usually viewed the lineage as a fundamental corporate 
group with important religious, political, social and economic functions. 
Today the Asante kingdom, with its chiefdoms and lineages, coexists with 
the republic of Ghana. This coexistence has sometimes proved to be 
problematic mainly because the Asante kingdom and the modern nation 
state are organized according to an entirely different logic with the result 
that their relationship to the Ghanaian society is also fundamentally 
different. 
In terms of modern anthropology, the classical definition of Asante 
social and political structure is by Meyer Fortes. His theory on Asante as a 
hierarchical, centralized polity, which coexists with a segmentary lineage 
system, is the starting point of my study. Fortes published several articles on 
the Asante and his views were elaborated in his book Kinship and Social 
Order (1969a). Through a rethinking of some of his key concepts I will 
introduce a model of the Asante polity that gives, I think, a more 
comprehensive picture of the relationship between social and political 
structures in Asante. 
 
 
1.1 Collecting data 
 
My fieldwork was carried out primarily during 2000-2001. This happened to 
be a particularly vibrant period in the Asante political life with a new king 
just installed a year earlier and the presidential elections of December 2000, 
which resulted in the first peaceful and democratic transfer of power in the 
history of Ghana. My permanent residence was in Kumase, the capital of the 
Asante kingdom, which is a city of one million people, although the 
surroundings are very “village-like”, if compared to any other metropolis 
that I have seen. Even though the old buildings of the historical section of 
Kumase were destroyed during the wars against the British, the place still 
has a feeling that cannot be compared with any other city. The town plan, 
the names of the streets and quarters, tell of a long and eventful history, but 
most importantly, the fact that the city is still divided among the numerous 
 3 
chiefs of the different afekuo, administrative and military groups, underlines 
the idea that it is a chiefdom first, and only after that a modern city. The 
inhabitants of Oseikurom, as it is often called after the first king, identify 
themselves passionately with their hometown. Being a Kumaseni (or a 
Kumasenu as the true “Kumasi boys” call themselves) means much more 
than being the urban opposite to the “villagers” (nkuraasefo]); it connotes 
history and tradition and forms a major part of their “Asanteness”. This is 
well exemplified by the way a friend of mine described his grandmother’s 
house: “You see, today most of the houses are made of concrete, but ours is 
made of mud [i.e., clay]. There aren’t many houses like that left anymore. 
When people see that our house is made of mud, they understand that our 
family is very old. It is as old as Kumase itself”. 
I lived with a shopkeeper family, whom I had known for six years 
before I started my research. We lived in a two-storey building, which was 
inhabited by several households, most of them related one way or the other 
to my host family. Almost half of my stay was spent “touring” outside 
Kumase and conducting fieldwork in other localities. As noted by many 
before me, the Asante are constantly on the move; they visit and are 
frequently visited by people from other localities (e.g., Fortes et al. 1947, 
167). In fact, most of the anthropologists who have studied the Asante have 
also conducted their fieldwork in several localities. Hence, staying in one 
place would have seriously impaired my chances of getting a full picture of 
the social and political life of the Asante.  
Kumase was not important to me only because it was the seat of the 
Asantehene and centre of political life. I took a special interest in the affairs 
of the chiefs of the so-called Adonten group. The chiefs of this group, which 
has a glorious but yet turbulent history, are major players in the local 
politics of Kumase and also in the whole of Asante. Through personal 
connections I was able to speak with some of the Adonten chiefs and other 
people involved. In addition to that, there is also rich and voluminous 
documentation concerning the history of the Adonten group. Adonten’s 
connections to other chiefs through clanship took me to different places 
outside Kumase as well as outside Asante. The most important of these was 
Nkoransa, a northern Asante chiefdom, the chief of which is traditionally 
considered a “brother” to the Adonten chiefs. Nkoransa also became the 
place where I studied the Asante traditional religion. Another place that I 
visited frequently was the Akan chiefdom Kwawu, a southeast neighbour of 
Asante. Those Kwawu chiefs who belong to the Asene matriclan are also 
related to the Adonten chiefs and the Nkoransahene. In Kumase I also 
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followed closely some the current court cases that involved the traditional 
rights of the chiefs. 
The necessary archival material was obtained from two main 
sources: the Ghana National Archives, where the records of the British 
colonial government and the post-independence regional administration are 
held, and the Manhyia Record Office, in which the documents produced by 
the Kumase Traditional Council and Asanteman Council are deposited. The 
data I have used consists mostly of public enquiries held in connection with 
court cases, i.e., cross-examinations of chiefs by their opponents and judges. 
The court cases constituted a valuable source for my study because in them 
the chiefs themselves explicitly debate the key principles that define 
hierarchies. The holdings of the archives cover a rather wide time span, 
1906-1980, but my data is mostly from 1925-1950. It seems that during that 
time, the latter part of the colonial period, which was also characterized by 
the indirect rule, the cases were many and the administrators had a 
particularly keen interest in them. In addition to this, some of my informants 
were kind enough to give me access to their private papers. Some additional 
archival material was also collected from the Public Record Office in 
Britain.  
 
 
1.2 Outline of the problem 
 
In order to find out how it was materially possible for a kingdom, such as 
the pre-colonial Asante, to emerge in the middle of a thick tropical forest, 
the archaeologists Peter and Ama Shinnie set up excavation sites in 
localities that had a central role in the oral traditions concerning the dawn of 
the kingdom. One of these sites was the village of Anyinam, a good 30 
kilometres south of Kumase, which is famous as the birthplace of the first 
Asantehene Osei Tutu. Because of this history the village chief has been 
granted some special privileges by the king. Namely, he has the right “of 
continuing to wear his sandals when greeting the Asantehene; he also does 
not remove the cloth from his shoulder as custom requires from others and 
is entitled to shake the Asantehene’s hand” (Shinnie & Shinnie 1995, 15). 
Normally, a village chief does not have the right to shake hands with the 
Asantehene; the king is greeted by bowing from a distance. Moreover, no 
chief, not even the great paramount chiefs, has the right of greeting the king 
with both sandals on and his left shoulder covered. So, in this very specific 
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sense, the chief of this tiny village is the most senior chief in the whole 
kingdom.  
This case epitomizes practically all the important questions that re-
occur throughout this study. First of all, it shows how high rank or seniority 
can be argued on various grounds. In fact, it would simply be impossible to 
try to list all the possible arguments. Hence, I will concentrate on the most 
important ones, which are relevant within the framework of kinship and 
ritual relations. These matters are discussed mostly in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 
7.  
Second, it shows how origins and histories are crucial for asserting 
superiority. Thus, different representations of the past, genealogies and 
historical narratives, are instrumental for my study. My intention is not to 
portray the hierarchy of chiefs at any certain point of time – past or present. 
Instead, I study the basic principles that create and maintain hierarchies 
through time. Hence, the examples I give cover a temporal span from the 
genesis of the polity to the present day. Some things described here belong 
to the past, but many are still very valid. The principles themselves are 
historical and, of course, subject to change and circumstance. Chapter 5 
focuses on the ways in which the hierarchies are based on the ideas of the 
past and also how this enables the processes of change. 
Third, the example of Anyinam also raises the question whether this 
prerogative of the village chief is only “symbolic” or “ceremonial”, having 
to do merely with etiquette and dress code, or does it entail any political 
power or authority? How do hierarchical relations of this kind relate to the 
formal political structure of the Asante state? To understand the relationship 
between the social and political orders, it has to be established how power 
and authority are constructed. Where does the king’s power and authority to 
allocate rights come from? What are the principles for distributing authority 
to other chiefs and the people? Chapters 7 and 8 address these questions.  
Fourth, the Anyinam case shows that the traditional ideas about 
superiority and seniority among the chiefs are not forgotten although there 
are people who claim that chieftaincy is a thing of the past. On the contrary, 
these ideas remain topical in modern Ghana. In Chapter 9 I discuss the 
position of the institution of chieftaincy in Asante (and Ghana) today and 
how it has endured the challenges of colonial and post-colonial times.  
I begin the study by discussing the Asante kinship and marriage 
systems in Chapter 2, and particularly how the ideas of hierarchy and 
political relations relate to them. This discussion is linked to Fortes’ view on 
 6 
the Asante political system as a system of descent groups, which is re-
examined in Chapter 3. 
 
 7 
2 POLITICS OF KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE 
 
Meyer Fortes’ interest in the Asante was lifelong and versatile. Although in 
the anthropological community he is probably best known for his two 
monographs on the Tallensi of northern Ghana, his other major research site 
was in the south, among the Asante. He partly drew his inspiration from the 
legendary government anthropologist R. S. Rattray, but, as he put it himself, 
“the Ashanti themselves were the principal magnet”. Fortes collected the 
bulk of his field data during 1945-1946 in a research project called the 
Ashanti Social Survey. The survey was branded as “an experiment in social 
research” because it was an interdisciplinary project, which combined 
reports from three fields of study. It was a joint effort by an anthropologist 
(Fortes himself), a geographer, and an economist, and its aim was to give “a 
broad, general picture of the social and political structure of the Ashanti to-
day”. The survey was facilitated by the Gold Coast Government and 
Colonial Research Council (among others) and it was thought to address 
questions like “progress”, “development”, and “welfare” in the colony 
(Fortes et al. 1947). However, in spite of the practical orientations of his 
first study, Fortes’ subsequent published works on the Asante were mostly, 
if not solely, concerned with anthropological theory. Even now, two decades 
after his death in 1983, Fortes’ impact on Asante studies remains strong. 
Not only does his work constitute an important point of reference, as well as 
reassessment (e.g., Clark 1994), but also the huge body of data he and his 
many assistants collected in the 1940’s has served as material for 
subsequent studies up to the present time (e.g., McCaskie 2000). 
Despite his vast knowledge of, and deep affection for, the Asante 
people, Fortes’ scholarly curiosity was not directed at individual people. As 
T. C. McCaskie (ibid., 22) has noted, Fortes was in agreement with his 
mentor A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1968, 192), who maintained that an 
anthropologist should be interested in “the actual relations of Tom, Dick and 
Harry” only so far as they illustrate a general description. What is really 
needed “for scientific purposes is an account of the form of the structure” 
(ibid.). For those purposes Fortes found his data on the Asante to be most 
appropriate. In his essay Time and Social Structure (1970 [1949], 1-32) 
Fortes took the Asante household as an example of how structures could not 
be understood unless it is realized that the principles of social organization 
that bring structures into being operate through a period of time and in 
changing circumstances. These considerations later formed the basis for the 
model of the developmental cycle of the domestic group (Goody 1971). But 
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most importantly, in Fortes’ writings of the 1950’s and 1960’s the Asante 
came to exemplify how a complex, but yet unmistakable, differentiation 
between two kinds of normative orders could prevail in society. 
 
 
2.1 Structural domains 
 
The distinction between private and public domains, internal and external 
spheres, has a long history in Western social thought, dating back to the 
political philosophy of the ancient Greeks. This dichotomy apparently made 
its way into modern anthropology through the writings of the social theorists 
of the Victorian era (Rosaldo 1980, 401-409). The idea of two structural 
domains “as an aid to systematisation” or “a heuristic framework” had its 
most explicit elaboration in the works of Fortes, notably in Kinship and 
Social Order, where he distinguished the familial, or domestic, domain from 
the politico-jural domain. In that book his treatment of the Asante social 
system provided the most important “paradigmatic ethnographical 
specimen” in support of his theory of “how kinship and polity are 
interconnected in tribal society” (Fortes 1969a, 219). 
Fortes (1969a, 95-96) begins his definition of domain with the 
notion of person as a composition of various statuses. In a social situation or 
relationship a person puts one or more of them into use, while the rest 
remain inactive but still available in a new or changing situation. Each of 
the statuses deployed is connected to certain norms and behavioural 
patterns, which ultimately give a social situation its unified structure. Hence 
any social relationship or activity consists of “persons-in-relationship acting 
in customary ways, exercising rights and privileges and discharging 
obligations or responsibilities in conformity with norms and values that 
allow them to accomplish culturally legitimate aims and ends in the service 
of their individual needs and propensities” (ibid., 96). Fortes concludes that 
all “social events, occasions and institutions” can be seen as nexuses of 
status elements, which are not only associated with normative behaviour, 
but have also “a characteristic socio-spatial substratum” of their own, such 
as a working place, home, village, and so forth. These “social nexus 
formations” can be systematically categorized as follows: 
 
I suggest that the social and cultural elements and processes that 
make up a given social system fall into determinate sectors of 
organization. Each such sector – which I call a domain – comprises a 
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range of social relations, customs, norms, statuses, and other 
analytically discriminable elements linked up in nexuses and unified 
by the stamp of distinctive functional features that are common to 
all. It is, to make a crude comparison, as if everything in one domain 
were blue, in another red, and so on. The domain of law in our 
society embraces judges and courts, police, prisons and lawyers, the 
statute book and case law, marriage lines, death certificates, voting 
rights, and a hundred and one more offices and practices. 
Heterogeneous as these items seem to be, they are all intrinsically 
bound up with one another and have a common, though very 
abstract, functional significance, centered on the authority of the 
state. We have no difficulty in distinguishing the domain of the law 
from that of the family, which is mirrored in our vocabulary of 
kinship and family (ibid., 97-98). 
 
In essence, the domains are several; one can discriminate between legal, 
religious, economic, political, and so on. Fortes was convinced that societies 
could be typed according to the number and character of domains 
incorporated in their social structure, although he does not pursue this 
matter at length. However, he makes a basic distinction between “complex 
societies”, where a high level of specialization of roles and statuses prevail, 
and thus a greater variety of domains can be found, and “simple, or 
primitive societies”, where the domains remain relatively undifferentiated 
(ibid., 99). More importantly, some domains of the social structure are 
considered common to all human societies, and that is where the dichotomy 
between familial and politico-jural is brought forward: 
 
As I see it, human social organization everywhere emerges as some 
kind of balance, stable or not, between the political order – 
Aristotle’s polis – and the familial or domestic order – the oikos – a 
balance between polity and kinship… [P]olity identifies the domain 
of legitimate authority and of the associated constraining powers that 
emanate from the total society in which individuals have citizenship. 
It works through institutions, offices and arrangements – or their 
equivalents – that are backed by and enforce rules and norms of a 
legal or, as I prefer to say, jural kind, in compliance with which there 
is an element of contract. At the opposite pole of social structure, as 
I see it, is the domain of the family as a domestic association which 
is the agency that fulfils the productive (i.e. providing food and 
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shelter) and reproductive (both physical and social replacement) 
requirements that are indispensable for society to exist or even 
persist at all. In this domain conduct is regulated primarily by moral 
not jural norms and value, so that mutual trust and amity are the 
prescribed values (Fortes 1978, 14-15). 
 
The two domains are ultimately separated by the sets of “normative 
premises” governing each domain. The politico-jural domain is regulated by 
jural norms backed by public sanctions, even to the extent of the use of 
physical force, while the familial domain is controlled by moral norms, 
which have their basis in amity among close kin (see Fortes 1969a, 250-
251).  
According to Fortes, every society from the smallest hunter-gatherer 
groups to large-scale industrial states has its political and familial spheres, 
but what differentiates them is how and by what means they are connected 
to each other. To summarize, everywhere and always there are political 
things and familial things, but in simple societies, those without 
administrative organization, kinship plays a significant part in the political 
structure, whereas in complex societies “family and kinship relations have 
little or no politico-jural validity in the extra familial social structure” (ibid., 
79). Thus, when studying “tribal societies” it would be important to 
“explore the structural interconnections” between kinship and polity (Fortes 
1972, 283). When Fortes (1969a, 251) talks about kinship operating in two 
separate domains he does not suggest that there are two kinds of people, 
political people and familial people; on the contrary, he clearly states that 
“there is no entity as a kinship person who is not also invested with politico-
jural, economic, ritual, etc. identity and responsibility”. But what he does 
suggest is an elementary division made between two kinds of kinship 
relations: bilateral relations (filial, sibling, and affinal relations), which 
belong to the familial domain, and are thus politically irrelevant, and 
descent relations, which belong to the politico-jural. Or, as Harold Scheffler 
(1970, 1464) calls them, an ego-oriented kinship system, which consists of 
“a field of social relations ascribed between individuals on the basis of the 
simple parento-filial relations”, and an ancestor-oriented descent system, 
which consists of “a field of intra- and inter-group relations, defined in 
terms of common descent”. This division of kinship relations into two basic 
categories served as an important theoretical starting point for African 
Political Systems when the editors created their typology of political 
systems: 
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We must here distinguish between the set of relationships linking the 
individual to other persons and to particular social units through the 
transient bilateral family, which we shall call the kinship system, and 
the segmentary system of permanent, unilateral descent groups, 
which we call the lineage system. Only the latter establishes 
corporate units with political functions. In both groups of societies 
[i.e., states and stateless societies] kinship and domestic ties have an 
important role in the lives of individuals, but their relation to 
political system is of secondary order (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 
1969, 6). 
 
The ensuing critique has touched on a number of aspects of this distinction. 
The universality and variability as well as the historical specificity and 
cultural relativity of the two domains were discussed especially by the 
feminist writers of the 1970’s (Comaroff 1987, 54-57). As John Comaroff 
has pointed out, this criticism was partly enforced by the fact that Fortes 
himself had difficulties in deciding how the domains should actually be 
treated (ibid., 57-58). On the one hand, he renders that “kinship and polity 
can be analytically and empirically distinguished even where the two orders 
seem to be fused together in a single kinship polity” (Fortes 1978, 15). But 
on the other, he seems to deny it by stating that “this is a methodological 
and analytical distinction”, and thus the “actualities of kinship relations and 
kinship behaviour are compounded of elements derived from both domains 
and deployed in words and acts, beliefs and practices, objects and 
appurtenances that pertain to both of these and to other domains of social 
life as well” (Fortes 1969a, 251). 
 
 
2.2 Political blood and familial spirit 
 
Fortes quite clearly saw that his theoretical notion of a social person being 
basically a combination of two kinds of statuses was matched by the 
indigenous Asante notions of human essence. Namely, the conception that a 
person is made of blood, mogya, which is inherited matrilineally, and spirit, 
nt]r], which is transmitted patrilineally, seemed to constitute an ideological 
basis for the separation of two complementary social fields. The former 
determines a person’s political and legal rights in the community, whereas 
the latter provide him/her with a “cluster of moral and contingent rights”. 
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Without both, i.e., acknowledged maternity and paternity, a person is not 
seen to be complete (Fortes 1963, 59-60). In addition to these two, a person 
also has a “soul”, kra, which affects his/her destiny (nkrabea) in life, and a 
“spiritual backing,” sunsum, which can be “tall” or “short”, i.e., more or less 
potent, depending on the experience and knowledge of the person in 
question. However, kra and sunsum are not acquired through filiation, but 
from supernatural sources, and they do not endow a person with any kind of 
social status.1   
Matrfiliation confers membership in a local matrilineal descent 
group, abusua, members of which trace descent to a common ancestress. It 
also is based on the notion of shared blood, which can be transmitted by 
women only. This perception is exemplified by a well-known proverb that 
runs: abusua baako, mogya baako, “one lineage, one blood”.2 The lineages 
belong to exogamous matriclans, also called abusua or abusua kesee, “big 
lineage”.3 The clans are not localized units and they include member 
lineages throughout all Akan chiefdoms. All persons belonging to the same 
clan, irrespective of their place of residence, are considered to be related by 
blood, or more specifically, to be descendants of a common ancestress 
(Fortes 1969a, 158-162).4 The matrilineage has a male head (abusua panin) 
who is assisted by a female head (obaa panin). He exercises authority over 
the internal matters of the lineage, but in that capacity he is largely 
dependent on the support of the elders of the lineage. These matters are 
mostly what Fortes called domestic, such as marriage, divorce, property 
relations, etc. (ibid., 163-165). The lineage also forms a link to higher 
                                                 
1
 Similarities and linkages between the constitutive elements make this quadripartition 
problematic and hence it should not be considered a definitive model of the Akan 
conception of personhood. Both Fortes (1969a, 198-199) and Rattray (1959, 153-155) as 
well as many contemporary writers (e.g., Gyekye 1987, 85-102) have pondered on this 
matter.   
2
 The strength of this notion is well exemplified by one of Gracia Clark’s (1994, 98) 
informants, who maintained that abandoning the lineage would mean that “I would have to 
open my wrists and drain out all my blood first”. 
3
 The number and names of Akan matriclans vary in different accounts (see Wilks 1993, 
80). The contemporary Asante usually mention the following eight: Oyoko, Bretuo, Asene, 
Aduana, Ekuona, Asona, Agona, and Asakyiri. 
4
 There is no constituted national hierarchy of matriclans. Their relationship should rather 
be seen as complementary in terms of their mythical contributions to society and the offices 
vested in their lineages. For instance, the ancestors of the Asakyiri clan are considered to be 
the first people who built houses, while the ancestors of the Aduana clan were the first ones 
to put out fires. Similarly, although the fact that the office of the Asantehene is vested in a 
certain lineage of the Oyoko clan is a source of pride for every Oyoko person and lineage in 
the country, there are important and powerful offices vested in other clans as well, whose 
members are equally proud of them. Accordingly, many people, at least of the older 
generations, know which stools are vested in the lineages of their clans and take interest in 
their affairs. 
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political authorities since the decisive criterion for citizenship in a chiefdom 
is “membership, by right of birth, of one’s mother’s matrilineal lineage” 
(ibid.,145-146) and “all transactions of a political or juridical nature” are 
conducted through the lineage heads (ibid., 163). Politically the most 
important corporate possession of the lineage is the stool, the office, vested 
in it (ibid., 165).5 The corporate character of the Asante matrilineage will be 
discussed extensively later; at this point it is sufficient to say that Fortes 
(ibid., 183) considered it to be the primary segment of the Asante political 
structure.  
Rights to offices, land, and property are transmitted through the line 
of matrilineal descent. According to Fortes it is a “fixed principle of Ashanti 
social structure” that at death every person must have an heir and successor. 
What is actually inherited is a jural status, which is “anchored in a person, 
labelled by kinship terms, and represented in material possessions which can 
be passed on” (ibid., 173). This idea is more or less identical to the notion of 
positional succession.6 Men are in most cases succeeded by their nephews 
and brothers, and women by their daughters and sisters. The basic unit of 
inheritance is the minimal lineage (]yafunu koro), which Fortes also called 
the “nuclear and paradigmatic descent unit” within the larger maximal 
lineage. The household (afie, sing. ]fie) is usually built around a minimal 
lineage (ibid., 169-175). In terms of the relations between close matrilineal 
kin, Fortes had his focus on mother-child, sibling, and uncle-nephew 
relations. His description emphasized the warmth and intimacy of the first 
two and the formality and strained nature of the last (Fortes 1962, 263-264, 
270-276). The relationships within the lineage are regulated “by law and 
sanctioned by the deified jural authority projected in ancestor worship” 
(Fortes 1963, 60). 
Patrifiliation, in contrast, confers membership in a nt]r] division, 
which does not constitute a corporate group like the matrilineage, but rather 
a ritual category, members of which share a specific weekday for rituals 
                                                 
5
 The stool (akonnua, pl. nkonnua) is the material symbol of every office. Thus offices are 
usually referred to by using the term “stool”. 
6
 This parallel with the Central African materials, such as Audrey Richards’ (e.g. 1962) 
work on the Bemba of Zambia, was recognized by Fortes (1969a, 173) himself. Elsewhere 
Fortes (1975) discusses both kinship statuses and offices as instances of “corporation sole” 
as defined by H. S. Maine (1861). However, Marilyn Strathern (1985, 199) has pointed out 
that the notion of kinship roles as “miniature offices” bestowed with rights and obligations 
regarding people and property is characteristic of West African (and presumably Central 
African) societies. Hence status devolution, or what she calls a holder/heir model, is not 
necessarily a good analytical metaphor for discussing kinship in other societies.   
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connected to nt]r], certain avoidances and names, and a formal salutation.7 
There are nine divisions and they are divided further into several 
subdivisions (McCaskie 1995a, 170-173). In terms of shared bodily 
substances, nt]r] is considered to be transmitted by semen in sexual 
intercourse, and also by saliva, which is put into an infant’s mouth by 
his/her father or paternal grandfather in a name-giving ceremony. Whether 
the nt]r] divisions are (or were) exogamous has been matter of dispute: 
Fortes claims that the boundaries of the category of unmarriageable 
patrilateral relatives are defined by demonstrable genealogical connections 
and not by shared nt]r] as such, whereas Rattray (1955, 45) states the 
opposite. The fact that the beliefs and practices associated with nt]r] were 
already dying out in Fortes’ time has made it difficult to study it (Fortes 
1962, 265). Nowadays, most people do not know to which nt]r] division 
they belong and some are not even familiar with the concept. However, the 
nt]r] affiliation remains an important matter for the chiefs and royals who 
continue to perform the rituals connected to nt]r].  
According to Fortes, patrifiliation does not guarantee politico-jural 
rights like membership in a lineage does.8 It rather forms a basis for a 
personally meaningful and rewarding relationship (Fortes 1963, 66-67). 
Ideally, children, and sons in particular, should live and spend as much time 
as possible with their fathers, who are responsible for their “moral training” 
during their formative years. After this they may join their own lineage kin. 
Fortes emphasized the father’s lack of legal authority, although he has the 
right to instruct and discipline his children. He concluded that the tie 
between the father and his children is primarily an affectionate one, 
regulated by personal conscience. The father is able to express moral 
goodness by making material gifts to his children even though there are no 
binding obligations to do so, and conversely, his children support their 
father in his old age although it is not explicitly their duty (Fortes 1962, 
268-269). Instead of jural norms, patrilateral relationships are “regulated by 
inter-personal moral bonds and sanctioned by beliefs about the mystical 
components of personality” (Fortes 1963, 60). 
                                                 
7
 According to McCaskie (1995a, 170), the most important nt]r] rituals are the “blessing of 
the mouth” with water and the “washing”, i.e., purification, of one’s kra. Some nt]r] rituals 
were recorded by Rattray (1955, 50-54). 
8
 However, patrifiliation can form a basis for “quasi-citizenship” in one’s father’s 
chiefdom. This is done by voluntarily accepting certain political obligations, e.g., payment 
of levies imposed by the chief. Nonetheless, a “quasi-citizen” is not eligible to inherit 
offices or property of his/her father’s lineage nor can he/she transmit his/her status to 
his/her offspring (Fortes 1959a, 208).  
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Superficially, the criteria that define relationships between individuals 
within the descent group as hierarchical or equal are clear-cut. Seniority of 
generation, age, rank or office command respect. Conversely, equivalence in 
the same categories permits familiarity (Fortes 1969a, 192). However, it 
does not follow that by applying these criteria one would be able to grade all 
the members of a given descent group in any definite way. For instance, it is 
not at all rare that a woman has a junior brother who is younger in age than 
her eldest son. So, in terms of generational seniority, the one having a junior 
status of a nephew is actually older than the one with the senior status of an 
uncle. In these cases the young uncle is often quick to point out that “I’m 
actually X’s uncle”, while the elder nephew, of course, acknowledges the 
existing relationship, but is still likely to add that “it is not so important in 
our case, because I’m older than Y”. These same ideas about seniority apply 
also to other relatives outside one’s own lineage and the same kinds of 
contradictions occur. In terms of patrikin, one frequently runs into a 
classificatory father (FB) who is younger than his classificatory son (BS) 
and they both respond with the same kind of unease if their formal 
relationship is brought up.9 However, when it comes to everyday life, the 
two might have grown up together and hence they tend to treat each other as 
siblings. A man in his late twenties described to me his relationship with his 
father’s brother, roughly the same age, by saying that “even though he is not 
my brother, we are very close. Sometimes I even begin to think that he is 
closer to me than Z [speaker’s brother next after him in age]”. However, 
respect is not merely a question of status, and this did not go unnoticed by 
Fortes (ibid., 192), who recognized that authority and influence also 
command respect. But it has to be understood that they too can contradict or 
be contradicted by the status of the person in question. For example, the 
lastborn of a set of siblings, who has earned a fortune as a migrant worker, a 
burger,10 might become virtually treated as the head of the sibling group, a 
                                                 
9
 According to Fortes (1969a, 192-193) the Asante terminological system “follows the 
usual Crow-type rules of classificatory generalization”. I think it has to be added that the 
Asante system does not have the same terminological disregard for the generational 
differences in ego’s father’s matrilineage as it is usually the case in a “textbook” Crow 
system. Nonetheless, as Harry Basehart (1962, 293) very fittingly points out, there is an 
extensive set of alternative terms, which “introduces varied possibilities in the concrete 
application of terms by a given ego, possibly in accordance with shifts in the social 
situation”.  
10
 Burger [b]g] is a very widely used Ghanaian slang word meaning a person who has 
travelled overseas. Its etymology supposedly goes back to the 1960’s and 1970’s when 
many Ghanaians migrated to Germany, especially to Hamburg and its environs. 
Consequently, all emigrants regardless of their destination are called burgers, short for 
Hamburgers. In Ghanaian folk imagery a burger is often seen as a frivolous spender who 
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position normally held by the firstborn, but that does not, strictly speaking, 
change his place in the line of succession. Or an uncle who has squandered 
his fortune on alcohol, extramarital affairs, or unwise business deals is 
treated with the formal respect due to his status by his adult nephews, but in 
practice his opinion or advice, which in normal circumstances would be 
crucial, do not count. Although the basic principles that define hierarchy and 
equality are the same within both lineage kin and patrikin, their social 
significance differs. In Fortes’ terms, they are operative in different 
domains. Broadly speaking, seniority in terms of generation and/or age can 
be decisive when offices and property are inherited within the matrilineage, 
whereas within the patrikin its importance is limited to giving and receiving 
formal respect in social intercourse. 
As Fortes’ critics have pointed out, his analytical approach resulted 
in a two-dimensional view of Asante kinship, namely in a tendency to 
define all bilateral relations necessarily, and completely, familial and 
descent relations above all political. Thus entire categories of social 
relationships, and not their elements or aspects, are assigned to one or the 
other structural domain (Yanagisako 1987, 113). For instance, the following 
quote seems to suggest that a man’s relationship to his own children is 
exclusively familial and to his sister’s children primarily political: 
 
An Ashanti father’s model field of kinship relations has two parts. 
On the one side is his wife and children, on the other a sister and her 
children, the two being residentially separated. In relation to his 
children he conducts himself solely in accordance with norms of the 
familial domain. These entitle him, for example, to chastise his 
children if they misbehave. In relation to his sister’s children his 
behaviour is ruled more strictly by reference to the politico-jural 
domain, the source of his lawful rights and duties towards them. This 
corresponds to a field of social relations that extends beyond the 
domestic field – it includes his lineage, the village political 
authorities, and the chiefdom of which he is a citizen (Fortes 1969a, 
98). 
 
Consequently, Fortes saw that this duality was also responsible for “the 
chief problem of kinship relations” among the Asante, which was the 
adjustment of “moral claims and bonds arising out of marriage and 
                                                                                                                            
has adopted the Western life style. His counterpart, a local guy, is poor and ignorant of the 
ways of the world. Ulf Hannerz (1992, 228-229) reports similar ideas in Nigeria. 
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fatherhood to those imposed by matrilineal kinship” (1962, 283). Hence 
although a person’s social relationships are neatly classified under two 
“sections”, it also follows that a person’s social life is characterized by the 
diverse obligations coming from these “sections”. Fortes’ own favourite 
example was a man’s controversial double status as an uncle and a father, 
which meant that he had to care for both his sister’s and his own children so 
that neither of them would be neglected or favoured. He had to be both a 
law-abiding uncle and a morally good father. In practice, living up to this 
ideal proved troublesome. Hence, the duality of relations implied both 
complementarity and conflict.  
 
 
2.3 Marriages of men, women, and offices 
 
2.3.1 Marriage as a process 
 
The critics of Kinship and the Social Order were puzzled by its rather casual 
dismissal of so-called alliance theory (e.g., Kuper 1972, 290). However, 
Fortes himself had made it clear earlier that in creating and consolidating 
inter-group relations marriages are of secondary importance. He maintained 
that a social structure based on an association of exogamous corporate 
unilineal descent groups cannot hold together in a stable political system 
unless there is some sort of overruling centralized government or it “is knit 
together in the field of dyadic social relations by a web of kinship ties that 
counterbalance the centrifugal tendencies of the descent groups”. The 
principal social mechanism producing these ties is complementary filiation 
and not marriage (Fortes 1959, 209). To put it in a simpler way, it is the 
birth of children to parents from different groups and not the exchange of 
women between groups that brings the groups together. Although Fortes, of 
course, understood that without mating there cannot be filiation and 
succession of generations, he still insisted that kinship creates an 
“involuntary, perpetual, and inescapable bond of complete mutuality” based 
ultimately on prescriptive altruism, whereas marriages and affinal relations 
in general are characterized by “norms and institutions of contract, of 
obligatory exchange, of credit and debt, of sexual love, of nominally 
voluntary choice and terminability, by the spouses or those who have jural 
control over them” (Fortes 1972, 293). In short, kinship transcends the 
realm of free choice of human beings and is thus axiomatic, while marriages 
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are merely agreements made (and unmade) by people and thus “artificial”, 
as Fortes once put it (ibid.).  
One can also see an interesting parallel between Fortes’ lack of 
interest in marriage alliances and the way he perceived the Asante marriage 
as “a bundle of separable rights and bonds rather than as a unitary all-or-
none tie” (Fortes 1962, 280). It is my understanding also that, among the 
Asante, to be married legitimately does not depend so much on any legal 
rules about marriage, but rather on the man’s capacity and compliance to 
carry out the duties of a husband and father and the woman’s to perform 
those of a wife and mother. Any customary or civil formalities are seen as 
secondary.11 Similarly, in her study of Kumase market women Clark (1994, 
344) noted that her informants saw marriage as a process rather than as an 
event or a state of being. The appearance of regular allowances from the 
side of the man and preparation of daily meals by the woman “marked the 
beginning of marriage as a socially recognized pairing” and their ending 
marked the termination of that relationship (ibid.). Hence common-law 
marriages, mpena aware (lit. lovers’ marriage), are ordinary among the 
Asante and they are not considered to bring any social stigma upon the 
people involved (cf. Fortes 1963, 59).12 
According to Fortes the decisive formality that establishes a legal 
marriage (aware) is the giving of tiri nsa (lit. head drink), which consists of 
liquor and/or a sum of money. It is handed over by the head of the 
husband’s lineage to the head of the bride’s lineage, after which it is 
distributed between the bride’s father and members of both lineages 
witnessing the transaction. The husband may also personally distribute some 
customary gifts to the bride, her parents, uncle, lineage elder, and sometimes 
to certain deities and charms. The payment of tiri nsa guarantees the 
husband exclusive sexual rights over his wife, legal paternity of the children 
born in that marriage, and rights to essential domestic and economic 
services. Conversely, the man is obliged to provide his wife and their 
                                                 
11
 This is not to say that the rules are unimportant. In certain situations, for instance, when 
claiming compensatory damages for adultery, the jural context of the relationship becomes 
crucial (e.g., Rattray 1929, 24). Judging adultery cases was one of the main responsibilities 
of chiefs during the pre-colonial and colonial periods (e.g., Vellenga 1983). Although, by 
Ghanaian national law, the jurisdiction of chiefs in these matters has been restricted 
nowadays, they still have a role in arbitrating adultery cases in accordance with “native 
customary law”.  
12
 However, prolonged and casual courtship might lead to speculations on the “real” status 
of the union by outsiders and also by the two parties involved. A friend of mine told me 
that he had visited an acquaintance in a house, which was not his permanent home. In the 
house he met a woman, who was preparing a meal for them, and the man introduced her as 
his wife. When the woman heard this, she responded angrily: “Since when have I been your 
wife?” 
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children food and clothing (and also housing in case of patrilocal or 
neolocal marriages). He has to take care of her in case of illness, be able to 
satisfy her sexually, and take responsibility for her debts. Constant failure to 
fulfil the marital duties on the part of either husband or wife gives ground 
for divorce, which both parties are entitled to demand. In case of divorce, 
tiri nsa is returned to the husband’s lineage, but other customary gifts 
presented by the husband are not returnable (Fortes 1962, 280-281). 
Fortes (1970, 7-8) concluded that in the case of the Asante “the usual 
ethnographic method of describing domestic organization is not applicable” 
and thus “such ‘blanket’ terms as patrilocal and matrilocal are quite 
useless”. Nevertheless, some “blanket terms” have been applied by others. 
Rattray (1929, 22) spoke of patrilocal marriage, but elsewhere he described 
some practices that he considered survivals of matrilocal marriage (Rattray 
1955, 229). Clark (1994, 104) claims that “the classic Asante marriage” is 
duolocal, but in practical terms “women can legitimately live with a wide 
range of kin, including mothers, fathers, uncles, brothers, sisters, aunts, and 
children, as well as with husbands”. My own observations confirm Fortes’ 
conclusion. Although I did not conduct a household survey or anything like 
that, it became very evident during my fieldwork that real life residential 
patterns are extremely diverse and complex and reducing them to a single 
rule of post-marital residence would not be justifiable even as a sweeping 
generalization.13 This same observation could be made both in urban and 
rural settings. Hence, instead of concentrating very closely on the residence 
rules, the anthropologists (especially Fortes) have stressed the fact that 
marriage does not at any rate undermine a woman’s (or her children’s) 
politico-jural status, which is tied to her lineage and chiefdom. This is the 
case even in patrilocal marriages, where the wife moves to her husband’s 
place of residence, but does not lose her membership in her natal lineage or, 
in case of inter-chiefdom marriage, her “citizenship”. For example, Rattray 
(1929, 22) wrote that the wife’s “position (apart from the contract which she 
has entered) appears to be one of almost complete isolation and 
independence, among strangers, for the very children she may bear will not 
belong to her new lord [i.e., husband]”.  
                                                 
13
 Some of the existing forms are quite hard to fit into any of the basic rules identified by 
anthropologists. For example, as Katherine Abu (1983, 160) has also noticed, one of the 
most desirable arrangements among the contemporary Asante is when a husband sets up a 
new place for his wife (and their children), but he himself goes to live in another place of 
his own choice. This is certainly something other than duolocality or neolocality as they are 
commonly understood. 
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Asante marriage is constrained by the concept of incest (mogyadee and 
atwebenefie).14 Those unmarried men and women who are forbidden as 
sexual partners are also prohibited as spouses. Most importantly, this relates 
to members of the same matrilineage. Strictly speaking, the prohibition 
extends to the matriclan throughout Asante and all the other Akan peoples 
sharing the same clan system. On the paternal side marriage is prohibited 
with any “patrilineal descendant” of one’s great grandfather (Fortes 1962, 
278-279). Polygyny is admitted, and customarily it is an obligation for 
chiefs and traditional priests. In the case of ordinary men, the husband needs 
his wife’s (or wives’) approval before taking a new wife. As for affinal 
relatives, one’s wife’s real and classificatory sisters in the same lineage are 
prohibited as new wives (Fortes 1963, 63). Nowadays, male attitudes 
towards polygyny are becoming increasingly unenthusiastic. The young 
men I talked to said that they would never enter a polygynous marriage 
because “it’s too expensive”, but added that in principle “a man should have 
the right to marry as many women as he wants to, if he can afford to take 
care of them”. Those women interviewed by Clark (1994, 342) in the 1980’s 
saw polygyny as “a serious threat to their economic and personal interests” 
and considered co-wives always as competitors and not as helpers or 
confidants. However, many people I know who have grown up in 
polygynous households have close relationships to all of their father’s wives 
and deny that the relations between the co-wives were ever particularly 
strained. 
In spatial terms, the ideal match is a man or a woman from the same 
locality. According to Fortes’ field survey in 1945, more than 75 % of 
married persons had their spouses from the same or adjacent village (1962, 
279). One can see two main reasons for such a loose kind of village 
endogamy. First, by marrying within a close distance women avoid 
separation from their matrilineal relatives, and men will be able to stay close 
to their children, even if they have moved to live with their uncles after the 
formative years. Second, as Fortes put it, “the character and family 
background are known” by both parties involved and consequently they are 
likely to be saved any unpleasant surprises in the future (ibid.). Nowadays, 
this spatial preference is compromised, but not replaced, by the growing 
                                                 
14
 The term mogyadee refers simply to sexual intercourse with a “blood relative”, i.e., those 
of the same abusua. The term atwebenefie is more problematic since it entails sexual 
relations with patrilateral relatives but also with the spouses of certain persons with whom 
one has close social relationships (including both relatives and non-relatives), and hence, as 
Rattray (1929, 304-306) noted, in many cases it has more to do with adultery than incest. 
More recently, this distinction has been discussed by Françoise Héretier (1999, 160-170).  
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desire, especially among young people in urban areas, to live and work 
abroad. Therefore, I am told, the burgers are the hottest items in the 
contemporary marriage market.15 For most of the male emigrants that I 
spoke with the “perfect wife” came roughly from the same locality where 
they had grown up (or otherwise considered home) and had a recognized, 
acceptable family background.  So, in all, one could say that the 
endogamous aspect has these days more to do with social and cultural 
familiarity than physical distance. 
In genealogical terms, the most desirable spouse has customarily 
been a real or classificatory cross-cousin from either side. This is not the 
preference of the couple but of the senior men, mother’s brothers and 
fathers, who traditionally have the final say in these contracts, although it 
has to be kept in mind that “all parental kin have rights and interests in the 
married partners, and therefore have a voice in the match” (Fortes 1969a, 
213). The members of the parental generation defend these unions on 
various grounds, but very often the reasons have to do with expediency in 
distributing and transmitting property and wealth (Fortes 1962, 281-282). 
Similarly, Fortes’ own view on the two forms of cross-cousin marriage was 
very pragmatic. He concluded that whichever of these two forms “proves 
most convenient or feasible in a given case, it is initiated by parents and 
uncles and permits them to fulfil a major paternal duty without doing 
violence to avuncular obligations” (Fortes 1969a, 214). So, even though 
there are marked differences between the two forms of marriage, they still 
have basically the same function of reconciling the conflicting claims 
arising from the two fields of kinship. For instance, in the case of a 
matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, an uncle is able to make sure that his 
daughter has a decent husband in his nephew, and since he is also his 
possible successor the inheritance left behind will indirectly benefit his 
daughter as well. Similarly, a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage gives a 
father an assurance that his son has a good wife in his niece and that when 
he gives material gifts to his son he is not neglecting his sister’s children 
because the gifts will be at least partly shared by his niece, now also a 
daughter-in-law. However, already in Fortes’ time many young people saw 
this form of marriage as unattractive because they felt that cross-cousins are 
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 Many young men who wanted to migrate told me that one of the main objectives, 
alongside with getting rich, was the attainment of “burger status”, which would eventually 
help them in the marriage market. When they returned home, they could “choose anyone at 
all”. However, those who really had travelled and returned home often complained that 
finding “a nice girl to marry” had actually become more difficult because, according to 
them, there are so many women “who just want to use you in order to get a visa or 
residential permit and then leave you”.  
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more like full siblings than prospective spouses. In Fortes’ survey only 8 % 
of all married women were or had once been married to a cross-cousin and 
consequently he saw this as an indication that young people were becoming 
more able to choose their spouses independently (Fortes 1962, 282). The 
impression that I got is that the young people of the urban areas are likely to 
marry later in life and they are also less dependent on (but certainly not 
indifferent to!) the wishes of their parents and uncles, whereas in the 
villages the marriages tend to follow the traditional pattern more closely.16 
 
 
2.3.2 Keeping the great names 
 
In addition to these practicalities brought up by Fortes, there is one aspect of 
the cross-cousin marriages that has fascinated many anthropologists. This 
debate was launched by Rattray who had tried to explain “cross-cousin 
marriage and its particular relationship to the social organization of the 
Ashanti, by metaphysical beliefs” (Lévi-Strauss 1969, 111).17 Rattray’s 
proposal was based on the observation that people are thought to be able to 
reincarnate through a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Quite simply, when 
a man’s son (sharing his nt]r]) marries his niece (sharing his mogya or 
abusua through his sister), their children will bear exactly the same 
inherited components of blood and spirit as the paternal grandfather. In 
these instances the grandson is considered as a possible reincarnation (kra 
pa, “good soul”) of the grandfather (see Figure 1). After his death the 
grandfather becomes an ancestor and he is believed to be able to born again 
in his descendants who combine both matrilineal and patrilineal elements of 
his person.18 Exactly how, when, and how many times the actual 
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 As for cross-cousin marriages, it is difficult to say anything certain about their popularity 
nowadays. All I can say is that the structural problems that the cross-cousin marriages are 
supposed to address are still there, although not in such a critical form as in Fortes’ days. 
Similarly, I imagine that in small villages with effective endogamous tendencies cross-
cousins would be highly valued as marriage partners. However, this is merely my own 
guesswork and more extensive research would be needed in order to give a more accurate 
picture.  
17
 The other major anthropological debate is whether the Asante have a double descent 
system. It has been reviewed by others (e.g., Goody 1969, 106-111) and I do not see any 
reason to take it up here. 
18
 I cannot see any reason why these same principles should not apply to women as well, 
and hence in Figure 1 granddaughter Aa could be a reincarnation of her maternal 
grandmother Aa. But since senior men contracted the cross-cousin marriages and they were 
seen predominantly as the business of male officeholders, I am referring here to men only. 
Nevertheless, I disagree with Luc de Heusch (1981, 69-70) who suggests that nt]r] 
constitutes a case of “the regime of masculine sex affiliation” and thus does not concern 
women. Although nt]r] is transmitted only by men, it is not transmitted only to men. 
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reincarnation is thought to occur is a complicated question and different 
interpretations are based on a variety of ideas concerning the qualities and 
interrelationship of mogya, nt]r], kra, and sunsum (e.g., Kurankyi-Taylor 
1951, 172). Nevertheless, my own understanding is that the possibility of 
rebirth is not restricted to the paternal grandfather and grandson relationship 
and it may take place in later generations as well, provided that there is a 
conformity of mogya and nt]r] between the person and the ancestor who he 
personifies.19 It is only that this particular form of marriage creates offspring 
in the grandchildren’s generation who are ideal for reincarnation.  
However, Rattray argued that the same idea of reincarnation was 
also behind the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage even though 
contemporary evidence did not support this claim. The whole argument was 
based on his hypothesis that a dual organization had previously existed in 
Asante. He referred to certain oral traditions claiming that all communities 
had started as pairs of men and women, who lived in isolation and hence did 
not marry from any other group or place. In the long run these groups kept 
on growing until there were “a great many people who belonged to one or 
other of the two clans, and one or other of the two ntoro” (Rattray 1959, 
328).20 Accordingly, as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969, 107) puts it, a double 
dichotomy of the social group was established. In such a case, if similar 
rules of exogamy prevailed,21 there would not be any difference concerning 
the “direction” of marriages; both patrilateral and matrilateral cross-cousin 
marriages would produce male and female “duplicates” of (some of) the 
grandparents.22 Finally, the groups started to expand and found other groups 
                                                                                                                            
Women inherit it from their fathers just as the men do and they also need it in order to exist 
as “whole persons”. 
19
 For instance, the present Asantehene Osei Tutu II is often said to be the reincarnation of 
the first Asantehene Osei Tutu. I have heard a number of stories that testify of the change in 
kingly persona. In these stories people who knew the king “as a young man” are surprised 
to meet him “as a completely different kind of man” after he has been installed to the 
office. In this case, there are ten generations between the ancestor and his reincarnation, and 
hence the status as a reincarnation of the first king is not seen to result directly from any 
single marriage, but rather from a new relationship to the ancestor established in the 
installation rituals. 
20
 According to Rattray (1929, 66-67), the Asante matriclans were formerly divided into 
two intermarrying moieties that had been afterwards merged into each other, and the name 
of one or the other moiety had come to represent the clan as a whole. Thus, for instance, the 
Bretuo clan was originally “a twin clan”, supposedly named Bretuo ne Tena, “Bretuo and 
Tena”, signifying its dual character. The relatedness between the Bretuo and Tena is still 
acknowledged, e.g., the Okwawuhene, a non-Asante paramount chief from the Tena clan, is 
considered to be a brother to the Mamponhene, who is Bretuo. 
21
 It has to be kept in mind that Rattray considered the nt]r] divisions to be exogamous and 
that same view was adopted by his critics also. 
22
 In Figure 1 a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage between son Ab and daughter Ca would 
not create a possible reincarnation of anyone in the previous generation. However, in a dual 
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to marry. This led to the disintegration of the dual organization and the 
locally bound isolated intermarrying descent groups were incorporated into 
a single exogamous group, members of which started to marry from new, 
previously unknown groups (Rattray 1959, 328). Ever since, Rattray (ibid., 
330-331) insisted, there has been no “true dual organization”, and that has 
resulted in a “curious anomaly”, where the abusua and nt]r] “can come 
back independently of any special combination”, except when a patrilateral 
cross-cousin marriage is arranged by two parties. Rattray’s critics, namely 
Brenda Seligman (1925) and later Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]), did not pay 
much attention to his evolutionary hypothesis, and concluded that “the 
dialectic of the ntoro and of the abusua would entail the marriage of 
bilateral cross-cousins only if each category comprised two and only two 
exogamous groups”, but this was not the case among the contemporary 
Asante, who had “an indefinite number of clans and ntoro”. Hence, “the 
metaphysical necessity of reincarnation through alternate generations” could 
only be met by the patrilateral type (Lévi-Strauss 1969, 111-112). So, for 
Rattray the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage remained some sort of a 
survival from times immemorial, whereas for the rest it constituted a 
dilemma, which had to be solved by using other approaches (Heusch 1981, 
68-70). Whether such dual organization described by Rattray really existed 
in pre-historic Asante is not important here. What concerns me are the ways 
in which these two forms of marriages allocate so-called great names, which 
connect individuals and descent groups to noble ancestry both matrilineally 
and patrilineally. 
The Asante themselves express the significance of the patrilateral 
cross-cousin marriage with names. A child is named by a man who belongs 
to the same nt]r] division. Usually that person is his/her father or 
grandfather. In the case of a boy, he might be named after his father, father’s 
brother, grandfather, etc. In general, it can be said that the names used are 
those of his patrilineal ancestors and are thus considered to belong to the 
nt]r] division (or sub-division) in question.23 Some of the names that are 
                                                                                                                            
organization, this would happen. If granduncle Aa would have married his brother-in-law 
Bb’s sister, his nephew Ab’s matrilateral cross-cousin marriage with his daughter (in that 
case Ba) would produce “duplicates” of grandfather Bb and his sister (Aa’s wife). Hence, 
the difference between patrilateral and matrilateral marriages would merely depend on 
one’s point of view.   
23
 This applies to the so-called ancestral names. It has to be kept in mind that the Asante 
name their children after many other things too and therefore a person usually has several 
names. A person uses one of his/her names in everyday social intercourse, while the others 
are kept “in the box” (adaka mu) and brought up in some special occasions. Although the 
contemporary Asante, for the most part, are not familiar with the beliefs and practices 
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used are known as great names (aboadenfo], sing. aboadeni). They have 
belonged to chiefs, war heroes, great accumulators of wealth, and other 
prominent persons in the past. Naming children after them is not merely a 
way of commemorating their great deeds, but also the “admirable 
characteristics displayed by such persons were understood as accreted 
properties of the nt]r]” and they might be reincarnated in their patrilineal 
descendants (McCaskie 1995a, 172). 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Inheritance of abusua and nt]r] in a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. 
Legend:  
A, B, and C signify membership in an exogamous matrilineal descent group (abusua).  
a, b, and c signify membership in a patrilineal ritual division (nt]r]).  
Grandfather Aa and his reincarnation, grandson Aa, are marked with dotted line. 
 
When Rattray (1959, 324) enquired about the justification for patrilateral 
marriage from his informants he was told that “[i]f my niece does not marry 
my son, but marries a man not of my ntou (ntoro), then I cannot call any of 
her children after myself or my ancestors”. To put it in another way, if a 
                                                                                                                            
associated with nt]r], the idea of the father naming his children and the name coming from 
patrilineal ancestry is still valid.  
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man wishes to name his successor, i.e., his male matrilineal descendant, 
after himself or his patrilineal ancestors, it requires that they both share the 
same nt]r], which is possible only between a grandfather and grandson 
produced by a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Through such a marriage 
the predecessor may pass on, along with his status, office, and property, also 
his name, the admirable qualities of his nt]r], and furthermore, be secure 
that he himself may reincarnate in his successor. Hence, it follows that the 
patrilateral cross-cousin marriage is the primary technique by which 
patrilineally inherited great names can be given to matrilineal descendants 
and thus kept in the matrilineages. To put it more figuratively, it is a way of 
directing flows of matrilineal and patrilineal nobility along the same 
channel.  
 
The reason given for making cross-cousin marriages may now be 
analysed in detail. The majority give as the reason for these 
marriages the desire ‘to bring back certain names’. When the family 
group was centre of the social world, the uncle, who was its head, 
wanted his name to be perpetuated; later the uncle became the chief, 
and still later the king, and names came more than ever to mean a 
link with the aristocracy. A clan [i.e., matrilineage] is therefore not 
anxious to lose any names, and (…) family arrangements are 
necessary to ensure that no loss takes place (Rattray 1959, 323). 
 
Therefore, it is not only that the great names of a particular nt]r] division 
make the division itself noble,24 but also (some of) these names become 
associated with lineages since famous lineage ancestors once carried them 
and were able to pass them on to their matrilineal descendants. In terms of 
succession to an office, a candidate’s name and his nt]r] affiliation 
differentiate him from the rest of the candidates, who might be equally 
eligible in terms of matriliny. So, in this sense the names are things, which 
should be kept away from the sphere of exchange, because they affirm the 
differences of identity between groups and individual within groups. At the 
same time the names connect them to their origins (Godelier 1999, 200). For 
example, in case of the office of the Asantehene, a candidate has to be a 
member of a particular lineage of the Oyoko clan, preferably carrying the 
                                                 
24
 There is no constituted hierarchy of the nt]r] divisions, but precedence is claimed by 
referring to the great names of the past officeholders who have belonged to the same 
division  (McCaskie 1995a, 170-172). 
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name of one of the former rulers, and thus belonging to the same nt]r] 
division.25   
Nonetheless, it has to be emphasized that the name itself or 
membership in a “famous” nt]r] division does not guarantee a candidate 
anything in the way that full membership in the matrilineage guarantees 
candidacy. Other candidates with “modest” names might have other virtues 
valued more by the electors (McCaskie 1995a, 172-173). Similarly, the 
great names are not considered great merely because they are associated 
with great ancestry. Every man has the potential to make his own name 
great. In fact, as a very prominent officeholder once put it, a “man was born 
to make name” and it was a huge misfortune if a man came to realize that 
“after his death his name might go into oblivion” (cited in Wilks 1975, 462). 
A pertinent historical example is Asantehene Kwaku Dua Panin, who was 
installed in 1834, and who was considered to have a “commoner’s name” 
and accordingly not fit for a king, but his supporters argued that he had a 
great name “in his own right”, notably because of his bravery in the battle of 
Katamanso against the British in 1826 (McCaskie 1995a, 189). After 
making his name and nt]r] great this way Kwaku Dua made every effort to 
pass both his name and the office of the Asantehene to one of his 
grandchildren by arranging marriages between his favourite sons and 
eligible royal women (ibid., 198). Kwaku Dua had hundreds of children, and 
only the selected few were to marry royal women, but eventually two of his 
grandsons were installed as kings, namely Kwaku Dua Kuma and Kwaku 
Dua III, who later became better known as Akwasi Agyeman Prempe 
(McCaskie 1980, 199-200). 
On the whole, it appears that among the royals patrilateral cross-
cousin marriages were practised indifferently and they were not perpetuated 
one generation after another according to any strict rules about the sons of 
chiefs (or kings) marrying royal women. In his study of the marriages of the 
Asante queen mothers Rattray constantly ran into “incorrect marriages” or 
“mésalliances” that introduced new nt]r] elements and ancestral names to 
the royal lineage. In actual fact, he discovered that only three out of the nine 
queen mothers whose conjugal relations he had studied had entered a 
“correct marriage” (Rattray 1959, 321-325). This “spoiling” of nt]r], as 
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 For instance, the late Asantehene Opoku Ware II, who passed away in 1999, belonged to 
the Asafodee subdivision of Bosommuru nt]r] and the “greatest name” mentioned in his 
case is the second Asantehene Opoku Ware, to whom he is patrilineally connected through 
Akyempemhene Adusei Kra, Dwansahene Opoku Tano, Gyakyehene Kwadwo Adusei, 
Bepoahene Amankwa Boko, Kwame Adusei of Gyakye, and Gyakye Abontemdomhene 
Kwadwo Adusei (Wilks 1995, 4). 
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Rattray called it, did not result from failed marriage plans or anything like 
that, but merely from the fact that royal women were not obliged to marry 
their matrilateral cross-cousins and so produce reincarnations of past kings 
as perfect rulers-to-be. Hence, the chiefly lineages never really had any 
“caste-like aspect”, as Edmund Leach (1968, 25) erroneously assumed. For 
instance, T. E. Bowdich, an officer of the British African Company, who led 
an expedition to Asante in 1817, wrote that 
 
[t]he sisters of the King may marry or intrigue with whom they 
please, provided he be an eminently strong or personable man; that 
the heirs of the stool may be, at least, personably superior to the 
generality of their countrymen (Bowdich 1966, 254). 
 
Instead of following prescriptive marriage rules, the unions of royal women 
often served political ends so that they were meant to confirm alliances 
between polities (Wilks 1975, 327-344). For example, after the first 
Asantehene Osei Tutu had incorporated the chiefdom of Amakom to the 
capital Kumase and killed Amakomhene Akosa Yiadom, the successor of the 
latter married Osei Tutu’s niece Asantehemaa Nyako Kusi Amoa and was 
thus able to establish an important affinal (and later patrilateral) link to his 
new overlord’s lineage (see Figure 10). In this case the husband and wife 
were certainly not cross-cousins and, what is more important, this 
arrangement was unique. When I discussed it with the present Amakomhene 
he made it very clear that such marriage has not become customary and, 
correspondingly, he did not remember that anyone of the Amakom royals 
would have married from there ever since. However, the second Asantehene 
Opoku Ware was a product of this marriage and it was through this single 
transaction that the names of the Asafodee subdivision of Bosommuru nt]r] 
were introduced to the ruling lineage of Kumase, kept there ever since, and 
considered to be among the noblest names in Asante.   
As is evident in the above, patrilateral cross-cousin marriages were 
particularly important to the kings and chiefs. Through such unions they 
were able to perpetuate their reign beyond their own demise, and 
respectively, “office holders, and the Asantehene above all, were looked to 
atavistically in relation to their” great names (McCaskie 1995a, 172). The 
patrilateral marriage as a chiefly marriage served also as a starting point for 
Heusch’s explanation for the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. He claimed 
that the two types of marriages “stem from two different ideologies and can 
certainly not be put on the same footing”. According to him they are 
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practiced on different “social levels”. The patrilateral type was practiced by 
“princely families”, whereas the matrilateral by “ordinary folk” (Heusch 
1981, 69). The former revolves around reincarnation, while the concept of 
nt]r] is “quite alien” to the latter. Instead, the latter type is associated with 
residence rules, or in the Asante case, with the variety of such rules. By 
referring to Lévi-Strauss’ (1969, 441) notion of disharmonic and harmonic 
regimes, Heusch (1981, 70) deduces that Asante as a matrilineal society has 
a “fluctuating residential regime that hesitates between virilocality and 
uxorilocality”. Similarly, due to uncertainty of the residence rules the 
system “oscillates between the disjunction of husband and wife and that of 
the siblings” (ibid., 69). Heusch suggests that through a matrilateral cross-
cousin marriage the Asante are able to stabilize their residential system, 
because in such cases post-marital residence becomes as fixed as possible 
(ibid., 69-70); the nephew lives with his uncle (and now father-in-law) and 
siblings, as he is expected, and the daughter is not likely to live elsewhere 
since two important men, her husband and father, live in the same place. In 
the patrilateral cross-cousin marriage this type of preservation of the 
conjugal cell is not probable, since the husband would have to leave his own 
lineage kin and move to his wife’s and father’s house, which is not very 
likely (cf. Fortes 1970, 19). Or, conversely, the wife would have to leave her 
uncle with the much-valued paternal grandchildren. This view is also 
confirmed by the fact that the standard answer provided by Rattray’s (1959, 
322) informants, when he asked the advantages of one’s nephew marrying 
one’s daughter, was “because it will keep my daughters in my house”. To 
my mind, this explanation adds relatively little to that already given by 
Fortes, according to which cross-cousin marriages are practised in order to 
balance the pressures arising from different fields of kinship. I do not see 
anything incorrect in Fortes’ or Heusch’s views on the functions of the 
matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, but I think their explanations as a whole 
remain half-finished. A fuller picture starts to emerge when the attention is 
turned to the actual matrilateral marriages of the chiefs. Contrary to 
Heusch’s theory, there is evidence suggesting that matrilateral cross-cousin 
marriage is very important for chiefs and nt]r] has everything to do with it.   
 
 
2.3.3 Distributing the great names 
 
In his critique of Rodney Needham’s (1969) distinction between 
prescriptive and preferential marriage systems, David Schneider (1969, 34) 
 30 
asserted that in the writings of alliance theorists it is difficult to distinguish 
between marriages as expressions of alliance and marriages creating 
alliances. Generally, it is understood that Lévi-Strauss followed Marcel 
Mauss in proposing that exchange between groups is “the basic mode of 
integration”. However, when Mauss spoke of total services he not only 
meant that exchanges took place between groups and not individuals, but 
also that the series of exchanges and the things exchanged in them all 
formed a total system of exchanges. For this reason there cannot be any 
single marriage, gift, or other mode of exchange that is more crucial or 
decisive than any other (ibid.). So, in order to paraphrase Mauss (1990, 5), 
the exchange of women is “only one feature of a much more general and 
enduring contract”. In such instances marital exchange between a wife-
giving and wife-taking group should be seen only as one expression of the 
structural principle of alliance. But according to Schneider, all marriages 
cannot be treated that way. In an opposite situation, if a husband represents 
one group and a wife another group, “and these two units are not already in 
a set or formal relationship to each other, then that particular marriage may 
create a bond and reiterate it in another way by the offspring of that union” 
(Schneider 1969, 57). In this case, one may speak of a marriage creating an 
alliance. I find this distinction very useful for analysing the different kinds 
of marriages of the Asante chiefs.  
Maybe because of Fortes’ rejection of marital exchange as an 
integrative social mechanism no one has really discussed the political 
significance of marriage alliances in Asante. Even one of Fortes’ staunchest 
critics, Leach (1968, 24-25), claimed that among the Asante marriage 
alliances do not serve political ends and, moreover, “there are no ‘relations 
of perpetual affinity’ which can serve to express enduring political relations 
of superordination and subordination”. However, he was wide of the mark 
and led to this conclusion by a rather selective reading of Rattray. On the 
contrary, marriage alliances do serve political ends in Asante, and moreover, 
one can make a relatively clear distinction between those marriages that 
create alliances and those that express them.   
In the above, I referred to the marriage between the chief of 
Amakom and the niece of Asantehene Osei Tutu as a tie that cemented the 
incorporation of the chiefdom of Amakom to Kumase. Most often, when the 
Asante discuss such marriages, it is the Asantehene who marries a woman 
from an allied or subordinate group. Accordingly, the successive 
Asantehene have married from the member chiefdoms of the Asante 
kingdom and other Akan and non-Akan tributaries in order to strengthen 
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and/or sanctify the alliance between the polities, and in some cases it is said 
that the chief or the whole polity in question is a wife to the Asantehene. 
Usually, it is only the affinal link once established that is preserved and 
commemorated in oral traditions, ritual, speech, and such things, but the 
alliance itself is not perpetuated by similar marriages in the succeeding 
generations. Such a marriage is known as adehyee aware, a union between 
two persons of freeborn descent,26 and Rattray (1929, 24) described it as 
“the highest or most desirable form of marriage”.27 It is exactly marriages of 
this type that create alliances between groups. One could now argue that 
even in this case the marriage is only an expression of the political alliance 
between the two chiefdoms, especially since it is said to strengthen or 
sanctify it. However, a political alliance is based on oaths exchanged by the 
rulers who represent their polities, whereas the marital exchange takes place 
between two kin groups (to which the rulers belong). Although the latter tie 
symbolizes the former, it does not mean that they belong to the same total 
system of exchanges. Hence, the two exchanges, although in conformity 
with each other, involve different sets of groups. The term adehyee aware is 
not restricted to marriages between chiefdoms, or to chiefs as such, and 
normally it refers to a conventional marriage between two freeborn persons. 
It is only that for chiefs it serves political ends. Marshall Sahlins (1985, 48) 
calls such chiefly ties “founding marriages”, which are characteristic of the 
system of positional succession. The statuses of husband and wife are 
inherited by the successors of the two officeholders that originally 
contracted the marriage that formed the alliance between the ruling groups. 
In these cases a single aristocratic marriage outweighs the multitude of 
commoner marriages, which are not considered significant in forming 
political alliances. As Sahlins points out, structures of this kind are not 
statistical; they are not expressions of “the empirical frequencies of 
interactions” (ibid.). This distinction is significant in the Asante case.   
The second form of marriage practised by the chiefs should be seen 
as an expression of alliance. In order to understand it fully, it is important to 
first take a brief look at the political structure of what Fortes calls a 
chiefdom (]man, pl. aman). By this he refers to the towns and villages, 
which are made up of mutually independent matrilineages of diverse clan 
origin. One of the component lineages is a ruling lineage, or royal lineage, 
of the chiefdom, whose position is based on the ancestral occupation of the 
                                                 
26
 This is in opposition to persons who descend from slaves. 
27
 Rattray (1929, 22-32) lists six different forms of marriage among the Asante. The two 
forms that I discuss in this passage I consider to be the politically significant ones.  
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land.28 The offices of the chief (]hene, pl. ahene) and the queen mother 
(]hemaa, pl. ahemaa) are vested in that lineage. The other component 
lineages are comprised of the descendants of those groups and individuals 
who have arrived later to the locality and who have been given permission 
to settle there by the ruling lineage. They are represented by divisional 
chiefs or the lineage heads (mpanyinfo], sing. ]panin) who have sworn an 
oath of allegiance (soaye) to the chief. Together they form a council of 
elders. The chiefly stool owns the soil (asase), whereas the members of the 
so-called commoner lineages have the right to “eat on the soil” (didi asase 
so), meaning that they can have their homes and farms on the land, and also 
hunt, fish, and make use of any collectable products of the forest. In return 
the chief is entitled to a part of the crop during the annual harvest festival 
and to a fixed share of the catch of the hunters and fishermen as well as 
other products of the forest. Customarily, he has the right to levy a wide 
range of taxes and mobilize his subjects for war or communal tasks (e.g., 
Fortes 1969a, 139-150).  
The structural relationship between the ruling lineage and the other 
member lineages of the chiefdom, as described by Fortes, is presented in a 
generalized form in Jack Goody’s typology of dynastic structures. In this 
royal descent group structure “the dynasty is but one of a number of similar 
groups” (Goody 1979, 46; see Figure 2). This implies that if for one reason 
or another the descent group holding the chiefly office is not able to 
function as a ruling lineage, any other lineage is structurally capable of 
taking its place. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Royal descent group structure according to Goody (1979, 27). 
Legend:  
UDG: unilineal descent group. 
 
                                                 
28
 According to A. Y. Y. Kyerematen (1971, 17-19) in Asante traditional accounts the 
ancestral occupation is established through discovery, gift, purchase, or military conquest.  
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The second form of marriage is known as ayete aware.29 The most 
important thing that separates ayete marriage from adehyee marriage is that 
in the latter case the tie is seen to exist between the man and the wife and 
their respective lineages, but in the former only between the chiefly office 
and a wife-giving commoner lineage. To put it simply, the women in the 
ayete marriages, the “stool wives” as they are called, are not married to the 
chief but to his office, which, of course, is vested in the ruling lineage. 
Accordingly, when the chief dies his successor will inherit the “stool 
wives”. Or, when a chief is deposed, he will only stay married to his 
“personal” wives, whereas the “stool wives” stay married to the office. But 
most importantly, when a “stool wife” dies, or the chief divorces her, her 
lineage has to replace her with a new woman. This possibility of sororate is, 
in addition to marrying twin girls (Fortes 1962, 279), a form of marriage 
that is considered incestuous for ordinary men but not for the chiefs (Rattray 
1929, 27). In 1946, when the Ashanti Confederacy Council was reviewing 
the legislation concerning “stool wives”, the relationship was defined as 
follows: 
 
The bond is between the Stool and the House; for example the 
original aseda [i.e., bride wealth] sealing the marriage need not be 
repeated; the new wife is merely continuing an existing marriage, 
not making a new one. (…) The obligation of the House is to see that 
the Stool has, as wife, a woman of the House. If the individual wife 
of the moment for any reason vacates her place, the House must, on 
demand, put another individual in that place (PRAAD ARG 
1/2/30/5a).30 
 
Basically, the ayete marriage starts as a conventional marriage, but it is 
perpetuated after the death of either of the parties involved. In a way, since 
the exchange of bride wealth does not reoccur, it is seen as a single marriage 
and not a series of successive marriages. However, not all chiefly marriages 
have resulted in this arrangement. As for the question how and when an 
ayete relationship is actually constituted, the Confederacy Council did not 
have a definite answer. The memorandum states that  
                                                 
29
 The word ayete comes from ]yere, a wife + te, to patch, fill a gap, replace (PRAAD ARG 
1/2/30/5a). 
30
 The use of the term “House” is slightly confusing here, particularly since it is later in the 
document defined as family “in the local sense” (PRAAD ARG 1/2/30/5a). As noted above, 
marriages are contracts between matrilineages and not households. Most probably the 
authors refer to the “clan house”, the headquarters of a locally anchored lineage. 
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[t]he mere fact that a Chief has married one woman from a House 
does not entitle him to a replacement on her death; but if he makes 
the request, and it is complied with, and if this happens several times 
over the years; it becomes recognised that ‘there is ayete in that 
House’. The bond apparently arises in this way, and not by one 
definite agreement or transaction; but there seems to be no 
uncertainty in a given case as to whether there is ayete in the House 
or not (ibid.). 31 
 
Hence one could say that the adehyee marriages may create alliances 
between the ruling lineage and other component lineages of the chiefdom in 
the first instance, whereas ayete marriages come to express those alliances 
between lineages.  
In the ayete relationship the chiefly lineage is turned into a wife-
taking group and the commoner lineages into wife-giving groups and this is 
exactly where it becomes visible how the ayete marriage relates to 
matrilateral cross-cousin marriage and nt]r]. First of all, as Figure 3 clearly 
shows, when the initial marriage between the chief and a woman from a 
commoner lineage is perpetuated by the succeeding generations the spouses 
are bound to be cross-cousins (real or classificatory). Hence when the 
adehyee marriage is turned into ayete marriage it also becomes a 
matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Of course, in reality the unions do not 
always take place tidily between first cousins as in Figure 3, nor do the 
nephews automatically follow their uncles to the throne, but the basic 
principle of positional succession employed here is always the same. In the 
Asante terminological system a male ego may call all his collateral female 
relatives from his mother’s brother’s daughter’s lineage by the same term 
and they are all marriageable. Obviously, it has to be taken into account that 
the old “stool wives” inherited from the previous ruler might belong to 
ascending generations and not considered cross-cousins as such. However, 
                                                 
31
 Nowadays, when chiefly marriages are becoming increasingly monogamous, the ayete 
relationships have undergone certain adjustments, but they are, nonetheless, still upheld. 
After the death of a former “stool wife”, the lineage in question will choose a woman from 
its ranks who will continue as “the chief’s wife”. However, these “stool wives” do not 
perform marital duties in the same way as in an ordinary marriage, but they still have some 
specific obligations, for instance, they represent their lineages in ceremonial occasions with 
the “real” wife of the chief. They are not allowed to take a “real” husband without the 
permission of the chief. If such permission is granted and the woman gets married to 
another man, the lineage still has to fill the vacancy with one of its unmarried female 
members. Even quite recently, chiefs have been known to use their prerogative to ban their 
“stool wives” from entering a conventional marriage. 
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according to the Confederacy Council’s view, there are ways of dealing 
with this problem.  
 
The [age] gap usually occurs through death; but if the Stool becomes 
vacant there may be great disparity between the old wife and the 
new chief. Either party may not wish her to continue as a Stool wife, 
in which case she may be divorced in the ordinary way, and a new 
wife put in her place (PRAAD ARG 1/2/30/5a). 
 
Nevertheless, the cross-cousin status and the age difference are of secondary 
importance, when one merely considers the “stool wives” as representatives 
of their own lineages upholding the tie between the chiefly office and the 
subordinate group. However, the age of the wives is important regarding the 
children that these marriages should produce in abundance. This has to do 
with the idea that the stool has to have as many sons (ahenemma, sing. 
]heneba) and grandsons (ahenenana, sing. ]henenana) as possible.  
 
They [the Asante] say that sons are the support of their fathers. 
Chiefs, in particular, stress this. The more sons and sons’ sons a 
chief has, the more secure does he feel. As their social standing 
depends on him and as they have no rights to his office, they will 
support him in all circumstances. They are the most trusted 
followers, and important chiefs appoint their own and their brothers’ 
sons and sons’ sons (…) as titled councillors to attend closely on 
them (Fortes 1962, 269).   
 
The offices of such “titled councillors” are known as mmamma dwa, sons’ 
and grandsons’ stools, which are not vested in matrilineages, but are filled 
“by appointment or at least confirmation” by the superior officeholder who 
(or whose ancestor) had created the office in question (Fortes 1969a, 202). 
Sometimes these offices are reserved specifically for the chief’s own 
immediate offspring, but sometimes they are awarded to non-relatives and 
passed on in a pseudo-patrilineal line to brothers, sons, and grandsons of the 
first occupant.32 However, because of the matrilateral marriages the 
patrilineal line of officeholders may be in conformity with matrilineal 
succession. The office of the Akomforehene of Kumase is a good example of 
                                                 
32
 Occasionally, these offices have also been called nt]r] stools  (e.g., PRAAD ARG 
1/2/30/3a), which implies that the patrilineal dimension is not merely based on matters of 
practicality, such as getting uncompromised support and loyalty, but that it also has some 
spiritual significance. 
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that.33 The first Akomforehene Boakye Atonsa was a son of Asantehene 
Kwaku Dua Panin and his wife called Nana Adwoa Adowaa who belonged 
to a certain lineage of the Asona clan. Originating from this union an ayete 
relationship was established between the Asantehene’s office and Adowaa’s 
lineage and the office of the Akomforehene was created for their son. Up till 
now, five kings (and some royals of the Asantehene’s lineage) have married 
from the Akomforehene’s lineage and had several children. As a result of 
this, as the present Akomforehene Boakye Atonsa II puts it, “almost all the 
royals of the Akomfore stool are [real or classificatory] great, great 
grandchildren of the past Otumfuo”.34 When I asked about the succession to 
the Akomfore stool, the answer was that it is matrilineal, but “the children 
of the Golden Stool” are in a favoured position in comparison to the other 
royals. Hence, the matrilateral “stool marriage” ensures that the ruler may 
appoint his own patrilineal offspring as his councillors without 
compromising the principles of matrilineal descent. The male children from 
“stool marriages” are thus eligible both matrilineally and patrilineally.35 In 
addition to offices, it was also customary for the Asantehene to allocate land 
in Kumase for his favourite wives and their matrilineages. They were not 
only allowed to settle there, but the lands became corporate property of the 
wives’ lineages and sometimes attached to the offices created for the sons 
(e.g., Berry 2001, 89, 126-127). 
As noted above, matrilateral cross-cousin marriage does not produce 
possible reincarnations of the grandparental generation and hence, 
superficially, it might look like outright “spoiling” of nt]r]. However, it has 
to be understood that the objective of the “stool marriage” is not the keeping 
of great names as in the patrilateral type but their distribution. In fact, the 
handing over of names was one of the reasons why the commoner lineages 
were eager to give wives to the chiefs. This becomes unmistakably clear 
from a letter to the Ashanti Confederacy Council written by a chief, 
Atipinhene Boakye Dankwa,36 who complained that the ayete system was 
becoming too much of an economic burden for the chiefs. In 1946, when the 
letter was written, the Atipinhene claimed that the cost of living had reached 
such a point that the chiefs were unable to maintain their many wives and 
                                                 
33
 The Akomforehene belongs to the Manwere group in Kumase (see Figure 8). 
34
 Otumfuo or Otumfo], “the powerful one”, is the most commonly used appellation of the 
Asantehene.  
35
 This is a point that should be taken into account when reading the works of the historians, 
who have often treated “bureaucratic” or “patrimonial”, (pseudo-) patrilineal succession as 
antithetical to “aristocratic”, matrilineal succession (e.g., Wilks 1966). 
36
 The Atipinhene belongs to the Ankobea group (see Figure 8). 
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children and thus some of the latter were in danger of becoming “ruffians 
and jail-birds”. However, in the past such problems had not existed. 
 
But let us remember that in those past days, a Chief did not equally 
clothe and maintain all his wives. Their maintenance lay on the bare 
shoulders of their own relatives… Moreover, in the past, Chiefs’ 
sons were not trained in any work. When they married, their wives 
were mostly fed by their own relatives, because they were contented 
with the high names which were given to their children (PRAAD 
ARG 1/2/30/5b; italics added).  
 
Not only were the chiefs exempted from bride wealth in the case of 
successive “stool wives”, but they and their sons were also exempted from 
those economic responsibilities that are usually considered an essential part 
of the foundation of the whole institution of marriage. These responsibilities 
were seen to have been covered by the chiefly names passed on to the 
children, who belonged to the wife-giving lineage. By distributing them to 
the commoner lineages it became possible for the chiefs to maintain a large 
number of wives. Thus through marriage the chiefs are able to share their 
“greatness” in the form of names and receive in return extensive rights to 
women. It is important also to notice how this relates to the totality of 
exchanges between the ruling lineage and the commoner lineages. Tribute, 
services, and rights to women move up to the chief, while rights to land, 
offices, and names move down to the commoners. 
From this it follows that the great names were also valuable things 
that could be exchanged and this observation opens up a totally new avenue 
for the comparison of patrilateral and matrilateral cross-cousin marriages. 
As there is no “true dual organization” in Asante and people are free to 
marry from a number of lineages belonging to different clans and also from 
a variety of nt]r] divisions, it is impossible to keep the great names 
exclusively in a single matrilineal descent group. As Rattray (1959, 330) 
noted, “[a] man may therefore to-day be compelled to bear a name which 
previously was possessed by a man of some clan [i.e., matrilineage] quite 
different from his own”. However, as it became apparent above, the names 
are important for the identity of the groups and their members, and through 
the idea of reincarnation they quite literally connect them to another time of 
origins, when the ancestors had made their names great through their great 
deeds. So, they cannot be given away entirely; they have to be kept to some 
extent. Here one runs into something that resembles the seemingly 
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paradoxical idea of “keeping-while-giving” developed by Annette Weiner 
(1992). The two forms of ideal marriage are responses to this paradox. 
Hence, in case of chiefs, who are the ones having the great names, the two 
forms stand in a peculiar relation of both complementarity and sequence. 
The matrilateral cross-cousin marriages, which distribute the great names, 
are practised by chiefs themselves, whereas the patrilateral cross-cousin 
marriages, which keep the great names in the lineages, are practised by the 
sons of chiefs. The first ones give them away, but the second ones “get them 
back”, as the Asante themselves have put it (Rattray 1959, 321-322).   
 
 
FIGURE 3. The “stool marriage” as a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. 
Legend:  
C1, C2, and, C3 are successive chiefs. 
W1, W2, and W3 are their respective wives who are also their MBDs. 
S1, S2, and S3 are sons and grandsons of chiefs.   
The dotted line separates the ruling lineage from the wife-giving lineage. 
 
This chapter about the politics of kinship and marriage among the Asante 
has touched on two of the most influential models in kinship studies of the 
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twentieth century, namely descent and alliance theories. Accordingly, there 
has been much talk of groups, divisions, and categories. Despite the marked 
differences of these perspectives they both have concentrated on a certain 
type of society, which has its basis in Émile Durkheim’s (1984, 127-131) 
idea of segmentary society. The two schools of thought disagree on the 
fundamental nature of the segments, whether they are physically there or 
whether they are to be described through concepts and ideas. Similarly, 
there is no consensus on the rules about how the segments are formed, 
whether they have more to do with corporate character or marriage rules and 
exogamy. And finally, there is disagreement on how the segments are 
related to each other, whether they are primarily related through 
complementary filiation or marriage alliances. However, they both share the 
idea that if the segments are to be discrete there can be no overlapping 
membership. People are either in or out of the segment; there cannot be a 
simultaneous membership in two or more segments of the same order 
(Schneider 1969, 43-50). This does not mean, as Fortes (1969a, 287) 
emphasized, that all members of the society are sorted into unattached 
groups, “like apples in a stack of boxes”. Certainly, people belong to all 
sorts of groups and have all sorts of relationships, and hence they are in no 
way “prisoners” of their segments. In a lineage-polity, like that of the 
Asante, lineage membership forms “the indispensable foundation for a 
person’s social existence; but there are components of personhood and areas 
of social action that are independent of lineage regulation” (ibid., 288). 
However, in terms of the politico-jural domain, the lineage is seen as the 
only relevant group. So, when Fortes says that the Asante polity is a 
“lineage-polity”, he suggests that abusua, the matrilineal descent group, is 
the primary political group, a number of which comprise a chiefdom. This, 
of course, corresponds to Goody’s structural model presented above. A 
person gets his/her politico-jural status through a membership in a lineage, 
recruitment to which takes place through matrilineal kinship. Thus kinship 
forms a bridge between the familial and politico-jural domains (Fortes 1972, 
287-288). Or more specifically, “the pivot of the whole system is the status 
of citizenship, which originates for each freeborn individual by 
matrifiliation and is established by the recognition of his descent as the 
credential for lineage membership” (ibid). In the following chapter I will re-
examine Fortes’ model of Asante polity by studying the principles 
according to which a person’s politico-jural status, his/her citizenship in a 
chiefdom and eligibility to hold an office, are designated. To be more 
precise, I will investigate whether such a status is derived directly from 
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membership in a separate and exclusive political group and whether group 
membership is determined solely according to rules of kinship and descent.  
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3 IS THE STATE A GROUP OF GROUPS?  
 
Early anthropologists searched for common concepts that could be used in 
describing both Western and tribal societies. As a result, Roy Wagner 
(1974, 97) insists that social anthropology became “the science of descent 
groups” when the anthropologists turned kinship “into jurisprudence and 
corporate economics”. Since the tribesmen did not carry passports and did 
not have permanent addresses, their politico-jural rights and obligations had 
to be defined according other principles. Most often these were seen to be 
derived from a membership in a social group, e.g., kin groups, age sets, or 
residential groups, which had clearly defined criteria for membership. In 
this defining, the anthropologists assumed that tribal societies have a similar 
“constitutional charter” as Western nation states (ibid., 103). Ghana, as a 
nation state, presents itself as a group of groups. The republic of Ghana 
consists of ten administrative regions, which are all divided into numerous 
districts and so forth.1 These forms were, of course, preceded by comparable 
divisions made by the British colonial administration. All of these divisions 
have fixed boundaries defined in state laws and a citizen of Ghana is a 
resident of only one region and district, where he/she exercises his/her 
citizenship rights. In Fortes’ writings the structure of Asante state was seen 
in many ways analogous to a modern state. It too was a group of groups. 
The subtitle of Fortes’ 1969 volume was The Legacy of Lewis Henry 
Morgan, which referred to the second key theme in the book. In addition to 
its contribution to kinship theory, the book was also concerned with 
disciplinary history: it explained how a certain intellectual legacy had been 
handed down to Fortes and his contemporaries (most importantly E. E. 
Evans-Pritchard) from Morgan through W. H. R. Rivers and Radcliffe-
Brown (Fortes 1972, 285-286). In terms of the study of political 
organization, Fortes claimed that Morgan had already understood that the 
“gens”, i.e., a unilineal descent group, belonged to the “realm of 
government and of political institutions” and therefore it had to be kept 
separate from the “kindred”, which belonged to the domestic sphere. 
Accordingly, Morgan had realized that in simple societies it was the “gens” 
and never the family that was the basic unit of political organization. All 
this, of course, corresponded to Fortes’ distinction between bilateral kinship 
                                                 
1
 The regions are Greater Accra, Central, Western, Eastern, Volta, Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, 
Northern, Upper West, and Upper East. The chiefdoms of the Asante kingdom are located 
in Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions, but there are also Asante “islands” in the Eastern and 
Volta Regions. 
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and descent (Fortes 1969a, 36-38). Furthermore, Morgan (1985, 61-66) had 
spoken of societas (or “gentile” society), in which the government was 
founded on “gentes, phratries and tribes”, and civitas (or political society or 
state) where the political organization rested on territory and property. An 
evolutionary sequence was postulated between the two societal forms; the 
former belonged to “ancient society” and the latter to “modern society”. 
Fortes (1972, 285) commended Morgan for his “thoroughly modern 
technique of synchronic analysis” and how his views on kinship and polity 
had been ahead of their time, but then again wanted to strip Morgan’s 
findings of  “their pseudo-historical clothing”. He suggested that the 
evolutionary stages should be thought of as “representative types of political 
systems” (Fortes 1969a, 37). Thus Morgan’s “gentile” and political societies 
had been reintroduced in a synchronic form in African Political Systems, 
where the editors maintained that in state societies “the political unit is 
essentially a territorial grouping”, for example, a ward or district, whereas in 
segmentary lineage systems it is a corporate descent group (Fortes & Evans-
Pritchard 1987, 6).2 As significant as the distinction itself is the feature that 
the two types of society are claimed to have in common: namely the fact 
that the political systems of both states and stateless societies are 
approached as systems of groups. Morgan (1985, 66) defined the “gens” as 
the primary political group among the Iroquois: several “gentes” comprised 
a phratry, a number of phratries a tribe, and finally several tribes constituted 
a confederacy. Similarly, Fortes (1969a, 138-153) saw an Asante chiefdom 
as a cluster of matrilineages, and a number of chiefdoms formed a 
confederacy. Thus tribal polities were seen as a hierarchical series of 
groups, where the higher structural levels encompassed those of the lower.3 
In this chapter I will first look at Fortes’ model of a closed descent group as 
a primary segment in the political system of the Asante and then show why 
my data on offices vested in descent groups is difficult to accommodate into 
this model.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The idea of states growing out of stateless societies is not completely absent in the 
writings of the structural-functionalists (see Evans-Pritchard 1969, 189). 
3
 This point is discussed in greater detail in the Tallensi ethnography (e.g., Fortes 1969b, 
50, 206, 232). 
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3.1 Do rules make the group? 
 
Morgan (1985, 67-68) used the term descent to refer to a classificatory 
principle that was used as a criterion of group membership. To him a “gens” 
was “a body of consanguinei descended from the same common ancestor” 
(ibid., 63). What held the body together was “the bond of kin” (ibid., 69). 
However, as an organized group the “gens”, or in his particular case the 
Iroquois matrilineage, derived its “vitality and individuality” from the 
“rights, privileges, and obligations conferred and imposed upon its 
members” (ibid., 70-71). A very similar division was made by Rivers (1926, 
86-88), who applied the term descent only to the membership in a unilineal 
group and kept it firmly separate from the processes of transmitting rank, 
property, and office. The members of the descent group, which Rivers 
called a clan or a “sib”, were kept together by relations of “sibship”, a 
common totem, and habitation of shared territory (ibid., 19-22). 
Nonetheless, group membership involved “certain duties and privileges in 
relation to the other members of the group” (ibid., 9). What separated 
Radcliffe-Brown from Morgan and Rivers for the most part was that, 
instead of treating descent merely as a subdivision of a kinship system, he 
sought to approach it from the point of view of its “social purposes”, or “the 
reality of kinship relations as a part of a social structure”, as he once put it 
(Radcliffe-Brown 1950, 10). He saw groups as corporations that owned an 
“estate”, which was “a collection of rights (whether over persons or things) 
with the implied duties”. The most important of these rights were the ones 
over a group’s territory and members. The continuity of the group was seen 
to be directly dependent on the continuity of its estate (Radcliffe-Brown 
1968, 34-35). Two kinds of normative necessities followed from this. First, 
in order to maintain the continuity and unity of the group no person outside 
the group could be allowed to share its estate. Thus group membership 
should be restricted only to persons who fulfil certain criteria (ibid., 37). 
Second, the estate of the group had to be shared among its members in such 
a way that conflicts would not arise or, at least, not remain unresolved. This 
meant that there had to be norms, which systematically defined and 
allocated rights and duties among the group members and made their 
intergenerational transmission possible (ibid., 43-44). Both of these 
necessities were considered to be met if a corporation adopted “a system of 
unilineal reckoning of succession”. For that reason Radcliffe-Brown 
concluded that the main social purpose of descent is the precise definition of 
rights (ibid., 46). Consequently, an individual acquired those elements of 
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his/her own status, i.e., the totality of his/her rights and obligations, that 
were drawn from the corporate group he/she belonged to, through unilineal 
descent (ibid., 37-39). 
Fortes (1969a, 74-75) criticized Radcliffe-Brown for understanding 
descent primarily as a jural concept and therefore ignoring “the external 
status of such [corporate descent] groups within the overall politico-jural 
structure”. In other words, what Radcliffe-Brown had not really grasped 
were the political relations between corporate groups which were also 
regulated through descent. However, as for the question of descent and 
status, Fortes was more in agreement with his predecessor. He saw descent 
as a source of “title to membership or to specific jural status, with all that 
this means in rights over and toward persons and property” also forming 
“the basis of the social relations among the persons who are identified with 
one another in the corporate group” (Fortes 1953, 30). For example, in an 
Asante lineage certain norms and behaviour patterns were an inseparable 
part of membership in a descent group: 
 
An Ashanti once admitted to his matrilineage exercises the 
capacities of citizenship and personhood ordered to the lineage 
system qua member of his lineage and through its organization. In 
marriage, for instance, he must obey the law of lineage exogamy and 
receive sanction from his lineage elders; in fulfilling his political 
duties to the chiefdom and exercising the corresponding rights, he 
must act through his lineage. Precise ritual obligations are likewise 
identified with his lineage membership, and there is a clear-cut 
dichotomy between these capacities and responsibilities, on the one 
side, and their complementary counterparts, ordered to his patrifilial 
connections, on the other (Fortes 1969a, 274). 
 
As Michel Verdon (1983, 6) has pointed out, Fortes and his predecessors 
shared a Hobbesian assumption that “interpersonal behaviour must be 
regulated for individuals to associate and form groups (i.e., to form an 
ordered society)”. Groups simply could not exist without definite rights and 
obligations and their systematic assignment, or otherwise, anarchy would 
prevail. A person had to have a status, or position, in the group, which was 
defined according to certain normative criteria. In non-Western societies it 
was kinship, or more specifically descent, that served as an “instrument for 
assignment of rights and status or for establishing interpersonal and 
intergroup connections” (Fortes 1969a, 281). Hence groups were not seen so 
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much as a number of individuals brought together by some common interest 
or activity, but as systems of statuses. Briefly put, Fortes saw the political 
system of a given society as a system of groups. A person acquired his/her 
politico-jural status, i.e. a compilation of rights and duties, by becoming a 
member of one of the constituent groups. In some societies these groups are 
corporate unilineal descent groups and member status is assigned according 
to principles based on descent.  
Two major lines of criticism arose from this view of the 
inseparability of descent and status: the so-called New Guinea models 
mainly re-examined the ways in which descent had been seen as a strict 
criteria for group recruitment (e.g., Strathern 1973), while the so-called 
transactional models questioned the ways in which descent had been 
considered to regulate interpersonal behaviour in segmentary lineage 
systems (e.g., Holy 1979). In both cases the critics had their focus on the 
relationship between the “descent dogmas” and actual social behaviour. 
These studies concentrated on “classical” segmentary lineage systems, such 
as the Tallensi and Nuer, but also societies that were characterized as 
“fluid”, “small-scale”, or “loosely structured”, like those of the New Guinea 
Highlands. Rarely, if ever, was critical attention given to descent systems in 
state societies. There are at least two reasons for this. On the one hand, it 
was widely accepted that in centralized states descent groups and the 
principles that regulate them are subject to state intervention and therefore 
they do not have the same “political relevance” as descent groups have in 
the segmentary lineage systems. A person’s political status is seen to 
become more and more dependent on his/her allegiance to the state and less 
on descent (e.g., Middleton & Tait 1967, 4-5). Or, on the other hand, in 
some cases the state incorporates the descent groups into its own 
administrative structure and enforces the rules governing the groups. Thus 
descent groups have plenty of “political relevance”, but they are boxed 
within a hierarchy of power categories of a different order, for example, 
ranked offices, and hence their structural autonomy is compromised by 
external factors (e.g., Lloyd 1969, 99-106). All in, descent in states was not 
considered an “autonomous social force” as it was in stateless societies. The 
neglect of state societies in the study of descent systems is a major 
shortcoming on the part of the critics of classical descent theory. For 
instance, it has been claimed that in order to construct his model of Tallensi 
social structure and ascertain patrilineal descent as an overriding principle in 
it, Fortes had to make some sweeping generalizations concerning 
indigenous Tallensi notions of kinship and ignore some local variations of 
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structure (Anglin 1979). If this is so, it puts the validity of the segmentary 
lineage structure as a specific type of political system into question, since 
the Tallensi ethnography supplied an essential part of the empirical data on 
which the typology was built. Is it not equally important to re-examine the 
“Ashanti model”, since it provided the necessary material for formulating 
“the concept of the corporate descent group as an ideally perpetual juristic 
person” (Fortes 1978, 12)? 
 
 
3.2 Descent and territory 
 
In Kinship and the Social Order Fortes (1969a, 128-138) begins his study of 
the Asante state and citizenship by contrasting the Asante lineage with the 
Lozi village, i.e., a descent group compared to a territorial group. The Lozi 
of Zambia live in relatively small village communities, which are 
interlinked by ties of cognatic kinship. Citizenship in the Barotse state, in 
which the Lozi are the dominant group, is based on personal allegiance to 
the king (through his dignitaries), and not on membership in a kin or 
territorial group. However, this allegiance forms only one part of person’s 
“full civic status”. Although in principle all the land and its resources are 
vested in the kingship, a person’s rights to obtain and cultivate land as well 
as exploit other natural recourses are based on recognized residency in a 
mound village, which is considered a person’s “true home”, even though 
during the rainy season the floods compel people to live elsewhere. 
Residential status is conferred by the village headman, and any cognatic link 
(but not affinal) to him entitles a person to apply for residential rights in his 
village. Most often a Lozi child is brought up in the village of his/her 
parents, but later in life the “indefinitely spreading web of cognatic kinship 
ties” enables him/her to choose from a great variety of villages and he/she is 
always free to move. Thus the field of kinship relations of a Lozi is 
constructed of “atoms of interindividual relationships”, which he/she can 
make use of “in any combination that serves a particular purpose” (ibid., 
131). Nonetheless, it is the residency, not the kinship status as such, that is 
the key to land rights, and if a person decides to move to another mound 
village he/she will lose all his/her rights and properties in the former place 
of residence. When a new village headman is elected, the sons of the 
previous headman are preferred, but in the absence of a suitable son, all 
cognatic male relatives of the same or younger generation can be 
considered. His election is ritually confirmed by the king and his dignitaries, 
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who have also the right to discharge him. In addition to his role as a 
distributor of land, the headman also administers the internal affairs of the 
village and to the outside world he represents the whole village as its leader. 
Hence, and Fortes cites Max Gluckman, the village is “the basic unit, below 
state, of political structure as it exists territorially” and a corporate group 
with its identity focused on its headman. Among the Lozi cognatic kinship 
transmits rights to land and office, but otherwise the political significance of 
kinship is fundamentally different than what it is among the Asante. This is 
so because the Lozi village is a corporation only externally; its structure is 
not in conformity with the kinship ties of its members, which extend far 
outside the territorial group. So, among the Lozi the boundaries of the 
corporate unit are a result of the “politico-jural status accorded to it in the 
overall political system”, namely residential rights and the common 
allegiance to the headman (ibid., 132). 
In the Asante case, Fortes argued, one finds “discrete and exclusive 
corporate groups”, which are not demarcated by such extraneous regulations 
as among the Lozi, but “strictly by rules of kinship and descent” (ibid., 138). 
Although Asante was a state society, he (ibid., 139) asserted that the rule of 
matrilineal descent was “operative throughout the social structure, in all 
domains” and identified the lineage as the “indivisible segment of the 
political structure” (ibid., 183).  Politically, the most important part of the 
“estate” the matrilineage has is its right to office. The office is “the keystone 
of the lineage’s continuity”, both on the plane of “religious ideology”, 
meaning the relations between the living and the ancestors, and on that of 
politico-jural relations (ibid., 189). 
An individual attains his/her politico-jural status, or citizenship as 
Fortes usually called it, in the chiefdom only as a member of a matrilineage, 
and thus “the ideology of matrilineal descent embodied in the lineage 
system is the medium for the articulation of the familial domain with the 
politico-jural domain” (1972, 287). For example, as a member of one of the 
component lineages a person acquires eligibility to occupy the office(s) 
vested in his/her lineage and usufructuary rights to farmland. There is no 
such thing as personal allegiance among the Asante; a person is connected 
to his/her chief through his/her lineage head who has sworn an oath to the 
chief. Full membership status in a lineage is acquired through matrilineal 
descent alone. Migrant populations who had been incorporated into a local 
“host lineage” of the same clan or descendants of foreign slaves who had 
been adopted as “quasi-members” were treated as true members of the 
lineage “for most social purposes”, but they were not eligible to occupy 
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offices (Fortes 1962, 255). In terms of group membership and politico-jural 
status, Fortes concluded that what the village represents in the Lozi polity, 
the matrilineage does in Asante, or more generally “what the substratum of 
locality represents among the Lozi, the kinship substratum […] does for 
Ashanti” (Fortes 1969a, 155). The fundamental difference between the two 
was that the lineage boundaries were determined internally, namely through 
descent, whereas the village boundaries hinged on external factors. 
In Fortes’ model the Asante lineage approximated the ideal type of 
corporate unilineal descent group (ibid., 304), but there were some 
problematic issues as well. Although he generally considered local ties to be 
secondary to lineage ties, he realized that in order to function as a corporate 
group, it was necessary for the lineage members to assemble for the conduct 
of their affairs (Fortes 1953, 36). He often spoke of the lineage as a local (or 
localized) group, but he used the word only in its casual meaning (e.g., 
Fortes 1962, 259). Elsewhere he made it clear that the lineage is not a 
locally bounded but a locally anchored association (Fortes 1969a, 183). This 
means that a lineage has its “ancestral home” in the village or town, where it 
has the seat of its office and its headquarters (abusua fie), where the 
ancestral stools,4 the paraphernalia of the office, and sometimes the shrines 
of the deities attached to the office are permanently kept. The lineage burial 
ground is in the same locality (ibid., 166). Customarily, every Asante village 
or town is also divided into wards (abrono, sing. brono), where the 
members of a single lineage are supposed to live in several households 
(Fortes 1962, 254-255, 262). However, the people comprising the lineage 
may be, and very often are, widely dispersed. Sometimes, group dispersals 
have resulted directly from political imperatives, such as wars, stool 
disputes, etc. (Fortes 1970, 9).  Some built-in structural inclinations of 
matrilineages are also a factor. Namely, the men of matrilineages want to 
retain control over their sisters and sister’s children, and thus the sisters are 
not likely to move away from their home villages. But when marriages 
outside the boundaries of one’s own community do occur, wives move to 
their husbands’ locality where they will establish new branches of their natal 
lineages. Also during the pre-colonial period the practise of pawning 
(awowasi) dependent kinsmen as collateral for debts was a factor in 
scattering lineage members (Fortes 1969a, 146). Finally, although the 
Asante have always been known as “inveterate travellers”, the increasing 
                                                 
4
 After an officeholder’s death his stool is “blackened”, i.e., consecrated, and deposited in a 
stool house (nkonnua fie) or stool room (nkonnua dan) with the stools of his predecessors, 
where they serve as ancestral shrines. 
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occupational and social differentiation brought by the colonial era created 
“the so-called drift to the towns” (Fortes et al. 1947, 167), and it is safe to 
say that this drift is nowadays only getting stronger. Today, this takes place 
on a global scale, since more and more Asante migrate out of the country, 
particularly to the metropolitan centres of Europe and North America. 
Nevertheless, migration itself does not change the primary allegiance of the 
migrants to their ancestral home and its chiefly authority. They and their 
descendants are never deprived of their membership status in their natal 
lineage no matter where they choose to live (Fortes 1969a, 147). Hence 
there is no strong imperative towards territorial and demographic 
consolidation of the lineage or the polity. 
However, in many cases the migrants have established themselves in 
a different locality, and have lived there long enough so that they are 
considered to have become amalgamated to another lineage of the same clan 
in their new locality. Or perhaps an office has been created for them, and 
hence they are considered a lineage of their own. What happens to their 
political status in their ancestral home in such cases? This is the point where 
Fortes got confused. On the one hand, he stressed that lineages are 
“demarcated from one another by unequivocal structural boundaries” and a 
person can belong to “one and only one lineage”, but on the other hand, he 
insisted that a branch which is attached to a new lineage of the same clan 
never loses its membership in its natal lineage. To support this, he presents 
instances where people “fulfil citizen obligations” in two separate 
chiefdoms (ibid., 147, 184). Can a single group act as a constituent of two 
different groups at a higher structural level? Can a person have two (or 
more) political statuses in different communities? If so, are Asante lineages 
then overlapping rather than discrete groups? By focusing on rights to the 
office of the chief I will explore the ways in which a person’s political status 
is dependent on his/her membership in a particular descent group.  
 
 
3.3 Descent and chieftaincy 
 
E. E. Kurankyi-Taylor (1951, 18) calls the Asante lineage a perpetual 
corporation meaning that it is understood to be comprised not only of its 
living members but also of the dead and unborn. In this scheme of things the 
office of the chief holds a nodal position, since it stands between the living 
who are considered the guardians of “the fortunes and affairs of the whole 
body corporate” (ibid., 172) and the ancestors (asamanfo]) who have 
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absolute power over the former. Generally, the ancestors are considered to 
use their powers to help the living in their worldly undertakings, but the bad 
deeds of the living also bring shame on the ancestors, who do not hesitate to 
punish them (ibid., 191-192). Thus the prosperity and welfare of the living 
is believed to depend directly on good relations with the ancestors (ibid., 
39). Because of the delicateness of this connection it is vital that the office 
vested in the lineage is occupied by a person who is a matrilineal descendant 
of the apical ancestor of the lineage and thus close enough to the ancestors 
for communicating with them. This communicating takes place through 
sacrifice. As Fortes (1963, 59) has put it, the Asante matrilineages are 
committed to being “of pure freeborn descent” because “their entire social 
existence hinges on their prerogatives of hereditary office and rank; and 
these would be jeopardized if the established laws of kinship, descent, 
inheritance and succession were set aside in the slightest particular”. In 
other words, the necessity of keeping the lineage, from which the chiefs are 
elected, a closed descent group ultimately arises from the relationship 
between the living and the ancestors, which has its nexus in the office and 
its occupant. 
The methods of electing a new chief vary in detail from one 
chiefdom to another (see Rattray 1929), but some general characteristics are 
shared by most. The so-called kingmakers who are the principal 
officeholders of the chiefdom make the final decision in the matter. 
Basically, they are the same persons who form the council of divisional 
chiefs or elders and who are also able to depose a chief. In the election 
process some members appear to be more important than others, so that 
their concurrence is necessary to hold a valid election. When the paramount 
office in the chiefdom has fallen vacant, it is the duty of the kingmakers to 
first approach the queen mother and ask her “to nominate one of the 
members of the Royal family whom she discretionally considers suitable for 
installation” (PRAAD ARG 6/2/28a). The queen mother herself is elected 
and installed by the chief and his elders, and she hails from the same 
matrilineage as the chief but need not to be in any exact relationship to him 
(such as mother or sister). At this point, any man who is able to make a 
reasonable claim for the office can offer himself as a candidate by 
presenting himself to the queen mother through an appropriate dignitary. 
After weighing the available candidates and nominating one of them, the 
queen mother and the elders of the ruling lineage “will then inform them 
[the kingmakers] through the linguists of her nomination and address them 
of his conduct and capability” (ibid.). The kingmakers consider the nominee 
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brought forward by the queen mother and either accept or reject him. In the 
former case he is introduced to the public and his training may begin. In the 
latter case the queen mother is asked to appoint another candidate. A 
number of candidates can be introduced and rejected before “everyone says 
he is good”, Obiaa se eye. Only after the chief-elect has been ritually 
installed, the blackened ancestral stools and other paraphernalia of the 
office, which connect him to his ancestors, are presented to him. During the 
transitional period they have been in the custody of caretakers (wirempefo]), 
who are not eligible for the succession (Fortes 1967, 17-18).  
The transfer of power among the Akan combines both prescriptive 
and elective elements. On the one hand, there is a group of people known as 
the royals who are all, given the certain restrictions of sex and age, 
genealogically qualified to occupy the office(s) vested in the ruling lineage.5 
On the other hand, a candidate put forward by the ruling group has to be 
suitable, not only in terms of genealogy, but in other respects as well. 
According to K. A. Busia (1968, 9) the qualities required from a candidate 
are “intelligence (adwempa), humility (ahobre-ase), generosity (ne yam ye), 
manliness (abooduru), and physical fitness (dem biara nni ne ho)”. As 
discussed above, whether a candidate is considered to possess these qualities 
depends partly on his name or his membership in one of the nt]r] divisions. 
In terms of realpolitik, the candidate has to already have support among the 
kingmakers and in order to secure that he has to have access to economic 
resources, since the use of money in “lobbying” has been and still remains a 
central feature of the election process (Wilks 1993, 136-139). Despite the 
complexity of demands made on a candidate it is safe to say that an 
accepted genealogical relation to the past ruler, or more precisely to the 
royal ancestors, is the primary charter for the chiefly office; without it the 
other qualities would not be taken into consideration. But even in terms of 
common descent there are differences in eligibility, and this brings me to the 
question of elimination: who are included and who are excluded from the 
group of eligibles? 
 
                                                 
5
 Among the Akan there are no strict rules of primogeniture: “[b]rother may succeed 
brother; nephew, uncle; grandson grandfather; and the younger may be chosen before the 
elder” (Rattray 1929, 85). 
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PHOTOGRAPH 1. A village chief (on the left) and his elders sacrifice a fowl to the 
blackened ancestral stool. 
 
Some segments of the ruling lineage, in certain cases all but one, are non-
eligible, because they are considered “latecomers”, i.e., groups of people 
absorbed into the original lineage after the foundation of the office (Fortes 
1969a, 146-147). In some chiefdoms the office rotates among the eligible 
segments of the lineage, sometimes referred to as “branches” or “gates”, 
whereas in others all eligible segments can contest for it. As a result of these 
practices, the candidate elected can be quite distantly related to the ex-ruler, 
both in terms of collateral kin as well as ascending and succeeding 
generations. If a suitable candidate cannot be found, the search has to be 
extended to the group of “non-eligibles” of the same lineage or even to the 
collateral lineages of the same clan. Thus, theoretically speaking, all clan 
members are potential officeholders. Interestingly enough, the Twi word 
“]dehyee” can mean both a “royal” and “freeborn person”, a lineage or clan 
member of full standing. On a more practical level, the Asante themselves 
make a very clear distinction between "true royals” whom the actual 
incumbency of office concerns, and “commoners” who are not directly 
involved. “There is a stool in the family of every Akan [person], but it is 
only the royals that can have it”, as one of my informants confirmed. 
Similarly, Fortes (1969a, 162) pointed out that “[t]he notion that every true 
member of a clan is eligible to succeed to any of the offices vested in its 
branches is understood to be a fiction”, but he too realized that there are 
certain situations where the rules of succession have to be altered. 
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There are well-authenticated cases in most chiefdoms of lineages 
becoming extinct or being disfranchised for treason, and offices held 
by them being awarded by the chief to a member of a collateral 
lineage or even to a son of the last holder and thus to a different 
lineage. The principle [of matrilineal succession within the lineage] 
is not thereby invalidated. It rests on the postulate (...) that lineage 
vested office is tied to the sanctioned ancestral stools and that a 
person who is not eligible by demonstrable descent to offer sacrifice 
and libation to them in his own right cannot have ancestral sanction 
for occupying the office bequeathed by them (ibid.). 
 
Fortes’ view on demonstrable matrilineal descent as a primary charter for 
office among the Asante is not questioned here. What is re-examined here is 
the exclusiveness and locatedness of the descent group. In fact, there are 
persons outside what is perceived as “the localized lineage”, even outside 
the boundaries of the chiefdom, who are considered (or consider 
themselves) eligible to perform sacrifices for the ancestors and thus occupy 
offices in their own right. Whether these claims for eligibility are generally 
acknowledged or rejected has to do with things other than an instantly 
recognizable status as a group member. A short study of dynastic affairs in 
the chiefdom of Amakom demonstrates that the lineage boundaries are 
highly elusive and negotiable, and that the “groupness” actually emerges 
through political competition. 
 
 
3.4 Two passages in the dynastic history of Amakom 
 
The chiefdom of Amakom is among the five original settlements in the 
vicinity of present day Kumase. Even today, one is able to find it from any 
map, located very close to the business centre of the city. Although initially 
an independent chiefdom, it was annexed to the capital in the wars that 
preceded the foundation of the Asante kingdom. It belongs to the Adonten 
group (Adonten fekuo) in the administrative and military hierarchy of 
Kumase (see Figure 8). In addition to Amakom itself there are four other 
chiefdoms in the group whose ruling lineages belong to the Asene matriclan 
and the chiefs consider themselves brothers (nuanom, sing. ]nua). In Asante 
oral traditions the cradle of the Asene clan is usually located in the area 
called Adanse, where the great ancestress of the Asene people, called 
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Krokotoi or Amena Gyata, emerged from a rock or a bead. Her descendants 
dispersed throughout the Akan country founding new settlements, some of 
which later became known as autonomous chiefdoms (Rattray 1929, 271). 
However, some Asene chiefs do not confirm these myths and claim 
independent origins (see Busia 1968, 3-4). In the two passages below I will 
focus on the Amakom ruling lineage’s relations to other Asene lineages in 
terms of sharing rights for office. My first example is the ruling lineage of 
Nkoransa, which is a direct offshoot of the Amakom ruling lineage. The 
second one is a group of migrants claiming membership in an Asene lineage 
in Adanse and thus claiming to be related to the Amakom people as 
descendants of a common ancestress.  
 
 
3.4.1 Brothers afar 
 
The chiefdom Nkoransa lies on the northern fringe of the forest belt, a good 
100 kilometres from Kumase and Amakom. The genealogical link between 
the two chiefdoms is relatively unambiguous (Figure 4). Traditions 
concerning the creation of the Nkoransa chiefdom are widely known and 
there are several published accounts as well (e.g., Meyerowitz 1952, 36-44). 
They differ in detail, but the basic outline seems to be the same in all. The 
first chief and founder of Nkoransa was a young Amakom royal called Bafo 
Pim. His maternal uncle, Adu Donyina, had laid an unsuccessful claim to 
the Amakom stool and was compelled to leave his ancestral home. “In the 
olden days things were different from what they are now. If you contested 
for a stool and lost, you had to go away, for sometime at least”, as the 
present Amakomhene explained to me. So, Adu Donyina, his sister Afua 
Sapon, and her son Bafo Pim left Amakom and proceeded north. When they 
arrived to the whereabouts of present day Nkoransa, Adu Donyina fought 
and subdued the indigenous populations of the area and did not stop until he 
got to the site where the capital of the chiefdom is currently located. There 
he met three old men, Asene Diamin, Akwasi Ampofo, Akwasi Dase, and 
their sister Duoduwaa Amane, who also belonged to the Asene clan.6 They 
told Adu that they were hunters of the chief of Takyiman, to whom the lands 
                                                 
6
 The name Nkoransa is said to be derived from nkokora mmeensa, lit. “three old men”. 
Traditions collected by C. Y. Boateng suggest that the three old men had also migrated 
from Amakom during some earlier period (Goody & Boateng 1965, 175). I have also heard 
some people in Nkoransa refer to them as the “three wise men”, which gives a certain 
“biblical flavour” to these accounts! 
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belonged. After getting permission from the Takyimanhene Adu decided to 
settle there with his clansmen. Soon after that a war broke out between the 
Takyimanhene Ameyaw Kwaakye and Asantehene Opoku Ware, in which 
Nkoransa was the major ally of the Asantehene. Consequently, Ameyaw 
was defeated and Nkoransa was awarded vast areas of land that had been 
deserted by the Takyiman people who sought refuge elsewhere. Many of the 
oral traditions depict the war as a result of Bafo Pim’s intrigue against the 
Takyimanhene. Some sources indicate that Adu Donyina had already died 
during the journey from Amakom to Nkoransa, and Bafo Pim had replaced 
him as the leader of the migrant group (e.g., PRAAD ARG 1/6/5/1/41a), but 
most seem to agree that it was Adu who led his people to their present day 
abode and that he also died there (e.g., PRAAD ARG 1/2/12/2). 
Nonetheless, all accounts confirm that Bafo Pim fought against Takyiman 
and was subsequently installed as the first Nkoransahene. Historians, 
relying on Muslim chronicles, date the Asante conquest of Takyiman to 
1722-1723 (Wilks 1975, 245). Some local traditions also imply that the 
migrants were still in Amakom after the Denkyira war of 1701 (PPKT a). In 
light of this information, one can estimate that the Nkoransa branch seceded 
from the Amakom ruling lineage roughly 300 years ago.  
Despite the long separation Nkoransa and Amakom have maintained 
very close relations. The Amakomhene is an uncle (w]fa, pl. w]fanom) of 
the Nkoransahene, even though in casual conversations they tend to refer to 
each other as brothers (see Figure 4). Much the same can be said of 
Nkoransahene’s relationship to other Asene chiefs of Kumase. As one of the 
members of the Adonten group described the situation, “Though Omanhin7 
of Nkoranza left Coomassie and went to Nkoranza, our relationship 
remained the same” (PRAAD ARG 1/6/5/1/41a). However, there is 
something that makes Nkoransa’s relationship to Amakom particularly 
strong. The following is an excerpt from an interview with Amakomhene 
Akosa Yiadom II:  
 
TK: I have been told that the Amakom royals can claim for the 
Nkoransa stool when it becomes vacant, and that the Nkoransa 
royals can make a similar claim for the Amakom stool. Has anybody 
from Nkoransa ever inherited the Amakom stool? 
                                                 
7
 Usually ]manhene (pl. amanhene), a ruler of an ]man, most often translated as 
“paramount chief”. 
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AY II: It is true that we can inherit them and they can inherit us. In 
fact, when the Nkoransa stool fell vacant the last time, I was invited 
there to see the proceedings.  
  
No one from Nkoransa has ever come to inherit the Amakom 
dynasty. It was only once that they had a lot of candidates for the 
Nkoransa stool and the elders there were having difficulties making 
up their minds. One solution they thought about was to ask for 
somebody from Amakom to occupy the stool. However, in the end 
they thought: “Why go so far to look for a chief?”, and decided to 
choose one of their own candidates. 
 
So, in actual fact, no one from Amakom has ever inherited the 
Nkoransa stool, even though it was close once. 
 
What is remarkable here is that rights for office are reciprocal. Not only are 
the members of the derivative segment, which now could be said to 
constitute an autonomous lineage, still eligible for the office of their natal 
lineage, but also the members of the natal lineage have become eligible for 
the office vested in the migrant segment. In my experience, instances of this 
type of open sharing of royal status between two related groups are not very 
common, but claims from “outside” based on common ancestry have 
occurred and do occur constantly.8 Hence the boundaries of the group are 
recurrently contested and re-negotiated.9 The events below give a 
                                                 
8
 For example, during the 1950’s more than a half of the cases brought before divisional 
councils concerned rank and status depending on membership in a particular lineage (Fortes 
1969a, 168). 
9
 For example, in the case of the office of the Asantehene vested in the Oyoko K]k]] 
abusua of the Oyoko matriclan, one could say that historically the rights for office have 
become more and more restricted. The descendant of Dako Panin and Dako Kuma, 
grandsons of Obiri Yeboa, who was the uncle and predecessor of the first Asantehene Osei 
Tutu, have been eliminated from the line of succession (McCaskie 1995a, 175-77), and 
several claims made by the ruling Oyoko lineage of the chiefdom of Kokofu up till the end 
of the pre-colonial period have been effectively rejected (Wilks 1975, 578). However, this 
has not put a stop to claims from the “outside”.  In fact, during the spring of 1999, when a 
successor for the late Asantehene Opoku Ware II was elected, the “Asaman Kani family” of 
Ekuona matriclan laid an unsuccessful claim to the Golden Stool by declaring that Obiri 
Yeboa was not a real uncle to Osei Tutu and that he had actually belonged to the Ekuona 
clan. Owing to the lack of male heirs an Oyoko, Osei Tutu, had been appointed as a 
caretaker for the stool, which was to be returned to the Ekuona lineage in due course. The 
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demonstration of how such claims have arisen and how they have been dealt 
with in Amakom. 
 
 
3.4.2 Resident aliens 
 
Sometime in the 1940’s a group of people, about sixty in number, came to 
settle in Amakom. They came from the kingdom of Akyem Abuakwa, more 
accurately, from a town called Asamankese, a little less than 200 kilometres 
southeast of Kumase. The newcomers belonged to the Asene clan and 
claimed to be maternal relatives of a woman called Akua Kwabena, alias 
Elizabeth Benson, a self-styled grandniece to the two successive 
Amakomhene, Anin Badwa and Kwaku Atta. They were introduced as 
relatives to the Asantehene, the Asantehemaa, and the “brother-chiefs” of 
the Adonten group, to whom they also paid the necessary aseda, “thank you 
money”(MAG 21/12/2/95a). Consequently, in order to restore “the 
homogeny of Amakom Royal Family”, the migrants were adopted to the 
ruling lineage of Amakom. After the death of Amakomhene Kwaku Atta in 
1949 a candidate from the migrant group was put forward by two Amakom 
elders. This claim was firmly resisted by representatives of the five 
subordinate stools of Amakom, who insisted that the adopted members 
formed only a non-eligible branch of the ruling lineage. None of them could 
be installed as a chief because:  
 
(i) They had never before attended Amakom royal funerals; 
(ii) They had never before contributed to the payment of Amakom 
royal funeral expenses; 
(iii) They had never before paid Amakom debts; 
(iv) They had never before paid (…) for the upkeep and progress of 
Ashanti Nation of which Amakom forms an integral part; 
(v) They had never paid or contributed to Adonten Division Levy 
within the framework of Kumasi Division of which Amakom forms 
an integral part… 
(vi) They had never before rendered any of the following menial 
services for the maintenance and prestige [of] the Amakom Stool to 
which they now claim to succeed, viz:- 
(a) They never attend State Durbars with Amakomhene; 
                                                                                                                            
matter was taken to the Chieftaincy Tribunal of the National House of Chiefs, but 
eventually the case was dropped by the plaintiffs. 
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(b) They had never before carried the Amakomhene’s Stool; 
(c) They had never served as Nhinkwa [servants] during 
Akwasidae and Awukudae ceremonies 10 to acquaint 
themselves of the ceremonials peculiar to the Stool, as 
contradistinguished from the custom at Akim [Akyem 
Abuakwa] (…) [I]n short they are total strangers (MAG 
21/12/2/95b). 
 
Apparently, the Amakom elders did not reject the migrant group because 
they were not eligible by descent to offer sacrifice and libation to the 
ancestral stools but because of their lack of ritual knowledge. Also, they had 
not yet shared the debts, taxes, and other economic burdens as true lineage 
members should do. Nor had they claimed their membership in the ruling 
group by assuming obligations outside the lineage, namely towards the 
state, the “Ashanti Nation”, and the clansmen, the “Adonten Division”. In 
addition to the list above, the newcomers were thought to be ignorant of 
“the various landmarks and boundaries of the extensive Amakom Stool 
lands” and they did not “know the peculiar idiosyncrasies of the Amakom 
people” (ibid.). Consequently, the candidacy was nullified, and the 
disagreement between the two factions was arbitrated by the Kwamohene 
from the Adonten group. The migrants and their supporters rendered an 
apology to the newly elected Amakomhene, Mensa Yiadom, and provided a 
sheep to be slaughtered in order to appease the ancestral spirits (MAG 
21/12/2/95a). 
Ms. Benson, the hostess of the migrant group, was not satisfied with 
the status granted to her relatives and brought the matter to the Asantehene’s 
court in 1952. In the trial she claimed that her maternal granduncle, 
Amakomhene Anin Badwa, had originally been a resident of Dompoase, a 
town in the Adanse area (ibid.). In Dompoase there are two major Asene 
lineages: the office of the chief, the Dompoasehene, is vested in one, and a 
subordinate office of the Krontihene, “the field commander”, in the other. 
The members of the two lineages are descendants from a set of female 
twins, Atta Kuma and Atta Panin, whose mother was Nyaako Sika, the 
granddaughter of Krokotoi, the great ancestress of the whole Asene clan. In 
addition to the twins, Nyaako Sika had two other daughters, Nyankomago 
and Tawia. The offspring of Nyankomago moved to a place called Wassa 
Amanfi, while Tawia’s descendants were the ones who migrated northwards 
and founded Amakom (IAS/AS 77; Figure 5). Thus all Asene people, 
                                                 
10
 Festival days during which offerings to the ancestral spirits and deities are made. 
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including those settled in Amakom, are originally from Dompoase, as one of 
Ms. Benson’s witnesses stated. For that reason, centuries later, when 
Amakomhene Anin Agyei had been captured by the British in the war of 
1900-1901, and the Amakom stool became vacant, the queen mother of 
Amakom, with some of the chiefs from the Adonten group, had sent a 
delegation to Dompoase in order to find a suitable candidate to fill the 
office. It was Ms. Benson’s granduncle, Anin Badwa, who had been chosen 
and later installed. After his death in 1913, his full brother Kwaku Atta had 
succeeded him. Ms. Benson alleged that Amakomhene Kwaku Atta had 
buried her son in the burial ground reserved for the royals. Similarly, she 
argued that “[i]f ever any of female my relatives [sic] should be married, it 
used to be my Nana Kwaku Atta that took the head rum [i.e., the bride 
wealth]”. If someone died in Adanse, Kwaku Atta sent a delegation to the 
funeral, and correspondingly, if a relative died in Amakom, a delegation 
from Adanse attended the funeral. The same had been done regarding 
Asamankese. She also insisted that her relatives had taken part in paying the 
debts of the Amakom stool (MAG 21/12/2/95a). 
She concluded that the members of her granduncle’s lineage in 
Dompoase, called Bosompem Ketekye lineage, are eligible for the Amakom 
stool (and also for the paramount and Kronti stools of Dompoase). What is 
more, she avowed that the predecessors of her adversary, Amakomhene 
Mensa Yiadom, had migrated from the chiefdom of Nsuta and were actually 
more recent arrivals in Amakom than the Dompoase people. She also 
managed to bring in several witnesses who corroborated her version of the 
history of the Amakom stool and testified that the relatives from both 
Asamankese and Dompoase had been sharing the court expenses of the 
Amakom stool. Mensa Yiadom, for his part, tried to prove that Anin Badwa 
hailed from Amakom and never lived in Dompoase. In the end, the court, 
which constituted of a panel of four chiefs and one linguist, ruled the case in 
the favour of the plaintiff stating that, “Elizabeth Benson is a royal and 
eligible to Amakom stool”. Since the migrants from Asamankese were 
expressly “collateral relatives” of her granduncles, the two past rulers of 
Amakom, they too had to be considered royals (ibid.). 
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FIGURE 5. Reconstruction of the relationship between the ruling lineage of Amakom 
and the lineage of Bosompem Ketekye of Dompoase (IAS/AS 77). 
Legend:  
A: Nyaako Sika, B1: Tawia, B2: Nyankomago, B3: Atta Kuma, B4: Atta Panin, C1: 
Ohewaa, C2: Nana Okofo, C3: Bosompem Ketekye, D: Awua Anin, E: Aberewa 
Musa, F1: Amakomhene Akosa Yiadom, F2: Amoanima Kuma, F3: Amoanima Panin. 
 
Several years later, an administrative intervention allowed the new royals to 
capitalize on their status. As an active member of an opposition party called 
NLM (National Liberation Movement), Amakomhene Mensa Yiadom found 
himself at odds with CPP (Convention People’s Party), the ruling party of 
independent Ghana. His name was connected to an illegal railway strike, he 
was arrested, and his personal property was seized (PRAAD ARG 
2/2/117a). A protégé of Ms. Benson was put on the stool. However, the 
reign of the new chief, Anin Badwa II, did not last very long. After the 
overthrow of Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah in the military coup of 1966, 
the Amakom stool was returned to Mensa Yiadom, who remained on it till 
his death in 1980 (Berry 2001, 72). His nephew, the present Amakomhene 
Akosa Yiadom II, shares his predecessor’s view of the past; the history 
about Amakomhene Anin Badwa coming from Dompoase as well as the 
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whole genealogy (Figure 5) connecting Amakom and Dompoase are “all 
lies”. Furthermore, he rejects all histories about the Amakom people 
migrating from Adanse as products of someone’s vivid imagination: “We 
didn’t come from anywhere! We have always been here. How can you be 
Adonten Piesie [i.e., the “firstborn” of the Adonten group], if you came 
from somewhere?” According to him, membership in the same matriclan 
does not entitle anybody to an office vested in a specific matrilineage. In 
order to support his point, he used an example from the chiefdom of his 
nephew: “Look at Nkoransa. Most of the stools there are Asene stools, but it 
doesn’t mean that they can inherit the paramount stool. If you are not a royal 
of the stool, you can’t contest. If I knew that I wasn’t a royal, I would never 
contest”. Similarly, when I talked with some of the Asene people from 
Dompoase who belonged to the ruling lineage, I was told very plainly that 
“the Dompoase line is a different line”. At the moment, some of the 
remaining original members and descendants of the migrant group still live 
in Amakom, although in some sort of “semi-ostracized” state, but one can 
be sure that if and when the Amakom stool becomes vacant again their 
claims will certainly resurface in one way or another.       
In light of the recent history of Kumase, it is not at all surprising that 
dynastic conflicts occurred in Amakom during the 1950’s and early 1960’s, 
and that the newly established post-colonial state took such a keen interest 
in them. That was precisely the era when Amakom and its environs changed 
“from village to urban neighbourhood” (Berry 2001, 70-73). The territory of 
Amakom is relatively small, especially in comparison with the nephew, 
Nkoransa, which is one of the biggest traditional areas in Ghana, comprising 
more than 100 towns and villages. Amakom, on the other hand, has gone 
through some major changes. It is now one of the central districts in a city 
of one million people. A university, a polytechnic, a secondary school, and a 
sports stadium have been built on Amakom lands. A beer brewery, a Coca-
Cola bottling plant, and a great variety of smaller industries are located 
within Amakom boundaries, not to mention office buildings and modern 
residential areas. Needless to say, the land prices have skyrocketed during 
the past 50 years or so (ibid.). The current situation in Amakom is radically 
different from that of Nkoransa, where the natural resources remain largely 
unexploited and the majority of the population is still engaged in farming 
and trading as they were in the pre-colonial period. 
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3.5 Knots and boxes 
 
The two examples of dynastic relations of the Amakom ruling lineage to 
other Asene lineages show perfectly how corporate group character emerges 
in the context of segmentary relations. Basically there is a more or less 
open-ended category of clansmen, which breaks into groups in competition 
for office(s). Obviously, these divisions do not follow strictly from 
genealogical facts. In the first example, there were two groups that trace 
descent from a common ancestor and are thus in agreement that the 
members of both groups have royal status for each other’s offices. So, in 
this case, if a corporate group is to be defined from the point of view of its 
rights, it would be more appropriate to speak of one group (instead of two), 
which holds rights for two offices. In the second example, common descent 
was considered an inadequate source for status. The critical emphasis was 
put on both secret and practical knowledge as well as participation in 
collective action. However, what both cases taken together clearly 
demonstrate is that combining and dividing people into different groups 
cannot not be derived from a distinct set of rules as Fortes suggested. 
Although both cases admittedly show that the Asante themselves view 
matrilineal descent as the most important principle in their political 
organization, it is equally clear that the “descent principle” and “group 
principle” are not congruent. Even though group solidarity is conceptualized 
in descent terms, in practise it is easy to see that there are descent ties of 
greater and lesser political significance. Hence one has to distinguish Fortes’ 
analytical model, first, from the Asante actors’ mental representations of 
their own political relations and, second, from what the Asante actually do.  
When taking into consideration the interconnectedness through the 
clan system, it is now possible to see how two, or even more, abusua in 
different chiefdoms become overlapping. They are all able to provide their 
members with the status needed to fill an office in a political group other 
than what would in Fortes’ model be perceived as their own. If one wishes 
to remain faithful to Goody’s diagrammatic representation, one should then 
show the dynastic group’s connections to other descent groups that trace 
descent from the same founding ancestor, as is done in Figure 6.  
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FIGURE 6. Alleged dynastic relations between the chiefdoms of Amakom, Nkoransa, 
and Dompoase. 
 
But how advantageous is it really to represent the lineages as discrete 
rectangulars or boxes? In his treatment of the Asante lineage Fortes had 
juxtaposed it with the Lozi village, thus explaining how the former is a 
corporation both internally and externally and the latter only externally. 
Certainly, there are marked differences between unilineal descent and 
cognatic kinship, but the idea that one or the other has some intrinsic “group 
forming qualities” seems rather questionable in light of the material at hand. 
Fortes (1969a, 132-133) argued that the Lozi village system does not set 
down “absolute structural boundaries” and hence the villages should be 
thought of as “fixed mooring points in the ever-changing flow of cognatic 
relationships”. Or, and he uses Gluckman’s phrase, they could be seen as 
“knots” that shape the network of kinship ties. But could it not be equally 
said of the Asante that there is a flow of clan relations in time and space, 
which have their intersections around offices? Hence offices are the “knots” 
that give form to the web of clan relations. They seem to be an important 
reason why certain descent lines are emphasized while others are 
overlooked. This is so because in a state like Asante, which is 
fundamentally a constellation of offices, it is the connection to office that 
makes a descent group of any range or depth a constituent unit of the 
administrative structure. 
Among the Lozi, people have kinship, affinal, and friendship 
relations in other villages all over the country. Within that framework 
people assist each other in economic ventures, support one another in cases 
of sickness, and so forth (ibid., 132). However, the politically important 
relationships, those that entitle a person to farmland and village 
headmanship, are in the confines of the village. In some stateless societies 
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with cognatic kinship, like the Iban of Borneo, there are no such boundaries 
and a person’s kindred is defined simply in terms of accessibility: 
 
Kin and non-kin do not, in cognatic systems of this type, constitute 
defined “groups”, but rather an ad hoc structural polarization of 
allegiances to the actor. In systems of this type, kinship establishes 
for the actor an internal field of moral relations that are also politico-
jural relations, as against the outside world at large, on the principle 
of amity within and enmity without; and there are no rules or 
criteria by reference to which an outside observer can determine 
unequivocally where the boundaries of the field lie (ibid., 232; italics 
added). 
 
At first sight, this would seem to be the antithesis of the Asante system, 
where people are supposedly distributed to their own “compartments” 
within and from which they manage their affairs. But does it need to be so? 
In the case of the territorially dispersed matriclans, one can say that 
ultimately the boundaries of the group are set by genealogical or quasi-
genealogical criteria. But within that huge category of people, things get 
much more complicated: some clansmen are so close that succession rights 
can be shared with them, whereas some are so distant that they are not 
considered much more than strangers. Hence, determining which descent 
relations produce “politico-jural relations” is by no means an easy task. As 
my data shows, an outside observer, no matter how familiar with the rules of 
matrilineal descent among the Asante, cannot conclude who is eligible for a 
particular office. The only way of finding that out is to study it empirically, 
by examining what the actors involved are actually doing. Sometimes it has 
to do with genealogical distance, sometimes with principles other than 
descent. 
 
 
3.6 Groups on the ground, groups in the mind 
 
Fortes’ view of Asante lineages as closed groups seems even more peculiar 
when one considers his work on the Tallensi. As Charles Piot (1999, 133) 
has observed, Fortes “is completely at a loss to decide where one Tallensi 
community stops and another begins – spatially, linguistically, or 
politically”. Fortes says the same about their descent groups: they too are 
“‘overlapping’, ‘intermeshing’, ‘merging’ and ‘blending’ into one another” 
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(ibid.). My conclusion is that the same applies to political groups in Asante; 
there are no associations with fixed boundaries defined in terms of descent 
and locality. It is rather that the idea of closed group satisfies an analytical 
need to see that there is a system with definite parts, in this case lineages, 
which comprise aggregates of a higher order. This idea of “pyramidal 
segmentation”, which has its classical statement in the works of Fortes (cf., 
Southall 1956, 249-250), is ultimately based on mathematical concepts of 
hierarchy. In the so-called Eulerian model, hierarchical relation is 
understood as one between larger and smaller, or more correctly, between 
the one that encompasses and the one that is encompassed (Leach 1971, 
234). In the case of Asante political groups, the conditions for establishing 
such a hierarchy are not complied with: the lineages do not encompass their 
members, and the chiefdoms do not encompass their lineages. So, the 
Asante state is not a hierarchical series of groups, a group of groups, if 
groups are to be seen as empirical facts, as actual masses of people “who 
can be seen and counted and plotted in space and time”, as Evans-Pritchard 
(1969, 266) once put it. In this sense, the Asante kingdom and the nation 
state that surrounds it are incomparable as political groups.  
However, this does not rule out the fact that the Asante themselves 
think and talk about their political relations by referring to exclusive groups 
and principles of matrilineal descent regulating group recruitment and 
relations, although what they actually do might not be in congruence with 
these notions. Posing questions, giving testimonies, making arguments, and 
passing judgements in courts would not be possible without these shared 
notions about the “enduring form of their society” (Holy 1979, 13), even if 
there is no direct relationship between the lineage structure (as perceived by 
the actors) and the observed social processes. As Greg Urban (1996, 135-
146) points out, the descent theorists’ “obsession” about groups is 
understandable in the sense that there was a very strong “circulating 
discourse” of descent rules and groups in the societies that they studied. 
However, it is another thing to assume the social group and its 
representation to be identical. Ladislav Holy, following Peter Caws (1974), 
makes a distinction between actor’s representational models, which 
correspond to the way the actor thinks and/or says things are, and 
operational models, which correspond to the way he/she practically 
responds or acts (Holy 1979, 12). The difference between the two models 
derives from their differing degrees of generality and their “differing roles 
in legitimising and interpreting the ongoing social transactions” (ibid.). 
Operational models consists of norms that are situation specific and from 
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the point of view of the representational model they may be seen as 
“contingencies”, whereas representational models are ideologies, which 
“transcend specific interactional situations and have an existence beyond 
and above them” (ibid., 13). So, in real life interactions the ideas about the 
enduring form of the society provide merely one factor to be considered, in 
addition to which the actors have “a number of other notions about their 
political relations and processes, which equally form part of their conceptual 
universe” (ibid., 11). For example, in the court case regarding the royal 
status of the immigrant group, the central part of the arguments of both 
parties was about demonstrable matrilineal descent as the most important 
criterion for group membership, but in a certain situation secret and 
practical knowledge suddenly took the place of shared ancestry as the 
decisive factor.  
Holy’s views are similar to those that Verdon (1980) has called 
ideological or political definitions of descent. What these analytical 
definitions have in common is that they do not consider descent as a 
principle of group recruitment, but see it as an ideology, which serves to 
pattern political relations. For instance, Sahlins (1965, 104-106) has argued 
that a “descent doctrine does not express group compositions but imposes 
itself upon the composition” and therefore it is “in the first place a political 
design, exercising arbitrary constraints on the supposition of ancestry”. 
What is the strength of that sort of ideology? Why are actors constantly 
referring to it, even though it cannot directly explain action? According to 
M. G. Smith (1956, 65-66), the ideology of descent “assumes invariance and 
uniformity in the constitution and relations of the differentiated units, while 
permitting their internal differentiation, cohesion, or development according 
to circumstance, and rationalizing these departures as consistent [with it]”. 
This flexibility or arbitrariness is clearly visible in the above statements 
made by the Asante themselves. For instance, by referring to descent 
principles it is possible to exclude some people from the group by saying 
that they are not royals just because they are related and include other 
people in the group by maintaining that they are royals because they are 
related. To put it simply, descent as a representational model is particularly 
unconstrained. However, it has to be understood that the ideological 
discourse is not irrelevant to the political action. It is not that the Asante do 
whatever they choose in every situation and then just explain it away by 
reference to the “descent dogma”. The descent ideology is not merely an “a 
posteriori justification of conduct” (Karp & Maynard 1983, 483-484). On 
the contrary, as Ivan Karp and Kent Maynard have pointed out, “the 
 68 
genealogical process of classification does not merely legitimize political 
action; it helps to formulate it” (ibid., 484). Thus when it is thought or 
uttered that “those are the Asene people of Asamankese, those are the Asene 
people of Dompoase, but we are the Asene people of Amakom”, it is not 
done only to justify political action. Such a thought or utterance also 
provides “an index of actors’ hopes, aspirations, and strategies in their 
political relationships” (ibid.). It tells about the way the actor thinks things 
should be.   
As a final point, it can be said that the Asante ideas about their 
political relations are based on groups, such as the abusua, matrilineages, 
and the aman, chiefdoms, and membership and citizenship in them. 
However, an outside observer is mistaken if he/she takes it as an accurate 
description of ongoing social processes and builds his/her analytical model 
of the Asante political structure on it. Consequently, determining a person’s 
politico-jural status directly from the tenets of this ideology is not possible. 
As an ideology or cultural logic, the segmentary lineage system is also 
extended to offices. Thus offices are classified according to the clan identity 
of the lineage in which they are vested; for instance, it is said that “the 
Amakom stool is an Asene stool”. Furthermore, the stool gives clan identity 
to the whole polity. One can thus say, for example, that “Nkoransa belongs 
to Asene” or “Nkoransa is Asene”. Through this extension, the offices, the 
chiefs occupying them, and their polities become related to each other. 
Therefore it is possible to say that “the Amakomhene is an uncle to the 
Nkoransahene” or “Amakom and Nkoransa are brothers”. In the following 
chapter I will show how the segmentary lineage system, in fact, forms a 
basis for a hierarchy of offices, which exists in conjunction with a different 
kind of hierarchy; namely that of the Asante state, based on oaths of 
allegiance. 
 
                                                                             
   
69 
4 CHIEFS AND THEIR CLANS: DESCENT AND HIERARCHY 
 
During the very early days of my fieldwork I visited a friend of mine in a 
town on the shoreline of Lake Volta, outside Asante territory. There I met a 
man who introduced himself as a full brother to the head of one of the north-
eastern Asante chiefdoms close to the savannah belt. I told him about my 
research and he seemed to be interested in what exactly I wanted to study. 
After hearing me out he said: “If you want to study the Asante chieftaincy, 
the first thing you have to do is to find out to which clans the different stools 
belong”. At the time, I must admit, I did not fully understand the full 
significance of this advice. Familiar with the works of the anthropologists 
and historians, I thought that the central issue in chieftaincy is the authority 
relations founded on the oath of allegiance. To put it in simple terms, I 
thought I should find out who is under whom, and not who is related to 
whom. However, during the ensuing months of fieldwork it became 
painstakingly clear to me that the so-called chain of command was 
complemented by, and indeed many times compromised by, a huge network 
of relations based on clanship, kinship, and friendship. When I returned to 
the lakeside afterwards and met my royal friend again, I found myself in the 
middle of a “chieftaincy-quiz”. Over a bottle of beer, he gave me the name 
of an office and I had to tell him to which clan it belonged, or conversely, he 
would mention a clan and then I should list as many offices that I could that 
belonged to that particular clan. At the end of the “quiz” I was congratulated 
in a very hospitable Ghanaian manner: “Oh, you have done well. Now you 
know something about Asante chieftaincy”.  
In African Political Systems states and stateless societies were 
treated as markedly different kind of structures. Perhaps most importantly, 
the role of kinship in their political organization was understood to be 
dissimilar. In small-scale stateless societies political structure and kinship 
organization were “completely fused” and in those of larger scale, like the 
Tallensi and Nuer, the lineage structure was “the framework of the political 
system” (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1969, 6-7). State societies, on the other 
hand, were organized “on totally different principles”; they had an 
administrative organization, which in many cases resembled “the pattern 
with which we are familiar in the modern nation-state” (ibid., 6). To my 
mind, Fortes’ work on the Asante was a major departure from this point of 
view. In Kinship and Social Order his aim was to investigate “the 
relationship of kinship system to polity in tribal society – more precisely, to 
explore the structural interconnections between certain specific 
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mechanisms, processes, and norms of kinship and descent systems on the 
one hand and the political and jural framework within which they operate” 
(1972, 283). The “Ashanti model” then showed how “the ideology of 
matrilineal descent embodied in the lineage system is the medium for the 
articulation of the familial domain with the politico-jural domain”(ibid., 
287). As noted above, this meant in practise that citizenship and royal status 
are allocated according to principles of kinship and descent. Thus, even in a 
state society like Asante, kinship is not left out of politics, to the level of 
domestic and interpersonal ties. Simply put, kinship ties together the 
political institutions and the social structure. And this, I think, was also 
Fortes’ suggestion for solution of “the ostensible paradox of a centralized 
Asante state existing in tandem with a segmentary lineage system” 
(McCaskie 1995a, 77), which has perplexed other anthropologists as well 
(e.g., Basehart 1962, 281). However, as the field anecdote above proposes, 
there is another way of looking at it. Namely, when the ideology of 
segmentary lineage system is extended to the chiefly offices, their relations 
can also be patterned according to principles of descent. Hence, the notion 
of kinship also orders the relations between political institutions and not 
only relations between people and institutions. These relations may also take 
a hierarchical form. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the principles 
that define such hierarchies and, finally, discuss what is their relationship to 
the hierarchy of ranked offices defined and sanctioned by the state.  
 
 
4.1 Hierarchy as a chain of command 
 
The relationships between the offices within a chiefdom were and still are 
expressed in a military idiom. According to Fortes (1969a, 150) the army of 
a chiefdom was made up of “lineage contingents grouped in companies, 
each under a captain who, in peace time, served as a councillor”. Military 
service was expressly a lineage obligation. All able-bodied men of a lineage 
formed a single fighting unit, which was led by their lineage head. Every 
unit was given an area of operations, for instance, members of a particular 
lineage formed the main body, Adonten, of the field army, and accordingly 
the head of the lineage was titled Adontenhene, the commander of the main 
body.1 All units were subordinate to the paramount chief, and he was the 
                                                 
1
 In addition to the military title, a lineage head or a divisional chief might be called after 
the original name of the group that he represents, which can be derived from its clan 
identity or place of residence or origin (see Dunn & Robertson 1973, 23-24, 180-184). For 
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supreme commander of the whole army. The war organization of different 
Akan chiefdoms varied in some details, but they were all modelled 
according to a standard type (see Rattray 1929). So, it follows that the 
lineage heads are also military commanders (asafohinfo], sing. asafohene), 
and at least in principle, kinsmen fought side by side under the command of 
the head of their own abusua. Fortes (1969a, 160-161) argued that the 
military organization, which formed the basis of the titled offices, required 
“seven – and only seven – primary positions of command apart from the 
chief’s” and this number would then correlate with the number of 
matriclans. Thus in the chiefdom there would be an office to facilitate 
people from every clan. Another important aspect was their structural 
autonomy: “authority and responsibility were so distributed among them 
that each had a function independent of those of the others and all were 
necessary for the defence and the normal government of the chiefdom” 
(ibid., 161). The major implication from this is that all the offices in the 
chief’s council are equal in rank, the chief’s office being primus inter pares. 
And since office gives a descent group its political status, then all the 
descent groups of same structural level are of equal rank. There is no 
hierarchy between the offices forming the chief’s council because their 
“only bond with one another on the political level was their common 
allegiance to the chiefly stool” (ibid.). So, the only tie that creates 
hierarchies between offices is the one created by the oath of allegiance. 
The oath of allegiance is reciprocal: the elders swear it collectively 
to the chief and receive it from him collectively. For example, in Nkoransa 
the elders take the following oath to the Nkoransahene: 
 
How my ancestors served yours likewise will I serve you; If I do not 
help you in any way I violate Boakye, Kwasiada and Yawda 
(PRAAD ARG 1/2/12/10).2 
 
The chief, in his turn, answers: 
 
                                                                                                                            
instance, the Nifahene of Nkoransa, “the commander of the right wing”, and his people 
occupy a place called Seseman and hence he is most often called the Sesemanhene. 
2
 Boakye, Kwasiada, and Yawda are “names of oaths”, which refer to some known disasters 
that have fallen on the Nkoransa stool. In an oath a person conditions the welfare and 
stability of the community on his/her/others’ actions by making a reference to some 
specific misfortune of the past. The oath is sanctioned by the chief to whose stool the oath 
in question belongs (see RAI MS 106: 18: 2150 for the origin and meaning of the Nkoransa 
oaths). 
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I swear Kwasiada, Yawda, and Boakye that I will follow the 
example of my ancestors and obey what my elders will tell me 
(ibid.). 
 
The verbal content of oaths differs from one chiefdom to another. In a 
number of oaths some specific responsibilities are mentioned, for example, 
the chief swears not to wage war against his sub-chiefs, not to seduce the 
wives of his subjects, or not to run away in battle (Rattray 1929, 165-166). 
Sometimes the content can be rather abstract, for instance, an elder might 
pledge that he will respond to his chief’s call whether he is called at day or 
night (ibid., 86-87). Generally speaking, the oath does not enumerate the 
rights and obligations of the parties concerned, it rather re-confirms the tie 
or union formed by the ancestors. However, this seeming abstractness does 
not mean that the people involved do not take the oaths very concretely. As 
one of my informants affirmed: “If you have sworn that you will respond to 
his [chief’s] call, you have to do so. It is not a matter to be taken lightly! I 
think it’s only in case of sickness that you don’t have to respond. Otherwise 
there is no excuse”. A violation of oath is considered both “a politico-jural 
delict and act of sacrilege”, which falls under the jurisdiction of the chief or 
the king (Fortes 1969a, 153-155). 
However, although the relationship is dyadic, it forms a link in a 
chain of similar relationships. As the elders pledge allegiance to their chief, 
similarly the chief does to his overlord. At the top end of the chain is the 
king, the Asantehene, and at the low end the chiefs of the most inferior rank, 
like the village headmen (adekurofo], sing. odekuro) and their elders. What 
in Fortes’ parlance is called ]man, a chiefdom, is an analytical construct. In 
reality the chiefdoms, which are nowadays often called “paramountcies”, 
consist of several layers of offices, each layer tied together by common 
allegiance to a particular overlord. Hence one could say that the chiefdom is 
made of several miniature chiefdoms organized according to the same 
model: the paramount chief’s elders have their own councils of elders, who 
in turn might have their councils, and so forth. Commands of the chief to his 
subjects have to be “transmitted through the appropriate hierarchy of chiefs, 
councillors, headmen, and lineage elders in proper sequence”, and 
conversely, “a citizen’s relations to his politico-jural superiors were 
mediated through the same series of steps” (ibid., 145). Thus, according to 
Fortes, the hierarchy of offices could be represented as “a series of 
concentric circles of authority and privilege”, as Rattray had done (ibid.; see 
Figure 7). 
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Despite the outward complexity of Figure 7, its main proposition is fairly 
simple. Rattray (1929, 403-405) created this model primarily for showing 
how “decentralization” was the fundamental principle of the “Ashanti 
Constitution”. For instance, if the paramount chief of A wishes to give an 
order to his subject residing in village A5, he must always do it through A2, 
or more precisely, the chief of subdivision A2 will convey the message to 
the village head of A5, who will forward it to a lineage elder, who will give 
it to the subject in question. Furthermore, there are no collateral “lines of 
communication” between the constituent parts of the chiefdom. For 
example, villages B1 and A5 are connected to each other only through their 
common allegiance to the paramount chief. To put it more figuratively, the 
circles never touch each other; they are connected only through the centre of 
the greater circle.  
So, basically, Fortes and Rattray both saw the hierarchy of offices 
among the Asante as a chain of command. This more or less corresponds to 
what is understood by hierarchy in “modern common sense”. Whether it is 
called a “power hierarchy” or “military hierarchy”, it is ultimately a system 
of graduated authority (see Dumont 1980, 65). However, it has to be added 
that although the political authority seems to stem from the king or the 
paramount chief and radiate downwards to the sub-chiefs of different orders, 
there is still a certain degree of autonomous political power on all levels of 
segmentation. So, there is no ultimate monopoly to political authority at the 
top, which would then be merely delegated further to the lower levels. That 
is the reason why political anthropologists have often called Asante a 
segmentary state in order to distinguish it from a so-called unified state (see 
Southall 1956). But what if, for example, one is told that in Figure 7 the 
chief of A3 is senior to the chief of A4, although they are on the same ladder 
in the power hierarchy? Or, alternatively, one is told that the chiefs of D, 
A1, D2, F2, and A7 all belong to the same matriclan and the chief D2 is 
their head. They are on different ladders, but the one claiming headship is 
not the one on the highest ladder? Obviously, these are all hierarchical 
relations, but they cannot be explained by reference to the chain of 
command. Yet these kinds of relationships do exist and are constantly 
discussed by the Asante themselves. In such instances the chiefs in question 
are usually connected through clanship, kinship, or friendship, or they may 
be considered neighbours in a particular area. In order to explain how such 
relationships are constituted, I will first have to discuss briefly the concept 
of clan. 
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FIGURE 7. An Asante chiefdom and its component parts described in a 
diagrammatical form by Rattray (1929, 97). 
Legend:  
The outer circle A represents a chiefdom under a paramount chief, who is represented 
by the centre of the circle. Inside circle A there is a smaller circle B with points 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 marked on its boundary line. They stand for the elders, through whom the 
villages represented by circles D, E, F, and G swear allegiance to the paramount chief. 
Circle C contains all of them thus representing the capital of the chiefdom. Outside C 
there are slightly smaller circles A1, A2, A3, and A4, which stand for the four 
subdivisions within the chiefdom owing allegiance directly to the paramount chief. 
Within the subdivisions there exists an organization exactly similar, although in a 
smaller scale, to that which is included in the greater circle A. Each subdivision has its 
chief’s capital (C1, C2), the villages within the capital (B1, B2, D2, E2, F2, and G2), 
and outlying villages under subordinate chiefs (A5, A6, A7, and A8). The lines leading 
from the centres signify the lines of communication between chiefs (Rattray 1929 96-
98). 
 
 
4.2 What is a clan? 
 
Fortes established that abusua is equated with brotherhood and thus it 
implies amity. As a lineage abusua is “descent translated into specific jural, 
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political, and ritual rights and duties, commitments and privileges”, whereas 
as a clan its meaning is much more vague. According to Fortes, the Asante 
themselves see it as “amity innate in the ties of siblingship extended to the 
farthest limits of putative co-descent” (Fortes 1969a, 161-162). Hence 
clanship too connotes brotherhood, but on a more generalized level, which 
is exemplified, among other things, by hospitality provided to a clansman 
visiting from another locality. Here one easily gets the impression that the 
nuclear family (mother-child and sibling bonds), the lineage, and the clan 
together comprise a single field of amity, in which harmony and goodwill 
are strongest at the core and weakest at the margins. However, Fortes 
refuted such notions, for instance, Bronislaw Malinowski’s views on 
“extensions” of intrafamilial kinship relations underlying classificatory 
kinship terminology (ibid., 67-68). Thus to speak of a single field of amity 
would be a misinterpretation, because although all three relationships 
mentioned are conceptualised in descent terms, Fortes saw them as based on 
entirely different principles and therefore incommensurate. On the one hand, 
relations within the nuclear family are based on moral imperatives that 
ultimately go back to biological and psychological facts that define human 
existence. An Asante mother does not love her children because it is her 
obligation to do so according to her lineage status; she does so because she 
is human and thus predetermined to put first the well-being of her offspring. 
These relationships have nothing to do with descent as such: a father’s love 
for his children is as unconditioned and “natural” as the mother’s even 
though in a system of matrilineal descent he is not recognized as a 
predecessor of his children (ibid., 191-192). On the other hand, the 
solidarity within the descent group, namely the lineage, was based on jural 
imperatives. The norms that regulate the relations within the lineage could 
not be directly derived from the same moral elements that are constitutive of 
filial relations. Thus descent relations should not be seen as “extended” 
parental or sibling relations. On the contrary, the two types of relations 
could be seen in an opposed relationship: the moral imperatives and 
emotions that indissolubly and universally belong to parenthood put limits 
to the external authority of the lineage or the state in respect to the 
reproductive nucleus.3  
                                                 
3
 Sylvia Yanagisako (1987, 114-115) has stressed this idea of opposition in her reading of 
Fortes. Her observation points to an interesting contradiction in Fortes’ thought. On the one 
hand, he says that filial relations connect groups to each other, but on the other, he seems to 
think it possible that the reproductive nucleus is antithetical to groups. 
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The third type, clanship, seems difficult to fit into these normative 
categories. The Akan clan consists of “politically discrete regional 
sections”, these being the localized lineages, and clansmen from different 
polities were not connected by jural ties as lineage members were, even 
though, genealogically speaking, both relationships are founded on shared 
matrilineal descent. Instead of clearly defined jural principles, the ties of 
clanship were upheld by “the belief in the immortality and sempiternity of 
the clan system” (Fortes 1969a, 161-162). Thus Fortes saw that clanship 
was not political kinship in the way that lineage kinship was. In terms of the 
structural domains, clanship in a centralized political system proved difficult 
to accommodate; it seemed to have more in common with cognatic systems 
than segmentary lineage systems. For instance, among the Tallensi 
solidarity within both the lineage and the clan was governed by same set of 
principles, so that the latter could be seen as an extension of the former 
(Fortes 1969b, 244-250). Accordingly, the maximal lineages were the 
smallest and the clans the largest “corporate units that emerge in political 
action” (ibid., 103). The Akan clan, in contrast, had “corporate 
characteristics”, but it never emerged as a unit of political action and thus 
could not be considered a corporation like a lineage could (Fortes 1969a, 
161-162). In both societies, Tallensi and Asante, lineage and clan relations 
are distinguished from other kinship relations because they are defined 
according to the principles of unilineal descent, but the ways in which these 
relations are regulated differ significantly. Among the Tallensi lineage and 
clan solidarity, embodied in rights and duties, has its foundation in the 
“moral premises” of the society, more precisely, in “the axiom that kinship 
is binding in its own right” (Fortes 1969b, 249). Ultimately, the social order 
is seen to be sanctioned by the ancestors (ibid., 144). Among the Asante the 
internal and external relations of the lineage are “subject to the jural 
regulation of the state”, which rested in the state’s command of organised 
force (Fortes 1969a, 158-159). An important and direct implication from 
this is that clanship, and consequently the whole concept of descent, has a 
different meaning in stateless societies than it has in state societies. Thus 
employing parallel terminology tends to create confusion.4  
However, Fortes did not consider clan ties to be completely 
insignificant in the Asante political organization. For him the Asante state 
was “a union of political communities bound to one another by chains of 
                                                 
4
 On a more general level, the early critics of the structural-functionalist school had pointed 
out that the terms lineage and clan had been applied to various societies without sufficient 
reference to the differences in their overall structure (Fried 1957, 6-7). 
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interlocked allegiances to the eminent office within a framework of law and 
of fiscal, religious, and military organization, reinforced by a network of 
clanship, dynastic kinship, and marriage ties” (ibid., 154). Hence in this 
scheme of things the clan system is an important “unifying force” (Fortes 
1962, 260): 
 
Chiefs who belong to the same clan call one another ‘brother’ and 
this is not a mere title of courtesy. Often this connexion has the 
support of a tradition that the founders of the chiefships were the 
sons of one mother. Chiefs thus fraternally related often consult 
together over urgent public issues irrespective of their immediate 
allegiances. When one of them is installed, his brother chiefs send 
him obligatory gifts and he, in turn, sends gifts to thank them. They 
may have special ceremonial duties at his installation; and again, 
when a chief dies his brother chiefs must attend the funeral with 
special gifts and may have ceremonial duties in connexion with it. 
These ties are thought of as holding between chiefdoms – the stools 
– not as being personal, and they often in the past formed the basis 
of concerted political action (ibid.). 
 
What is remarkable here is the precedence of political allegiance and a jural 
framework over association based on common descent (or other 
institutions). “The network of clanship” is a subservient system to the 
system of allegiances, and thus it simply has secondary, consolidating 
functions. It could not be regarded as an equivalent, alternative system of 
association: the territorially scattered lineages were politically discrete, and 
hence kin groups of larger scale, the matriclans, lacked political unity. This 
view has had a major impact on the ways in which the relations between 
offices within the chiefdom and the state have been seen. 
 
 
4.3 Seniority 
 
A good analytical tool for discussing the hierarchical relations between 
chiefs of the same clan is the concept of the order of precedence used by 
James Fox (1994). Much like Louis Dumont’s (1980) concept of hierarchy 
it is based on the idea of oppositions. Certain opposite categories are 
ordered asymmetrically in such a way that one member of the opposition is 
greater than the other. For example, in case of the Asante, it can be said that 
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older is considered superior to younger or indigenous is superior to migrant. 
Hence, as Fox (1994, 98) puts it, the “categorical asymmetry is effected by 
imposition of value”. To create precedence, the categories used must be 
both asymmetric and complementary, and used recursively. Thus a simple 
line of precedence follows this kind of pattern: 
 
a > b/a  > b/a  > b 
 
Older > younger/older > younger/older > younger 
Indigenous > migrant/indigenous > migrant/indigenous > migrant 
 
Unlike Dumont’s idea of hierarchy, there is no single dominant opposition 
that constitutes a hierarchy. The hierarchies emerge from the interaction of 
valued oppositions. According to Fox, “both the priorities given to different 
oppositions by different groups within the same society and the various 
valencies of these oppositions give rise to social hierarchy”. Since 
precedence is always a matter of social contention, it also becomes subject 
to complicated processes of reordering (ibid.). So, both the importance of a 
specific category for precedence and the value imposed to it can be 
questioned by the other members of the society. One set of categories may 
be used to dispute another in order to argue a case of precedence. A very 
simplistic, but yet pertinent, example of such situation could be the 
challenge between the younger uncle and older nephew mentioned in the 
first chapter. There the genealogical category of older > younger (i.e., uncle 
> nephew) is contested by the temporal category of older > younger. 
Among the Asante, hierarchies between chiefs who are connected 
through the segmentary lineage system, bilateral kinship, friendship or 
spatial cohabitation are based on the idea of seniority.5 Sometimes seniority 
has to do with a favourer position granted by a common overlord, such as 
the Asantehene. However, very often seniority is legitimated by reference to 
categories of valued oppositions. For instance, a chief may claim that he is 
the senior because he is the oldest (in terms of the genealogical or temporal 
age of his office) of the chiefs who belong to a certain group or category. Or 
he may say that he is the senior because he is the descendant of the 
indigenous inhabitants of an area occupied by a group of chiefs. Very often, 
but not nearly always, seniority and authority coincide. For example, as 
mentioned earlier, the position of the ruling lineage of a chiefdom is 
                                                 
5
 Seniority here refers to precedence, not temporal or genealogical age. Both can be used to 
legitimate precedence. The Twi term panin can be understood either as precedence or older 
age, depending on the context. 
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legitimated by the ancestral occupation of land, which many times refers to 
the idea that the lineage ancestors first discovered and populated the area, 
which later became to constitute the territory of the polity. However, in 
contrast to the chain of command, seniority is very debatable and it is 
frequently contested on differing grounds. 
To illustrate the idea of seniority I will present two ethnographic 
examples. The first case, already familiar, concerns seniority in the Adonten 
group of Kumase. The second discusses the headship of chiefs belonging to 
the Asene matriclan in the chiefdom of Kwawu. In both cases the chiefs in 
question belong to the same clan and polity. Although the two cases are 
similar in many respects, they exemplify two different kinds of relations 
between the chain of command and seniority. In the Adonten case, the 
chiefs swear allegiance to the same overlord and their relations are confined 
within an “administrative category”, but in the Kwawu case all of the chiefs 
have different overlords and hence their relationships cross-cut the chain of 
allegiance.  
 
 
4.3.1 The brothers 
 
Fox emphasizes that an important feature of any line of precedence is that it 
has “an initial term or inception point”. Therefore the order of precedence is 
always concerned with origins or sources (ibid., 98). In the Asante case both 
relations, those of seniority and authority, have their legitimation in the past, 
in history and myth. I have explained how the chiefly offices are related 
through the segmentary lineage system, or more specifically, on the grounds 
that their founding ancestors were thought to have been matrilineally 
related. Similarly, one’s place in the military organization is also explained 
by reference to the foundation of the polity.6 So, in order to understand the 
relationships between chiefs, one has to know when, how, and why the 
chiefs are considered to have become connected in the first place. Hence, 
the origins of the polities, localities, and clans are of decisive importance. In 
case of the Adonten group, everything goes back to the time when Kumase 
was established as the capital of the Asante kingdom. 
Usually, Akwamu, a chiefdom southeast from Asante, is credited for 
having introduced this new “politico-military form of government”. The 
                                                 
6
 It is important to note that the military idiom itself entails the idea of subordination, or 
rather the chain of command. For example, when a chief is called a Nifahene, it implies at 
the same time that he is a Nifahene to someone; he commands someone’s right wing. 
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historians maintain that the Asante adopted the Akwamu military pattern 
towards the end of the seventeenth century, and furthermore, in the course 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth century refined it by adding new elements 
(e.g., Kea 1971, 207-211). The emergence of the military organization is 
described in the Asante traditional accounts about Asantehene Osei Tutu’s 
development from an irresponsible and dangerous youth to a grown man 
and a chief. The outline of the tradition can be given as follows. The 
chiefdom of Kwaman (later renamed Kumase) was held as a tributary state 
by the kingdom of Denkyira, a southern neighbour of Asante. A young 
Kwaman royal, Osei Tutu, had been sent as a hostage to the court of 
Denkyira. While in Denkyira, Osei Tutu stole gold and other valuables 
belonging to the court and also attempted to kill the Denkyirahene through 
magic. Osei Tutu managed to escape back to Kwaman with chasers on his 
heels. His uncle, Obiri Yeboa, who was the chief of Kwaman at the time, 
was shocked by his unruly behaviour and sent him to Takyiman to look for 
shelter from the revenge of the Denkyirahene. In Takyiman Osei Tutu took 
the queen mother as his lover and while sleeping together killed her, 
beheaded her, stole her gold, and ran away back home. Enraged, Obiri 
Yeboa warned Osei Tutu not to disappoint him for a third time, and the 
wayward nephew was sent for the last time to seek refuge in Akwamu. 
While Osei Tutu was in Akwamu, Obiri Yeboa decided to wage war on the 
neighbouring people of Domaa. This particular conflict, known as the first 
Domaa war, was the last one fought without firearms, and moreover, the 
Kwaman army attacked the enemy in one group without covering their sides 
or their back. Consequently, the Kwaman were defeated and Obiri Yeboa 
was captured and killed.7 In the meantime, Osei Tutu had stayed in 
Akwamu and made a close study of their military organization. When the 
news of his uncle’s death reached Akwamu, Osei Tutu decided to rush back 
to Kwaman and accept the office of his late uncle that had been offered to 
him. Komfo Anokye, a traditional priest, to whom he had been introduced in 
Akwamu, accompanied him. On his way he performed several feats of 
valour. In Kwaman he vowed revenge on Domaahene Domaa Kusi, the 
killer of his uncle. He started preparing for war by arranging the army into 
different groups, each having a separate function, and training the soldiers to 
                                                 
7
 I was told by Domaahene Agyeaman Badu II in 2001 that the skull of Obiri Yeboa is still 
kept in the main palace at Domaa. During their annual yam festival the Domaahene places 
his foot on the skull, thus commemorating the historical victory and chiefly power over 
external enemies. Likewise, the skull of Domaahene Domaa Kusi, the slayer of Obiri 
Yeboa, was (and most probably still is) deposited in Kumase, and used in a similar manner 
during the Odwira festival (McCaskie 1995a, 214). 
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use guns. Finally, he led his army to the battlefield, drove away the Domaa 
from their lands, and killed Domaa Kusi (IAS/AS 39; McCaskie 1992, 238-
241; Otamakuro Adubofuor 2000, 3-4; Wilks 1993, 103-106). 
The story tells of a transformation on three separate levels: 
personality, technology, and organization. First of all, when exiled to 
Akwamu Osei Tutu puts aside his past life as a killer and thief and gets 
reformed. He acknowledges his own membership in the abusua and the 
state, i.e., he sees himself for the first time as the successor of his uncle and 
a chief in the making. As McCaskie (1992, 238) has put it, Osei Tutu 
internalizes “the behavioural norms deemed mandatory to human status (and 
appropriate to his privileged rank)”. Consequently, he assumes the 
responsibility of avenging the death of his uncle. The maturation process 
has put an end to homelessness, solitary existence, and negligence of duties 
and agreements. The two other transformations that followed were the 
external outcome of the first one, as well as elements of the maturation 
process as a whole: through the renewal of warfare, Osei Tutu’s kingship 
becomes fully developed. By defeating the Domaa in battle, Osei Tutu is 
able to add something (e.g., land, captives, heroic deeds) to the kingship. A 
new technology is introduced; obsolete weapons are replaced by firearms. 
The third, and in terms of this study the most important, level of 
transformation is organizational: the component offices of the chiefdom are 
reassigned to new military functions and they are renamed with new 
military titles. This is generally considered to be the origin of the distinct 
military units (often referred to as “divisions”, “wings”, or “clans”) in 
Kumase and subsequently in other Asante chiefdoms. 
The administrative structure and military organization of Kumase in 
the “post-Osei Tutu era” is somewhat different from “the common Akan 
type”. The Kumase army has also been divided into task-oriented fighting 
units, and military service is, in principle, a lineage obligation. The basic 
difference is that in Kumase each unit is composed of several offices (and 
their subjects) of diverse lineage and clan origins. In fact, such a unit is a 
group of chiefdoms, each of which was organized internally according to 
the traditional model. Accordingly, a member of a group is theoretically 
capable of waging war either as a component of his own group (and the 
Kumase army) or separately as an independent chiefdom. Such an aggregate 
is called fekuo (pl. afekuo) meaning “a group of persons sharing something 
in common” (McCaskie 1980, 190). The afekuo were created by successive 
Asantehene, and ties of friendship and/or kinship hold them together. The 
birth of the most ancient afekuo dates back to the times of Osei Tutu and 
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Komfo Anokye. The most recent addition to the number of afekuo took 
place in 1995, when Asantehene Opoku Ware II created the Nkosuo fekuo.  
The origin and development of the fekuo institution is well 
exemplified by the Adonten fekuo of Kumase (see Figure 8). The original 
number and names of offices that formed the Adonten group is vague, since 
some of the original members have been elevated to paramountcy and are 
not considered as subdivisions of the Kumase chiefdom anymore. These 
include Nkoransa, Agona, and Asaman. However, their ties to the group 
remain strong and, in one way or another, they are still considered as 
members. According to Amakomhene Akosa Yiadom II, the present 
members of the Adonten group are the chiefdoms of Eduabin, Amakom, 
Antoa, Akyawkrom, and Kwamo, which all belong to the Asene clan, and 
Asanso, Abenkyim, Aboaso, and Ayiaase, which belong to the Ekuona 
clan.8 Because of its antiquity Amakom is called Adonten Piesie, “the 
firstborn of the Adonten group”. Although senior in age, Amakom is not the 
most senior administratively: the leader of the group, the Adontenhene, is 
the chief of Eduabin, and he commands his junior brothers in war where the 
Adonten group constitutes the main body of the field army. In Eduabin 
traditions the group was brought together for the first time by Eduabinhene 
Aduonin Pim when the Asante chiefs were asked to fight a supernatural 
enemy: 
 
…Okomfo Anokye threw a searching question to the would-be 
Ashanti nation, “Who will be able to fight with the fairies or 
ghosts?” Adontin Pim (…) responded to this request of Okomfo 
Anokye. He said he would fight with the fairies or ghosts with 
alacrity (…) The Ghost’s War, it is said, was caused by the 
Juabenhene and the Adontenhene of Kumasi, then known as 
Aduabinhene who negotiated with his brothers known as “Aseniefo” 
for this war. The Aseniefo or Asenie group which he consulted about 
the war were as follows:- 
 
Amakomhene – Akosa Yiadom 
Akyawkramhene – Tutu Anpim 
                                                 
8
 Sometimes Otikrom is also mentioned as a member of the Adonten group. The ruling 
lineage of Otikrom belongs to the Aduana clan and is a cadet line of the ruli ng lineage of 
the chiefdom of Assumegya. Otikrom had joined the Adonten group temporarily during the 
rebellion of 1900-1901 against the British (Tordoff 1965, 230). Traditionally, Otikrom 
belongs to the Benkum fekuo (i.e., the left wing). See also Lewin (1978, 227) for some 
additional members in the late nineteenth century.  
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Antoahene – Sakodie Date 
 
He further negotiated with five Ekuona Chiefs, namely 
Asamanghene, Asansohene, Abenkyimhene, Aboasohene and 
Ayaasehene (…) The war with fairies it is said was one of a 
marvellous event because nothing was seen at the spot in question by 
the Adontenhene and his colleagues only gun shots and noise were 
heard. So after considerable fighting, the Adontenhene and 
colleagues having bravely fought these fairies, took to their heels 
(…) So the Adontenhene Aduonin Pim and his brothers defeated the 
fairies and captured them (IAS/AS 95). 
 
Due to this initial success the same composition was used when Osei Tutu 
fought the Domaa, after which the chief of Eduabin was permanently 
appointed as the Adontenhene (ibid.). However, traditional accounts from 
other chiefdoms do not mention “The Ghost’s War”, and Amakom 
traditions even testify that the Adontenhene is merely a caretaker of the title. 
The present Amakomhene states that “as Adonten Piesie, Amakom used to 
be the leader of the Adonten group”, but due to certain circumstances they 
had lost that status. One of his predecessors, Amakomhene Kwaku Atta, 
described to the colonial administrators how the first chief of Amakom, 
Akosa Yiadom, lost the title to the chief of Eduabin who had held a junior 
position prior to that. Hence in a government enquiry it was established that  
 
…[I]t was in prospect of the 3rd. DOMENA war (when the enemy 
were routed and their King slain) that the army was organized and 
his [Kwaku Atta’s] predecessor AKUSA YADOM appointed Head 
of the ADONTEN Division. In this war BUAKYI DANQUAH the 
Head of the EDUABIN family took part under AKUSA YADOM. In 
the 1st DENKYIRA war (when their King NTIM JAKARI was 
slain) AKUSA YADOM continued ADONTENHENE. BUAKYI 
DANQUAH was then dead. In the 2nd. DENKYIRA war AKUSA 
YADOM was too old to fight and he appointed the 
EDUABINHENE EDUANIM PIM, who succeeded BUAKYI 
DANQUAH, to lead the ADONTEN in his stead. During this war 
AKUSA YADOM died and his successor EDUPENIN was a child.  
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So when EDUANIM PIM returned victorious from the war he 
refused to restore to AMAKOM the symbols of his leadership – the 
horn and state umbrella. The King acquiesced in this usurpation and 
EDUANIM PIM continued to lead the ADONTENS in subsequent 
wars, and his successors have been regarded ever since as 
ADONTENHENE (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128a). 
 
The two traditions claim different principles as constitutive to the hierarchy 
between offices: according to Eduabin traditions the senior position was 
originally a reward from the overlord for confronting a supernatural enemy, 
while the Amakom traditions assert that initially the oldest should be the 
most senior.9 To put in another way, the Amakom traditions rely on 
precedence based on the category of older > younger, while Eduabin 
traditions claim that seniority has absolutely nothing to do with such a 
category. The disagreements concerning the origins of the group and its 
headship do not change the notion that “all the chiefs of the Adonten group 
always move together”. The fekuo is seen as a group of offices eternally tied 
by clanship, and disputes between individual officeholders, which arise 
almost constantly, do not compromise that unity. As the etymology of the 
term fekuo suggests,10 the relationship between its members is fraternal. The 
head of the group (fekutire) is only senior, not superior, to other 
officeholders within the fekuo, and he is able to give orders to his brothers 
and friends in war only. Thus the other chiefs respect (bu) the Adontenhene 
as the senior brother, but do not serve (som) him as they serve their 
overlord, the Asantehene, to whom they have sworn an oath of allegiance. In 
terms of allegiance, all of the five chiefs stand in a similar relationship to the 
Asantehene. They swear their oaths of allegiance directly to him, and more 
importantly, the same ceremonial sword (nsuafena), the Mponponsuo 
sword, is used in the ritual.11 They all have been granted the status of a “big 
man” (]biremp]n, pl. abiremp]n) and hence are entitled to carry the 
elephant tail (mena or mmra), the insignia of the abiremp]n. All five of 
                                                 
9
 According to a third version, in a manuscript prepared by Asantehene Akwasi Agyeman 
Prempe during his captivity, Akosa Yiadom had originally purchased the title of 
Adontenhene from Osei Tutu (HAKWCI, 105-106).  
10
 Afe, a peer, a contemporary, a comrade + (e)kuw, a group, a collectivity (McCaskie 
1995a, 281). 
11
  Certain swords are considered to have specific spiritual significance (McLeod 1981, 9). 
“Oath swords” of lesser rank are Ahweehweebaa, Akrafona, and Gyapatia  (PRAAD ARG 
1/2/30/2/12a). 
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them occupy their own ancestral lands and command the allegiance of their 
own sub-chiefs and subjects.  
However, the hierarchical dimension is not restricted to the 
relationship between the group’s leader and the rest of its members. First of 
all, those five chiefs who belong to the Asene clan are considered senior to 
those four from the Ekuona clan. Secondly, an order of precedence exists 
among the Asene chiefs. According to Amakom traditions it is based on the 
age of the offices, even though the dates of the foundation of the offices and 
the genealogical links between the ruling Asene lineages of the five 
chiefdoms are rather obscure, in most cases putative instead of 
demonstrated. According to the present Amakomhene the Adonten chiefs are 
ranked in the following way: 
 
We are not equal (…) Nowadays, I am the second in command. In 
the absence of the Adontenehene I take his place. Antoa is after me, 
then Akyawkrom, and lastly Kwamo. 
 
Furthermore, the chiefs distinguish themselves by using different 
appellations. In the same way that the Amakomhene refers to himself as the 
“firstborn”, the Adontenhene calls himself Adonten Onini, “the superior” of 
the Adonten group (IAS/AS 95), while the Antoahene speaks of himself as 
Adonten Akoten, “the general” of the Adonten group (IAS/AS 34). Both 
Adonten and Antoa are also said to be among the four Poduo stools of 
Kumase, which are considered to have “supernatural significance” (IAS/AS 
95).12   
Very much like Fortes and Rattray, the colonial administrators took 
the oath of allegiance as the only significant political relationship between 
chiefs and, moreover, they saw it distinctly as a relation of subordination 
between the giver and receiver of the oath, the subject and his/her 
overlord.13 However, in their capacity as the supreme judges and lawgivers 
of the land, the British frequently ran into cases where claims for superiority 
were made on bases other than direct allegiance. By far the most important 
and best known of such cases was between Adontenhene Kwame Frimpon 
                                                 
12
 I do not know exactly what is meant by Poduo stools. It is sometimes said that these 
stools were created by Komfo Anokye. 
13
 Apart from the chain of command the colonial administrators and the Ashanti 
Confederacy Council had a system of “grading” chiefs for different purposes, e.g., payment 
of adultery fees and slaughtering of sheep as compensation. It is my understanding that the 
grades were originally based on the size of the “allegiancy fees” paid by the chiefs at their 
installation (PRAAD ARG 2/2/120).    
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and Amakomhene Kwaku Atta, which took place during the 1920’s.14 
Throughout the first two decades of colonial rule the Adontenhene, or 
“Chief Frempon” as the British knew him, had gained influence in the 
political circles of the capital and subsequently managed to get the upper 
hand over his junior brothers. His prestige was mainly due to his “forceful 
personality and a marked aptitude for business affairs”, as one administrator 
described him. However, this favoured position was not enough; he made 
great efforts to change his status into authority. Accordingly, he made 
certain “claims to subserviency” concerning the other chiefs of the Adonten 
group, which included, among other things, a share of tribute received by 
the Adonten chiefs on alienating their lands. The other chiefs, with the 
Amakomhene as their spokesman naturally refused his demands. Initially, in 
1920, the Amakomhene lost such a case against the Adontenhene, but when 
he had appealed, a separate enquiry on “The Tribal Organisation” of the 
Adonten group was held in Kumase in 1924-1925 (PRAAD ARG 
1/2/1/128a).  
The administrators had some clue of what to expect. A very similar 
court case had taken place a little earlier between the chiefs of Bantama and 
Nkawie Kuma, who belong to the Kronti fekuo of Kumase (see Figure 8).15 
Originally, Nkawie Kuma had been attached to Kumase as a wife or a 
brother-in-law of the Asantehene and later “given” to the Bantamahene as a 
friend (adamfo, pl. mmdamfo), whom he should “look after”. The question 
under scrutiny was whether the Bantamahene, as a head of the fekuo, was 
also superior to the chief of Nkawie Kuma and thus whether the friendship 
between the two also implied subordination of the junior to the senior. A 
great number of witnesses called by both parties were heard. The spirit of 
the case was crystallized in a statement given by a linguist of the Bantama 
stool: “There are different relationship between chief [sic]. Some chiefs are 
‘more under’ than others” (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/130a). Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the chief of Nkawie Kuma is under the chief of 
Bantama, but “in a more limited sense that is usually attached to the term 
                                                 
14
 See Berry (2001, 20-26) for the personal motives and relationship between Kwame 
Frimpon and Kwaku Atta. 
15
 These enquiries form a very useful piece of “colonial ethnography” (Pels & Salemink 
1994). Of course, the administrative interests of the colonial government restricted the 
scope of the enquiries and certain ethnocentric views were strongly enforced. But as judges 
the colonial administrators were forced to deal with questions that have been largely 
ignored by the subsequent academic research. Rattray wrote a two-page memorandum 
about the Adonten case, but never brought forward “its main finding”, which I think he 
never fully grasped, in his published works (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128b).  
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‘UNDER’”.16 In practical terms this meant, among other things, that the 
Bantamahene is not entitled to any profits gained from the Nkawie Kuma 
lands nor has he any right to claim contributions from Nkawie Kuma for the 
debts or other expenses of his office. However, because of being “under” 
the Bantamahene, although in an “exceptional” sense, the chief of Nkawie 
Kuma had to show certain signs of respect, for example, when coming to 
Kumase or leaving there he was obliged to “pay his respects to 
Bantamahene in person or by deputy” (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/130b).  
This new notion of “underness” provided an important precedent for 
the Adonten enquiry. The colonial administrators concluded that 
“practically every point there [in the previous inquiry] decided is reflected 
in the relationship between the ADONTENHENE and the other 
ABREMPON [i.e., “big men”] in the Division“(PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128a). 
Hence, after a thorough investigation, it was decided that the Adontenhene 
had no “executive or administrative authority” over the other chiefs of the 
Adonten group (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128b), but nevertheless, he received 
some recognition, which was “prescribed by custom governing the 
observance of the forms of respect and courtesy between the junior members 
of the family and their senior” (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128a; italics added). 
These forms were:  
 
1. When public debts are imposed or profits gained by the whole fekuo, 
they are distributed by dividing the sums to two. The Adontenhene 
takes one half and the other half is shared equally between the rest of 
the chiefs. The “lion’s share” is due to the Adontenhene as the elder 
brother. 
2. When in Kumase the other chiefs of the fekuo must come to greet the 
Adontenhene each morning. 
3. In the battlefield and on ceremonial occasions they must walk in 
front of him. 
4. They must assist him in court. 
5. They must assist him in warfare (ibid.). 
 
The first three obligations on the list are done “out of respect” (obu nti) to a 
senior brother. They are precisely the ones in which the idea of seniority is 
                                                 
16
 The Asante themselves express the idea of one chief being under another by using the 
verb hye ase, which means “to wear”. Hence, for instance, it is said that Dendwahene hye 
Nkoransahene ase, the Dendwahene “wears” (is encompassed by, is under, etc.) the 
Nkoransahene.    
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manifest. However, the two obligations mentioned last are reciprocal; in 
them the “social identification and solidarity”, which Fortes (1962, 274) 
thought to be characteristic of Asante sibling relations, are clearly explicit. 
Thus, the same ideals of mutual sharing and co-operation, which hold 
together the lineage kin, are also prevalent in the relations between chiefs 
who belong to the same matriclan, even though in an entirely different 
context. For instance, in my own field interviews I was told without 
exception that any chief can ask for, and is entitled to get, help in warfare 
and litigation from another chief from the same clan. The justification for 
this was that it is considered proper conduct towards a relative. As one chief 
put it, “it does not look good if your brother is in trouble and you are not 
doing anything to help”.17 However, rights and obligations of this kind were 
and are not regulated by legal sanctions.  
In order to distinguish superiority, or “overlordship”, from seniority 
it was made clear that there are certain chiefly prerogatives, which the 
Adontenhene does not have regarding the other officeholders of the fekuo. 
 
1. They do not swear allegiance to the Adontenhene. 
2. Their jurisdiction is equal to his. Appeals from their courts go 
straight to the Asantehene and not to the Adontenhene. 
3. The Adontenhene is not entitled to any share of the court fees 
received by the other chiefs. 
4. The member chiefs do not contribute to Adontenhene’s debts. They 
do not share the costs of the building projects of the Adonten stool. 
5. The Adontenhene is not entitled to any share of the captives taken in 
war by the other chiefs. 
6. He is not entitled to any share of treasure-trove found on the lands of 
the other Adonten chiefs. 
7. The Adonten chiefs do not owe him any share of the tributes 
received from alienating land. 
                                                 
17
 On the subject of warfare the Adontenhene told the District Commissioner the following: 
 
Chief FREMPON. When any of my junior brothers went to war I had to give him 
assistance, for it is not good for a big brother to see a younger brother beaten. 
 
D.C. It was entirely a matter of what was due from relationship [sic]? 
 
Ch.F. Yes. As I said before, if some stranger gives offence to one of us he gives it 
to all (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128a). 
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8. The Adontenhene is not entitled to exact any “death duties” 
(awunnyadee and/or ayibuadee) on the death of the other chiefs or 
their subjects.18 (One of the main witnesses in the case placed 
decisive importance to this point, since “it shows the power which 
the overlord has over the subordinate”) (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128a). 
 
The Adonten case clearly establishes that there are “collateral lines of 
communication” between offices. The Adonten chiefs stand in relationship 
to each other, and these relationships are not dependent on their common 
allegiance to the Asantehene. The “brotherhood” between the chiefs is 
founded on common descent, namely membership in the Asene matriclan. 
Claims for seniority are instituted by reference to the valued opposition 
between older and younger, or on promotion by external authority. The 
hierarchy of the Adonten group is boxed within a hierarchy of power 
categories of a different order. In other words, the seniority of the 
Adontenhene is encompassed by the superiority of the Asantehene.  
 
 
 4.3.2 The uncle and his nephews 
 
My second example is also from the Asene clan, but from a different Akan 
group than the Asante. In the chiefdom of Kwawu, a southeast neighbour of 
Asante, there are six chiefly offices vested in lineages of the Asene clan. 
However, these offices do not constitute a similar unit in the administrative 
structure of the chiefdom like the Adonten group does in Kumase. On the 
contrary, all six are separated: they serve six different overlords, who are the 
divisional chiefs of the Okwawuhene, the paramount chief of Kwawu, who 
belongs to the Tena matriclan (see Figure 9).  
According to Nana Kwabena Tia II, the Asenehene of Kwawu, the 
first Asene people migrated to Kwawu from a town called Krokosi. They 
settled in the area of present day town of Abetifi, and named it Krokosiwaa 
(lit. “little Krokosi”). After having established themselves there they heard 
that there was a war going on in a nearby area and thought it safer to move 
eastwards across the Afram River and stay there for the duration of the 
                                                 
18
 There seems to be some confusion concerning the two Twi terms. According to 
McCaskie (1995a, 316-317) awunnyadee involved the self-acquired movable property of an 
individual, whereas ayibuadee involved the immovable property. However, Kwame Arhin 
(1995, 137-138) maintains that the difference is that in the case of the former a chief took 
part of a deceased subject’s property, but in the latter case a chief took a part of his 
subordinate chief’s property.   
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hostilities. After the war the Asene people returned to Krokosiwaa only to 
see that a new group of people had arrived there. The leader of the 
newcomers, who was an ancestor of the present chief of Abetifi, recognized 
the Asene people as the original inhabitants and asked for the Asenehene’s 
permission to settle on his lands. The Asenehene gave them land, but also 
said that he cannot be their chief because as an Asenehene he can only be 
the chief of people who belong to the Asene clan. It was then agreed that the 
leader of the newcomers can become the chief of the whole settlement, but 
when he is in the part of town that belongs to the Asenehene he is regarded 
as junior to him. Later this community that combined the two groups came 
to be the town of Abetifi, which constitutes the Adonten division in the 
chiefdom of Kwawu (see Figure 9). But still, even nowadays, when the 
chief of Abetifi, or the Kwawu Adontenhene, comes to the Asene ward: 
 
1. He is not allowed to bring his state umbrella. 
2. He is not allowed to wear any headdress. 
3. When entering the Asenehene’s palace, he must uncover his 
shoulders and tie his cloth around his chest. 
 
To sum it up, he has to behave like a subordinate officeholder to the 
Asenehene, even though outside this particular space he is the overlord of 
the latter. This relationship is legitimated by reference to the relationship 
between the indigenous and the migrant, which is often seen as the 
ideological basis of the relationship between the chiefly lineage and other 
lineages resident in a chiefdom. However, as described above, in actuality 
the reverse has taken place: the Asenehene pledges allegiance to the Kwawu 
Adontenhene, and through the migrant chief, he is connected to a hierarchy 
of larger scale. This hierarchical ambiguity is not endured; it is rather done 
away with by separating the political space into two, within and without the 
clan, where the positions of both chiefs can be constituted by reference to 
their autochthony. Hence temporal continuity is established by dividing the 
space and the category of indigenous > migrant remains uncontested. 
As for the other Asene lineages in Kwawu, four of them, namely 
those of Adumoa, Pepease, Bepon, and Nkwatia, are direct offshoots of the 
Asene people of Krokosiwaa (or Abetifi). The dispersal has taken place 
mainly as a result of marriages. Asene women have moved to the localities 
of their husbands and consequently set up new branches of their natal 
lineage, which by gaining rights to offices have become constituted as 
autonomous groups. The Asenehene described this process to me in a rather 
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wistful tone: “All Asene people should live together in the same place, but 
because of marriages, we are now in different places”. The fifth Asene 
lineage, established in Obo, is originally from Amakom, which they were 
forced to leave behind due to a war. They formed one half of a larger Asene 
group, which migrated southwards from Kumase and while some decided to 
join their clansmen in Kwawu others continued further south to a place 
called Akyim Ati. 
The relationship of the five junior Asene chiefs to the Asenehene 
resembles that between the chiefs of the Adonten group and the Kumase 
Adontenhene in many ways, although the hierarchy is constituted by 
reference to the genealogical category of older > younger, and not the 
temporal age of the office or a senior position awarded by a common 
overlord. The five chiefs address the Asenehene as their uncle and he refers 
to them as his nephews (as is also the case between Amakom and 
Nkoransa). They do not swear an oath of allegiance to the Asenehene; they 
swear it to their respective overlords, but after that they are formally 
introduced to the Asenehene. Customarily, they do not owe any tribute to 
the Asenehene, but as one of the Asenehene’s linguists put it, “if he [an 
Asene chief] has something he wants to give, he will give”. They hold their 
own positions in the military formations of their own divisions, but they are 
also obligated to assist the Asenehene in warfare. As elders of the divisional 
chiefs they are members of the judicial courts of the latter, but they are also 
obligated to support the Asenehene in litigation. As their uncle the 
Asenehene sees it, it is his obligation to support them militarily, legally, or 
in any possible way, “when they consult him in times of difficulties”. 
However, what is very different from the Adonten case is that the hierarchy 
of offices within the clan is not boxed within a larger hierarchy: there is no 
administrative group that constitutes a whole, which can then be divided 
into uneven parts. On the contrary, the allegiance to the divisional chiefs 
and the nephew relation to the Asenehene, which both have similar political 
implications, directly contradict each other. Figure 9 illustrates how the ties 
of clanship cleave the neat pyramidal structure of the chiefdom. Although 
the contradiction is more strikingly visible here, it is not completely absent 
from the Adonten group either. The paramount chiefs of Nkoransa, Agona, 
and Asaman, who do not belong to the Kumase chiefdom anymore, but are 
considered to have their own paramountcies, are still considered members of 
the Adonten group in many respects.19 
                                                 
19
 For instance, see Tordoff (1965, 376) for the Agonahene’s statement that “although I am 
an Omanhene yet I regard the Adontenhene as my senior”.  
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4.4 Status, power, and authority 
 
It is now clear that when chiefs talk about each other as relatives, it is not an 
idiom in which administrative relations are talked about as kinship relations 
(although the former may coincide with latter). There is a distinctive set of 
relationships between chiefs, which are patterned according to the principles 
of descent and kinship. The hierarchical aspect of the relationships is 
defined through the concept of seniority. The question is now why did 
Fortes exclude them from the “Ashanti model”, even though he clearly was 
aware of their existence? 
 Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1969, 5) established that states are 
societies in which, among other things, cleavages of privilege and status 
correspond to the distribution of power and authority. They argued that the 
“king and his delegates and advisers use organised force with the consent of 
their subjects to keep going a political system which the latter take for 
granted as the foundation of their social order” (ibid., 14). It is then implied 
that rank or status without any “power and authority” should be considered 
politically insignificant. Susan McKinnon (2001, 67) has pointed out, when 
discussing Evans-Pritchard’s Nuer ethnographies, that Evans-Pritchard 
recognized the superior position of so-called dominant (or aristocratic) 
lineages, but did not explain where this status was derived from. The Nuer 
aristocrats are said to have “prestige rather than rank and influence rather 
than power” (Evans-Pritchard 1969, 215). Therefore the hierarchical order 
of the society is not considered to have any political consequences. Evans-
Pritchard acknowledged that status and power do not necessarily coincide, 
but in such cases the status is structurally insignificant.20 
                                                 
20
 As Jukka Siikala (personal communication) has pointed out, elsewhere, in his work on 
the divine kingship among the Shilluk of Sudan, Evans-Pritchard (1962, 66-86) does 
exactly the opposite: he discusses the status of a sacerdotal king, a king who “does not 
govern”, as the pivot of the Shilluk political structure. 
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Hence in the case of Kwawu Asenehene and Adontenhene, the fact that the 
indigenous Asenehene is senior to the migrant Adontenhene should be 
considered structurally insignificant, and the fact that former swears 
allegiance to the latter significant. The put it bluntly, the Asenehene’s 
seniority is “symbolic”, whereas the Adontenhene’s superiority is 
“political”. This does not make sense because, as was shown above, the 
Asenehene’s seniority has a lot of political implication, although they are 
not based on formal authority or power to coerce. 
Dumont (1980, 66) defines hierarchy as “the principle by which the 
elements of a whole are ranked in relation to the whole”. He adds that “the 
view of the whole” is provided by cultural values; in his case religion gave 
the Indian caste system its unity. Within the whole, ranking is based on 
oppositions between religious purity and impurity. This view differs from 
that of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, not only because power and authority 
are not fundamental to the hierarchy, but also because they are seen as 
subordinate to the constitutive value. Since purity and thus higher status are 
not based on power, it follows that the “purest” Brahman priests, who have 
no secular power, are considered superior to the kings, who are the holders 
of secular power, although, as Dumont points out, “in fact priesthood 
submits to power” (ibid., 71-72). 
But the Asante chiefs are not like the Brahman priests. They do have 
powers. It is rather that the power of seniority is very different from the 
power of an overlord. It is mostly power of persuasion (cf. Clastres 1998, 
29-30), which emerges through the concept of respect. As a senior, in 
normal conditions, a chief has no authority, in a politico-jural sense, over his 
juniors. For instance, the Adontenhene does not command the obedience or 
force of the Adonten chiefs, but he has their respect, through which he is 
able to influence them. As signs of respect he receives homage, gifts, and 
assistance from his junior chiefs. And these are relations that the laws of the 
kingdom do not back up. Thus, Fortes obviously did not consider these as 
politico-jural statuses and did not pay attention to them in his account of the 
Asante political structure. However, if one studies the rights and obligations 
entailed in these statuses, one can hardly say that they are merely symbolic 
or ceremonial. Certainly, things like mutual assistance in warfare and 
litigation are something very political, even in (or precisely in) the 
conventional sense of the word. What is problematic about these statuses is 
their segmentary and moral nature, which makes them difficult to 
accommodate in a structure that is built on the presumption of dichotomies 
like the familial and politico-jural domain and state and stateless societies. 
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This theoretical incompatibility does not, of course, make them structurally 
insignificant, and as has been shown, seniority definitely has political 
consequences.  
Once again, one is able to see the influence of Western notions of 
politics behind the anthropological definitions of the political. Namely, if 
the African kingdoms are thought to resemble “the pattern with which we 
are familiar in the modern nation state” (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1969, 6), 
then such statuses as uncle and nephew do not seem to fit. For instance, if 
one were told that the minister of the interior is considered an uncle to the 
minister of defence and because of that the latter has to assist the former 
when dealing with the minister of foreign affairs, one would instantly reject 
such a notion as a joke. But for the Akan chiefs these notions are very 
important and, indeed, very political, and in this sense the chiefs are nothing 
like ministers. 
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5 FORGIVEN AND UNFORGIVEN SINS: NEGOTIATING 
SENIORITY 
 
When I talked about seniority with the Asante chiefs, I was very often told 
about how the order of precedence “used to be” and how so-and-so is 
“really” senior or junior to so-and-so. In these conversations, changes in 
relations of seniority were usually attributed to some specific historical 
instances. Such instances are still frequently brought up in court cases 
between chiefs as important precedents. In order to fully understand how 
seniority is constructed and contested one has to take into consideration the 
historical circumstances where these processes take place. Namely, one’s 
ability to argue for seniority is influenced by the existing relations of 
authority and power. There are moments when one is more likely to become 
recognized as the senior. As an example of this I use a judicial process 
concerning the violation of a taboo, which on the surface involves only the 
Adontenhene and the Asantehene, the violator and violated, but which has 
an effect on the hierarchy of the offices of the whole Adonten group. First, 
in this process certain statuses, which ordinarily are not considered 
constitutive to the order of precedence among the Adonten chiefs, become 
important and allow one of the members of the group to assume temporary 
headship. Second, the violation, or inability to live up to the values of senior 
status, reconnects the present time to the founding past through genealogies 
and historical narratives and allows a reconsideration of the principles that 
constitute the hierarchy. The concept of taboo in the jural framework is the 
beginning point for understanding this process.  
 
 
5.1. Taboo and collective responsibility 
 
Fortes’ definition of jural rested largely on that of David Tait (1961, 62), 
who emphasized the point that jural acts have “the moral backing of the 
society”. Thus Fortes (1969a, 88-89) argued that jural rights and duties 
“derive their sanction from the political framework of the society”. In 
segmentary lineage systems jural responsibilities are fixed on specific 
individuals (e.g., elders) and groups, but the total framework of lineage and 
clan relations is presupposed in them (Fortes 1969b, 230). For example, 
feuding, ostracism, and other such acts of retribution by an offended party 
are accepted by other members of the society because it is deemed that the 
offending party has violated norms that involve the society as whole. In 
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state societies the sanctions are for the most part mediated by specialized 
legal institutions, but ultimately they too “embody a jural consensus of a 
society” (Fortes 1969a, 90). Therefore jural norms are said to have public 
legitimacy in contrast with the private legitimacy of moral norms. Instead of 
external sanctions, the norms of the latter kind are enforced with “practices 
of morality or of religion or of etiquette” (ibid., 89). As for the 
consequences of non-compliance, Fortes saw that a “breach of jural norms 
disrupts a person’s relationship to society”, whereas an infringement of 
moral norms has a similar effect on a person’s relationship to individuals 
(ibid.). In terms of law, or jural custom, this distinction was recognized, for 
example, by making a division between civil and criminal offences. In the 
Asante context, Fortes (following Rattray) established that there are two 
kinds of offences, namely the “household cases” and the “tribal sins”. The 
former related to rules governing persons and property, and which are 
preferably arbitrated by the lineage elders, whereas the latter necessarily fell 
under the jurisdiction of chiefs’ courts (ibid., 155-157). 
The “tribal sins”, which I will call taboos (akyiwadee, lit. “a thing 
one turns his/her back to”), are things which are considered to be forbidden 
by the ancestors and/or the deities of the community and ultimately 
sanctioned by them. Every community has its own taboos, and it is the 
responsibility of the ruler to enforce them. Some taboos, for instance clan 
exogamy, involve the whole kingdom. The most dreadful ones are the 
“violations of the sanctity of the Golden Stool and offences against the 
majesty of the king” (ibid., 156). However, it is important to understand that 
akyiwadee does not correspond to the western notion of crime, since taboo 
encompasses all kinds of normative categories. On the whole, taboos strike 
“at the very roots of the whole social system”, and thus they are considered 
offences from “the angle of moral values, sacrilegious in religious terms and 
lése majesté in the political sphere” (ibid.). If such offences were to be left 
unpunished by the authorities, the supernatural consequences would not 
only fall on the offender him/herself but also on the community taken 
together. Such consequences are believed to be disastrous. As Kurankyi-
Taylor (1951, 39-40) has put it, “the land would cease to bear fruit, the 
animals in the bush would sicken and die, the tribe would decrease in 
numbers and in power and it would be overwhelmed by its enemies”.  
A key to understanding the nature of the sanctions, both jural and 
supernatural, is the notion of disgrace (aniwu). When a person commits an 
offence he/she not only brings disgrace upon himself but also upon his/her 
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community.1 In this context community can be understood in various ways, 
for example, as the matrilineal descent group, the polity, or in some cases 
even the patrilineal nt]r] ritual division (ibid., 158, 197). As noted before, 
human communities are seen to exist on three different levels, those 
occupied by the dead, the living, and the unborn respectively, and the 
disgrace caused by the living members is seen to extend to all of these 
levels. Since disgrace is shared by all, it is also in everyone’s interest to do 
everything possible to avoid it. So, whatever discontents or frictions there 
might be inside the community, it is crucial not to let them turn into public 
matters thus making the whole community exposed to the ridicule and 
judgement of others. As Kurankyi-Taylor noted, “[i]t was considered a 
disgrace if a grouping or community was unable to settle disputes among its 
members without the intervention of any outsiders” (ibid., 66). Recognition 
of this “collectivist feeling” is an important part of a child growing up into a 
good person (onipa pa). So, ultimately, the whole community (of whatever 
type or size) is responsible for the upbringing and good behaviour of its 
members (ibid., 152, 181). However, this is not purely a matter of collective 
conscience; the traditional courts also enforce the principle of collective 
responsibility. Throughout Asante history instances are known where the 
subordinates, friends, relatives, and even superiors of the offender have been 
held accountable for his/her offence (e.g. McCaskie 1984, 172-173). 2 
During the pre-colonial period, in the most severe cases the existence and 
self-reproducing powers of the entire community were at stake. For 
example, Rattray (1959, 87) described the punishment for adultery with a 
wife of the Asantehene as follows, “Not only (it is alleged) were the woman 
and her paramour killed (…), but the mother, father, and maternal uncle of 
both parties also suffered death, while all the remaining families of both had 
to undergo the ceremony known as ‘drinking the gods’, and to swear that 
they had not connived at the offence”.3  
                                                 
1
 This idea is expressed in a number of proverbs, for example, onipa b]ne te manmu a ne 
nkoa ne nnipa nyinaa, “one evil doer in the community makes slaves of us all” (Kurankyi-
Taylor 1951, 158). 
2
 This is true even today. For instance, quite recently, a dispute over some missing stool 
regalia occurred between the Tredehene, who belongs to the Kronti fekuo of Kumase, and 
his elders. The case was not correctly reported to the Asantehene in the Kumasi Traditional 
Council and as a result all chiefs of the Kronti fekuo, including their head, the 
Bantamahene, were ordered to slaughter a sheep each (Asante Tribune Sept. 12 – Sept. 18, 
2000). 
3
 In “drinking the gods” or “drinking fetish” (nom ]bosom) a person guarantees his/her 
promise by drinking water in which some “shrine objects” have been soaked, thus making 
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Furthermore, in addition to those supernatural agencies that have decreed 
the taboos and sanction them, the offender is also at risk of receiving 
punishment from his/her own ancestors who he/she has disgraced. It is 
believed that some violations are so disgraceful that the ancestors would 
rather exterminate the community through supernatural sanctions, which are 
considered to manifest themselves as the “evil fortune” (mmusuo) of the 
living, than live with the disgrace (Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 192). The 
extinction of the living members of the community is seen as the end of the 
community on all three levels since the living members cannot give birth to 
“unborn” children in whom the ancestral spirits could reincarnate. Those 
unable to reincarnate are “forever compelled to live in the Asaman forest in 
the cold dark shadows”, while those ancestors able to reincarnate live in 
happiness and prosperity.4 In conclusion, it can be said that the community, 
whatever is meant by it in each case, is subject to punishment for the 
offence of its members, whether from supernatural or human agency 
(ibid.,181-182).  
Although a violation of taboo affects all of the violators’ collective 
affiliations, it is safe to say that the most important are those concerning 
lineage and clan. In normative terms this means that clansmen are obliged to 
assist each other in disputes and all forms of jural activities.5 This 
responsibility concerns chiefs and elders in particular, because they possess 
the high status needed in the mediation of jural cases. Thus an officeholder 
has to be always ready to speak on behalf of his clansman regardless of 
his/her political allegiance or place of residence. The present Nkoransahene, 
Nana Agyeman Kudom IV, explained this to me in a following way: 
 
TK: If I am an Asene man living in some other locality than 
Nkoransa and I have a dispute with the local paramount chief, can I 
come to you for help? 
 
                                                                                                                            
him/herself vulnerable to a particular deity, which is then able to punish him/her if the 
promise is not kept (Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 188). 
4
 Asaman or Asamandow is the “land of the ghosts” or “spirit world” occupied by the 
ancestors. The ideas concerning its location and nature vary greatly (e.g., McCaskie 1995a, 
306-307).  
5
 Disputes (mansosem) are kept separate from violations of taboos and they are preferably 
arbitrated by a third party. However, when disputes are brought to chiefs’ courts the process 
involves swearing an ancestral oath, which makes it a “taboo matter” (e.g., Fortes 1969a, 
157-158). 
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AK IV: Yes, you can. You can come to me or the Amakomhene, or 
the Akyawkromhene or Kwamohene, or any of the chiefs of the 
Asene clan. 
 
TK: And you would feel obliged to help me? 
 
AK IV: Yes, I would help you. 
 
TK: What kind of help would that be? 
 
AK IV: Well, first I would try to find out what the misunderstanding 
is all about and then I would act as a mediator between two parties. 
 
It is also considered a right of the litigator to call a dignitary from the same 
clan to follow the proceedings of the court, thus making sure that his 
clansman is getting a fair trial. One chief expressed this idea by saying that 
“there is always somebody standing behind the court”. Similarly, after an 
unfavourable verdict, the guilty party can ask a chief or an elder from 
his/her own abusua to “beg” (sre) for him, so that the judge will be lenient 
with the odwanefo, “the runaway” (Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 134). A person, 
regardless of his/her status, who refuses to assist his/her clansman is seen to 
have behaved disgracefully, and, conversely, a litigator who does not accept 
the help and advice of his/her clansmen has made him/herself a “worthless 
person” (onipa hun) and has disgraced those who have offered their help 
(ibid., 79, 81). 
This is the cultural and normative logic behind the principle of 
collective responsibility among the Asante, which relies on the concept of 
disgrace and both human and supernatural sanctions. It is obvious that a 
breach of jural norms has an effect on a person’s status in his/her 
community. For instance, those royals, who have been found guilty of 
akyiwadee practically become ineligible for the office(s) of the community 
because they have tried to “bring disaster” on their community (ibid., 181-
182). Since taboos cover all normative categories of the society, the 
penalties for the violators cover them as well. Firstly, the violator will be 
punished for his/her transgressions against the polity, or the “jural consensus 
of the society”, by the legal institutions, but, secondly, through his/her 
transgression he/she has also made the members of his/her community liable 
and, consequently, he/she will receive a moral punishment from them. As 
the following example will show, a violation of taboo and its castigatory 
  
102 
consequences entails a renegotiation of statuses, which goes beyond 
demotions or promotions by an external authority. 
 
 
5.2 “Act of treason” 
 
Suing the Asantehene is possible only outside the traditional courts. 
Customarily, there is no way of taking legal action against the Asantehene: 
one can merely “beg” the Asantehene to reconsider his decisions or actions 
through an intermediary, who is usually a high-ranking officeholder. 
Nowadays, Asante chiefs are expected to submit their disputes to arbitration 
in the Asanteman Council,6 presided over by the Asantehene; they are not 
expected to take them to the Regional House of Chiefs7 or Ghanaian courts, 
which do not recognize the Asantehene as the supreme arbiter. However, 
some chiefs have openly defied this expectation. Principal among them has 
been the present Adontenhene, Nana Agyeman Nkwantabisa III, who has 
brought two lawsuits against the Asantehene in the Kumasi High Court. The 
matters at stake in the actual court cases have been discussed extensively 
elsewhere (see Berry 2001, 87-92), so there is no need to go into detail here. 
Basically, it has been a dispute over two tracts of land in the environs of 
Kumase: in Baaman, which is located close to the Accra road, and in 
Aputuogya on the road to Lake Bosomtwe.8 In both cases the Adontenhene 
                                                 
6
 At the present time in Kumase there are two separate councils: the Kumasi Traditional 
Council, which consists of the divisional chiefs of the capital and deals with the internal 
affairs of Kumase, and the Asanteman Council, which consists of the paramount chiefs of 
the kingdom and decides on matters of larger national interest. Both councils are presided 
over by the Asantehene. The Traditional Council is a “statutory body” recognized by the 
Ghana government, whereas the Asanteman Council is a “traditional body”, which only has 
arbitrary rights. The latter is the successor of the Asantemanhyiamu of the pre-colonial 
period, which was “restored” by the British as the Ashanti Confederacy Council in 1935. In 
terms of the national law of Ghana, no one can be forced to defend his/her case in the 
Asanteman Council. However, since litigation in the Asanteman Council is voluntary, its 
decisions are not appealable, unless there is evidence of foul play. 
7
 After the independence of Ghana, Regional Houses of Chiefs were set up for solving 
disputes over offices and land. They are comprised of the paramount chiefs of the 
administrative regions and they handle appeals from the Traditional Councils of the 
paramountcies. In the Chieftaincy Act 370 of 1971 the National House of Chiefs was 
created in order to take appeals from the regional level and also to keep a national register 
of chiefs. Appeals from the National House of Chiefs go to the Supreme Court of Ghana. 
8
 Newspaper articles about the cases (e.g., Asante Tribune Oct. 3 – Oct. 9, 2000) refer to a 
land case in Amaape instead of Baaman. Sara Berry (2001, 101-102), who has studied the 
High Court records and discussed the cases with the Adontenhene, does not mention 
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maintained that his ancestors had controlled the lands in question even 
before the time of Osei Tutu and the foundation of the Asante kingdom, and 
thus the Golden Stool has no legitimate right over them. The quarrelling had 
been going on, at least in the latter case, ever since the mid-1970’s, but the 
Adontenhene took the matter to the High Court only in 1996 (ibid.). This 
was considered akyiwadee, a sacrilege and a revolt against the Golden 
Stool, and therefore the late Asantehene, Opoku Ware II, banished the 
Adontenhene from the palace, and the Amakomhene took his place as the 
head of the Adonten fekuo. However, after the death of Opoku Ware in 
1999, his successor Asantehene Osei Tutu II appealed to the Asante people 
and told them to withdraw all stool and land disputes from the courts and 
bring them to him, as he would find a way of “solving them amicably”. His 
call was heard and a great number of cases were pulled out from the 
Regional and National Houses of Chiefs as well as the Ghanaian courts and 
taken to the Asanteman Council. The Adontenhene’s case was also taken 
under re-examination and after one year or so the Adontenhene was re-
instated and the dispute concerning the land was to be resolved on a later 
date by the Asantehene. It was said that the breach between the Adontenhene 
and the Asantehene had taken 23 years, and the Adontenhene “was therefore 
ordered to slaughter 23 sheep to purify the Golden Stool” (Kumasi Mail 
Aug. 29 – Sept. 4, 2000). The Adontenhene humbly obeyed the order and 
afterwards praised the Asantehene for having “the wisdom of King 
Solomon” (ibid.). 
However, before a full settlement was reached some of the members 
of the Asanteman Council had to be convinced to accept the purification 
offered by the Adontenhene. Many of them considered his lawsuit against 
the Golden Stool to have been “the biggest taboo in the Asante history” and 
“an act of treason”, and hence the Adontenhene should have been banished 
permanently. The biggest obstacle had been the opinion of the Adonten 
group. A couple of months before the Asantehene’s decision some of his 
linguists had asked them to express their views on the matter. A local 
newspaper reported that 
 
[T]he Adonten group was not prepared to work with the 
Adontenhene because he, Adontenhene, did not seek their advice 
before suing the Golden Stool and the late Asantehene. They said 
that the crime the Adontenhene has committed was unprecedented in 
                                                                                                                            
Amaape. In the Adonten enquiry “Aputuagya”, “Amapem”, and “Barman” are listed among 
the Adontenhene’s villages (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128a). 
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Asante history and for that matter the Adonten group of which 
Nkoranzahene is the most important figure must be pacified before 
the case was entertained (ibid.). 
 
A new attempt to persuade the Adonten fekuo to follow its leader was made 
some weeks later, but the answer was that “they were not prepared to budge 
an inch” (ibid.). In response, the Asantehene accused some of his chiefs of 
inconsistency in handling the case. Why had they backed up his decision of 
re-examining the Adontenhene’s case in the first place, if they were not 
ready to live with the decision? 
 
He told the chiefs: that in the Asante custom when one is asked to 
slaughter a sheep it presupposes that whatever sin he had committed 
would be for given [sic].  
“How then do you ask the Adontenhene to slaughter 23 sheep and 
come out to state that his sins cannot be forgiven. This is unheard of. 
If you really know that the crime the Adontenhene had committed 
was so grievous that he could not be forgiven why did you not tell 
him right in the face that his sins could not be forgiven.” (Ibid.; 
italics in the original). 
 
In spite of the opposition of some of his chiefs the Asantehene had passed 
his judgment and informed the Council that “whatever sins the Adontenhene 
has committed have been forgiven” (ibid.). Roughly a month later, in a 
meeting the former outcast was taken back to the ranks of the Kumasi 
Traditional Council as he himself “accompanied by family members and 
friends clad in white presented a sheep and drinks to the Asantehene in 
appreciation of Otumfuo’s benevolence” (Asante Tribune Oct. 3 – Oct. 9, 
2000). The Adontenhene had now taken back his place as one of 
Asantehene’s councillors and the relations between the two litigants could 
be patched up, but the brothers of the Adonten group were still waiting for 
more to come. To them the Adontenhene’s “sins” against the Golden Stool 
might have been absolved, but those against his clansmen remained to be 
expiated. When I left Ghana in April 2001, things were still in a deadlock 
and there was no indication of any quick settlement. 
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5.3 Embarrassments and punishments 
 
Some aspects of the case at hand have a long history involving matters that 
are exceedingly complex. It is not possible to know every single nuance of 
the case. But two features of the case illustrate efficiently how the hierarchy 
within the group is renegotiated. First, there is the position of Nkoransa in 
the court case as a son of the Asantehene, and second, there are the ways in 
which the position of Adonten as the head of the group is being questioned 
by Amakom and other members of the group. Although I discuss these 
aspects separately, they have a lot in common. In both cases the 
reassessment of one’s status takes place in a specific relation or situation. 
Moreover, the reassessment is supported by arguments in which the present 
relationships are considered to stand for relationships in the past.   
 
 
5.3.1 Father and son 
 
When I took up the Adontenhene’s court case in a discussion with the 
Amakomhene, he complained about how “this present Adontenhene has 
caused a lot of embarrassment to all of us”. According to him the Adonten 
group had done all that it could in order to protect the Adontenhene from 
banishment: 
 
When he decided to take the case against Otumfuo to the High 
Court, we all advised him, as he is our senior brother, not to do it, 
but he would not listen. We even asked the Nkoransahene to go and 
beg his father [the Asantehene] on behalf of the Adontenhene, but he 
embarrassed us all by saying that he has not asked anybody to beg 
for him. 
 
What is striking here is the position of the Nkoransahene. In the newspaper 
article cited above he is described as “the most important figure” in the 
Adonten group and the Amakomhene explains how he was elected as the 
spokesman for the whole group. This can be explained by the patrilateral 
link between the ruling Asene lineage of Nkoransa and the ruling Oyoko 
lineage of Kumase. The traditions of Nkoransa have it that the first 
Nkoransahene was the first son of the first wife of Osei Tutu (see Figure 
10). My informants in Kumase see him as the son of the second Asantehene, 
Opoku Ware, but the father-son relationship itself is acknowledged by 
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everyone. Hence the Nkoransahene addresses the Asantehene as his father 
(agya, pl. agyanom) and the queen mother, the Nkoransahemaa, addresses 
him as her husband (]kunu, pl. akununom). Correspondingly, the 
Nkoransahene is considered a son (ba barima, pl. mma mmarima) to the 
Asantehene and the queen mother is considered to be his wife (]yere, pl. 
ayerenom). As a result, the relations between the paramount offices of 
Nkoransa and Kumase and their respective occupants are considered 
particularly close and intimate, analogous to those within the immediate 
family of a single person. When Fortes (1962, 268) described the 
relationship between a father and his children among the Asante he 
emphasized the father’s lack of legal authority. Affection, unreservedness, 
and lack of formal rules also characterize the relationship between the 
Nkoransahene and the Asantehene. The following is an excerpt from an 
interview with the Nkoransahene: 
 
TK: You are a member of the Asanteman Council and thus swear an 
oath of allegiance to Otumfuo. This oath brings certain 
responsibilities. Are there some other responsibilities or rights that 
follow from the fact that you are also father and son? 
 
AK IV: Yes. I have some customary privileges that the other 
paramount chiefs do not have. 
 
TK: Can you give me an example? 
 
AK IV: It is difficult to pinpoint anything, but in the Asantehene’s 
court the Nkoransahene is treated differently, with more respect. 
 
I can ask anything from Otumfuo. For example, the last time I went 
to him, (…) I asked for his ntahera horns9 to follow me where I was 
going, and I got them. Others cannot do that. I cannot be denied 
anything that I ask from him and I can go to him anytime at all. 
                                                 
9
 Ntahera is a horn made out of elephant’s tusk. The horn blowers form a part of an 
officeholder’s retinue and they play a horn call specific to their chief (see Rattray 1929). 
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I am also a son to Dwaben. I can go to the Dwabenhene in the same 
way.10  
 
This clearly has an effect on his status. In terms of the court case at hand, 
the matrilineal juniority of Nkoransa, as a younger branch of Amakom, is 
superseded by the closer patrilateral relationship to the Asantehene, and thus 
in this situation he is seen as the head of the group. The category of uncle > 
nephew is considered less important in defining seniority in these 
circumstances. Matrilineally, as a brother of the Adontenhene, the 
Nkoransahene shares the collective responsibility for the violation of the 
former, but patrilaterally, as a son of the Asantehene, he is considered the 
most likely to receive absolution. So, in terms of the Adonten group’s 
relationship to the superior office, the Nkoransahene is able to claim 
precedence by referring to his patrilateral status as a son to the Asantehene. 
In a very interesting way his (junior) position in one relation of precedence 
has an effect on his position in another. 
What has to be pointed out is that the ways in which these kin 
relations are established and reinforced have their own distinctive logic. 
“Fatherhood”, “husbandhood”, or anything else like that does not follow 
directly from genealogical rules. The nature of the relationship does not 
depend on any real or classificatory kin relation between the persons in the 
present. On the contrary, the relationships are grounded on the idea that the 
present relationship stands for an “original” one, which once existed 
between their great predecessors. To paraphrase Sahlins, one could call 
them founding relationships. Certainly, the notion of kinship between 
offices and their occupants is partly based on what is perceived as “real” 
mothering, fathering, and marriages in the past, performed by their 
ancestors, and hence these ties are considered eternal and unbreakable. In 
the past, there have been disagreements between the two offices, but, as the 
Nkoransahene puts it, “what never changes is the fact that we are father and 
son”. The relationship is reproduced by reference to a chain of events: the 
relationship between the Nkoransahene and the Asantehene is such because 
Osei Tutu married Afua Sapon who gave birth to Bafo Pim, whose sisters 
gave birth to so-and-so, and so forth. To employ Valerio Valeri’s (1990, 
157) terminology, the present relation stands for the past relation 
metonymically, because they both belong to the same syntagmatic chain. 
                                                 
10
 An Asante chiefdom located roughly 30 kilometres northwest from Kumase. Dwaben is 
ruled by an Oyoko lineage and it is considered to be a member of the original group of 
chiefdoms that founded the Asante kingdom (e.g. Rattray 1929, 169-197). 
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Agyeman Kudom IV can stand for Bafo Pim and Osei Tutu II can stand for 
Osei Tutu because of the system of positional succession. Hence one can 
say that in the legitimate construction of the relationship the accepted 
genealogies of ruling lineages of both Nkoransa and Kumase, as 
representations of the historical past, give to it its syntagmatic component. A 
great variety of such cases of genealogical connections between the ruling 
lineages of Amakom and Kumase can be traced (see Figure 10), but still 
they have not come to constitute political relationships that are considered 
similar as that between Nkoransa and Kumase. Why is this so? The 
syntagmatic component alone is not enough for the construction of such 
relationships. 
As mentioned earlier, those chiefs, from whose lineages the 
successive Asantehene have married, are considered wives to the 
Asantehene. On ceremonial occasions these chiefs may present “wifely” 
gifts to the Asantehene, for instance, foodstuffs or a grinding stone that 
denotes “fealty and subordination, in the way of the wife to the husband” 
(McCaskie 1995a, 146). Correspondingly, the Asantehene gives “chop 
money” (akwanhoma) to the chiefs in a similar manner as a husband is 
expected to give to a wife as her daily allowance.11 In contrast, chiefs have 
married from the Asantehene’s matrilineage, but the Asantehene calls none 
of them as his husband. Furthermore, it is totally unthinkable that the 
Asantehene would bring grinding stones to these chiefs and would collect 
“chop money” from them. Some of these chiefs have, of course, been 
fathers to the Asantehene. For instance, Asantehene Opoku Ware was a 
product of a leviratic marriage between Nyako Kusi Amoa, the first queen 
mother of Asante, and Amakomhene Adu Panin and his two younger 
brothers Adu Manu and Adu Mensa (see Figure 10). Hence it is often said 
that Opoku Ware had “three fathers”. This genealogical relation is widely 
known and it is also commemorated by the notion that the Asantehene has 
“three great oaths” (ntam kesee mmeensa).12 But still, the Amakomhene 
does not usually refer to the Asantehene as his son. Neither does he think 
that he has liberties in his relationship to the Asantehene in a same way as 
the Nkoransahene does. 
 
                                                 
11
 “Chopping” means eating in Ghanaian English. See Clark (1994, 344-348) for the 
meaning of “chop money” in marriage and opposite sex relations in general. 
12
 McCaskie (1995a, 313) has discussed the origin and meaning of the Asantehene’s oaths. 
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PHOTOGRAPH 2. A chief in funeral dress reciting the history of his office. 
 
As was seen in the relationship between the present Asantehene and the 
Nkoransahene it clearly exemplifies some rules or norms about father-child 
relations: their unreserved but yet hierarchical relationship is analogous to 
that which is thought to have existed between Osei Tutu and Bafo Pim in 
the past. Thus the relation to the past is paradigmatic – it instantiates a rule 
or principle (Valeri 1990, 157-161). The present relation stands for the past 
one metaphorically: it shows the analogy between two relationships, which 
are not only temporally, but also qualitatively, distinct, namely that of father 
and son and that of overlord and subordinate. Since among the Asante 
“wifehood” and “sonhood” connote faithfulness and subordination, it is 
more difficult to metaphorically link a past wife or son to a superior 
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officeholder of the present time even though the syntagmatic component 
allows that. As the Asantehene is the overlord of the Amakomhene, the 
metaphor of the former as a wife or son does not illuminate any rule or 
principle through analogy and hence such notion lacks political meaning. In 
other words, any such relationship is more difficult to construct and 
maintain since it lacks a paradigmatic component. And this, I argue, is the 
key for understanding why, from the array of kin relations represented in 
Figure 10, some are brought up and maintained as politically meaningful 
and some are considered more as instances of marrying or fathering.  
The Asante chiefs themselves undoubtedly understand the relativity 
of the kinship terminology used in the political context and its 
connectedness to the contemporary power relations with all situational 
features. For example, regarding the hierarchical aspect of the matrilineal 
kinship relation between Nkoransa and Amakom the present Nkoransahene 
told me the following: 
 
TK: Is the Amakomhene your brother or your uncle? 
 
AK IV: This is a matter of dispute, because he can be both. In fact, 
there are some people here, who would even say that I am the uncle 
and he is the nephew. But, personally, I think that he is my uncle. 
 
However, this sort of speculation could not take place, if both chiefs did not 
belong to the same clan and would not (claim to) know the genealogical 
links between their lineages. The notion that they are of “one blood” or 
“from the same mother” is considered unquestionable: that is the core 
principle that unites them (with others) into one whole, which can be 
divided into different parts. So, even though the genealogies are full of 
relationships, which can be brought up in order to legitimate seniority, 
juniority, or equality, they also set the limits for one’s claims. Although the 
relatedness itself can also be denied and contested, it is still more a matter of 
fixed and indisputable status, whereas seniority, the hierarchical aspect of 
the kinship relation, is clearly more flexible and open to renegotiation. To 
put it in simple terms, a person has to be a relative first before he/she can be 
considered a senior relative. 
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5.3.2 The junior looking after the senior 
 
Another very important aspect of the court case is the Amakomhene’s 
historical seniority and contemporary juniority to the Adontenhene. The 
Amakomhene was originally made the Adontenhene explicitly because he 
was the “firstborn”. Therefore the principle or rule that the present relations 
within the Adonten group “should” instantiate is that the older is the senior. 
But, as mentioned above, the Amakom traditions hold that the chief of 
Amakom later lost the title of Adontenhene to the chief of Eduabin due to 
old age and/or ill health. So, the rule was changed, and thus the syntagmatic 
chain between the relationships of the past and present is not merely 
constructed of events in which the same principle is repeated. However, in 
general terms, the rule itself is not invalidated, since Amakom is still senior 
to the rest because it is older than the rest. Hence Amakom is junior to 
Adonten according to a rule that is different from the rule that makes Antoa, 
Akyawkrom, and Kwamo junior to Amakom. This causes a contradiction 
between Amakom’s historical status as the “firstborn” and its administrative 
status as the “second in command” even though both statuses have their 
legitimation in the past. To put it in theoretical terms, the paradigmatic 
components of different relationships within the same group seem to 
contradict each other. Here the inconsistency is not reconciled by a division 
of space like in the case of the Kwawu chiefs. Attempts to resolve this 
contradiction are made by narrative references to past events, which are seen 
to legitimate change instead of continuity.  
When I discussed the recent dispute between the Adontenhene and 
the Asantehene with the present Amakomhene, he compared it with a case 
that had taken place around 1765. Back then Adontenhene Amankwaa Osei 
had been charged of engaging in a liaison with and impregnating a widow of 
the late Asantehene Kusi Obodom.13 However, instead of facing his 
prosecutors, and most probably a prolonged and painful death,14 Amankwaa 
                                                 
13
 Customarily, the heir of the deceased person inherits his widow(s) (]kunafo, pl. 
akunafo]) unless the marriage is ritually called off (Rattray 1959, 173-174). The decisions 
made in this situation depend largely on the supposed will of the deceased who has now 
become an ancestor. An heir who rejects his predecessor’s widow or a widow who 
remarries against the supposed will of the deceased is seen to put him/herself at risk of 
getting punished by the deceased’s ancestral spirit (Rattray 1929, 28-29).  
14
 Those who were found guilty of adultery with the wives of the Asantehene were killed in 
so-called at]pere ritual (usually translated as “the dance of death”), which involved a 
slowly progressing dismemberment of the offender’s body (Rattray 1959, 87-89). 
McCaskie (1995a, 254-255) has analysed the “performative structuration” of at]pere.  
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Osei decided to take his own life (see McCaskie 1995a, 243). The 
Amakomhene described to me how his predecessor had tried to save the life 
of his senior brother in a similar manner as he himself had tried to help the 
present Adontenhene. According to his recollection:  
 
The Amakomhene went to him [the Adontenhene] and told him that 
they would have to go and plead the Asantehene. When the time 
came to go to Otumfuo, the Amakomhene went there only to find 
out that the Adontenhene had committed suicide. So, afterwards, 
instead of restoring the Amakomhene to his old position as the 
leader of the Adonten group, Otumfuo punished us too and took 
away two of my villages. You see, Otumfuo can do anything he 
wants to you. He has taken away so many of my villages and given 
them to his wives. 
 
Here the Amakomhene comes to the possibility of using a historical 
precedent to legitimate change. Although the hierarchy is reproduced – 
Adonten, nonetheless, remains senior to Amakom – the idea of change is 
present. As Valeri (1990, 190) has pointed out, even in those cases where a 
historical narrative constitutes a precedent for already established practices, 
it still “implies a choice between alternatives”. In this case the other 
alternative would have had a precedent of its own: Amakomhene Akosa 
Yiadom could not lead his brothers and follow his overlord to war and 
therefore the chief of Eduabin took his place, proved his abilities, and was 
thus allowed to continue as the leader of the Adonten group. Consequently, 
the change of rules is justified by failure of the senior chief to live up to his 
senior status. Apparently, the juniors perceive the failures of seniors (in 
front of superiors) as charters for possible legitimate change, which may 
take place during a period of liminal existence between the breakdown and 
reconstitution of the hierarchy. In the Amakomhene’s case the conflict 
between two incompatible statuses, as the older but junior, (re)surfaces in a 
situation, where the Adontenhene, as the younger but senior, fails and 
becomes a burden to the junior. The hierarchy becomes renegotiable in 
situations where the analogy between two relationships, namely elder and 
younger brother and group leader and his deputy, becomes void.  
However, in Osei Amankwaa’s case the junior is forced to share the 
collective punishment and the disgrace caused by the violation of taboo 
without a reward, which another precedent would have legitimated. The 
analogy between Osei Amankwaa and the present Adontenehene suggests 
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that now would be a moment when the contradiction of statuses in the group 
could be resolved. So, it seems that the dilemma of Amakom in its historical 
relationship to Eduabin (or Adonten) is that history does not repeat itself in 
a desired way: the omissions of the successive Adontenhene do not result in 
a similar outcome as had initially been the case with the Amakomhene.15 For 
Adonten there is no dilemma, since according to their traditions their 
seniority is justified by their heroic deeds in “The Ghost’s War” and not in 
Akosa Yiadom’s frailty.   
An important ramification of the Amankwaa Osei’s case is that it has 
enabled the members of the Adonten group to question the Adontenehene as 
the rightful successor of the first ruler, Aduonin Pim. Namely, after the 
death of Amankwaa Osei the Adonten stool itself was confiscated by 
Asantehene Osei Kwadwo. He also cancelled (pae din) the succession rights 
of the Asene abusua of Agyeiwaa Badu in Eduabin, in which the office was 
originally vested, and gave them to another lineage of the Asene clan in the 
village of Baaman (McCaskie 1995a, 243-244). For the other members of 
the Adonten group this has meant that the relationship between the 
Adontenhene’s office and its incumbent had to be re-evaluated. The 
Nkoransahene described how he saw what had happened in the aftermath of 
the whole episode: 
 
He [Amankwaa Osei] killed himself before he could stand trial. But 
all of us were called and we all had to go there [Kumase]. Otumfuo 
took the Adonten stool away from the family and gave it to 
somebody else who was not even a royal. So, strictly speaking, the 
Adontenhene is not our cousin anymore. 
 
Adonten traditions do not mention Amankwaa Osei’s transgression or 
suicide and also do not acknowledge any change in the line of succession. It 
is merely stated that “Nana Amankwah Osei was succeeded on the stool by 
his nephew Nana Kwarteng Pete in the reign of Asantehene Osei Kwame” 
(IAS/AS 95). However, the historical narratives of the Amakomhene and the 
Nkoransahene about Osei Amankwaa contest the accuracy of the Adonten 
                                                 
15
 A comparable instance took place about 1785, when Amankwaa Osei’s successor, 
Kwaaten Pete, was unable to account for a sum of gold dust (sika futuro) missing from the 
state assets during his stewardship of the “great chest” (adaka kesee). In addition to the 
compensations paid by the Adontenhene himself, the Amakomhene, Kwamohene, and the 
Adausenahene (who is the Nifahene of the Antoahene) were held collectively responsible 
and had to give up some of their lands and subjects in order to come up with their debts to 
the Asantehene (McCaskie 1984, 173).      
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genealogy and ultimately the relatedness between the Adontenhene and 
others. The relatedness between the offices is not denied, but the 
relationship between the “illegitimate occupants” of the Adonten stool and 
the “legitimate occupants” of the other stools is contested. This implies that 
the disgraceful behaviour of those Adontenhene, who have occupied the 
stool during the post-Osei Amankwaa period, has does not actually concern 
the other chiefs of the group. Since the present Adontenhene is not “really” a 
relative, then also the disgrace and collective responsibility should not 
“really” fall upon the other Adonten chiefs. 
The principles that constitute the order of precedence are multiple. In 
case of the father-son relationship between the Nkoransahene and the 
Asantehene affecting the uncle-nephew relationship between the 
Amakomhene and the Nkoransahene, this change could be called situational. 
In relations to the Asantehene the status as his son enables the 
Nkoransahene to take precedence over other Adonten chiefs. In the 
relationship between Amakom and Adonten, there is a strive for permanent 
change, which actualizes in circumstances, where hierarchal order is 
temporarily dissolved as result of a breach of jural norms. Kinship relations 
between chiefly offices are based partly on genealogical notions of “real” 
kinship, and they are given political meaning when a “kinship relation” is 
able to stand metaphorically for a “political relation”. Thus, one is able to 
see how seniority is not defined merely through a conceptual interplay of 
different asymmetrical categories, but it is also influenced by relations of 
authority and power. To put it bluntly, the powerful ones tend to be uncles 
and fathers more often nephews and sons. However, as is evident in the 
above, these relations are not established arbitrarily. One cannot claim 
seniority without reference to a recognized genealogical relation and/or a 
historical precedent. And because of this, the past continues in the 
circulating discourse of the present. 
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6 THE REBELLIOUS SON AND THE LEOPARD: THE POLITICAL 
SYMBOLISM OF KINSHIP 
 
As mentioned earlier, those who have subscribed to the ideological or 
political definitions of descent have pointed out that the power of the 
“descent dogma” lies in its flexibility – it seems to give room for all sorts of 
political manoeuvrings. In this chapter I discuss further how and why the 
ideology of kinship and descent is used as a justification for conduct. In the 
example given below a breach of allegiance is explained in terms of kinship, 
and these explanations are used to legitimate warfare by referring to the 
right order of things in society and nature. Furthermore, associating 
seemingly unconnected events with war also increases the potential to create 
new analogies, which describe the enemy as especially “deviant” or 
“disturbing” and thus confirm certain political actions. These associations 
are formed through inter-linkages between different symbolic systems. My 
example is the war between the Kumase based central authority and the 
chiefdom of Nkoransa in 1892-1893. It has an important place in the 
political history of Asante because it was the last rebellion in pre-colonial 
Asante that was suppressed by force of arms. But more importantly, the 
Asante themselves remember it as a war between kinsmen. It is still talked 
about as a disagreement between a rebellious son and his firm father, in 
which uncles and brothers were caught in between. 
 
 
6.1 From obedient son to rebellious son 
 
As noted above, the first Nkoransahene Bafo Pim had been the main 
supporter of Asantehene Opoku Ware in his campaign against the chiefdom 
of Takyiman. Traditions from both Nkoransa and Takyiman have it that the 
war was a direct consequence of a ruthless plot by Bafo Pim, who was 
seeking to remove the rich and powerful Takyimanhene, Ameyaw Kwaakye. 
To the Takyiman people these events meant the fall of their ancient Bono 
kingdom, which was considered to be the main contender for Asante might 
at the time, whereas for the Nkoransa people it was the foundation of their 
own chiefdom and establishment as the major Asante security post in the 
north. There are several published accounts of the Asante conquest of 
Takyiman (e.g., Meyerowitz 1952, 36-44), but below I give a shorter 
version of the tradition that I collected from Nkoransa. 
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The Takyiman royals used to be very rich. In fact, at that time, they 
were the richest in the whole country. They are not that rich 
anymore, but still, even nowadays, they have a lot of gold. I know all 
this because my mother has visited them and seen some of the gold 
with her own eyes and she told me about it. When Bafo Pim visited 
Otumfuo in Kumase, he used to pass through Takyiman. So, one 
time, he went to greet the Takyimanhene and told him: “I am going 
to Kumase to see my father. Is there any message that you would 
like me to give him?”  The Takyimanhene gave him some gold to be 
given to Otumfuo. Bafo Pim thanked him and continued his journey 
to Kumase. In Kumase when he met Otumfuo, he did not give him 
the gold. He kept it for himself. Instead, he told Otumfuo that the 
Takyimanhene has sent an important message for him. When 
Otumfuo asked what the message was, Bafo Pim gave him a flint 
stone, a handkerchief, and some gunpowder and said that these are 
from the Takyimanhene. When you give someone a flint stone, a 
handkerchief, and gunpowder you are sending a message. It means: 
Prepare for war! So, when Otumfuo received these items, he 
thought: “Oh! Is the Takyimanhene going to fight me?” That is when 
he decided to attack first and he conquered them and took their gold. 
 
Most of the Takyiman people fled to the north-western chiefdoms of Sampa 
and Gyaman, while their chief was captured, taken to Kumase and later 
executed. Their territory was redistributed so that the Nkoransahene was 
given most of it, while certain Kumase officeholders were given some parts 
to look after (hwe so) for the Asantehene. The land on which the chiefdom 
of Takyiman is currently located was given to them later, when the people 
returned from the refuge and “begged” land from the Asantehene. The old 
site of the capital of Takyiman is now on Nkoransa lands. About the 
motives concerning the redistribution of Takyiman lands the present 
Nkoransahene said the following: 
 
TK: Did Otumfuo give the conquered lands to Bafo Pim because he 
was his son? 
 
AK IV: The lands were given to Bafo Pim because he was a son to 
the Asantehene and because the Asantehene knew that he could trust 
him. 
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Nkoransa has been a buffer zone between Asante and the north. 
Over here we could stop any possible intrusion from the north, and 
this place also served as a platform for launching attacks to the 
north.  
 
Afterwards Bafo waged wars against his northern neighbours and further 
expanded the territory of Nkoransa. Since then, the local traditions portray 
the Nkoransa chiefs as staunch allies of Kumase, who took part in the 
ensuing wars of expansion (e.g., Goody & Boateng 1965, 176-178).1 
Kumase-Nkoransa relations are said to have been particularly warm during 
the reign of Asantehene Kofi Kakari (1867-1873), who awarded the 
Nkoransahene with some pieces of regalia made out of gold, which 
allegedly were “beyond the rank of the King of Nkoranza, and which he was 
not privileged to use” (PRO CO 879/39a). Kofi Kakari was deposed after 
the unsuccessful coastal campaign of 1873-1874, which led to the 
destruction of Kumase by the British troops, but he was able to make a bid 
for the Golden Stool once again after his successor, Asantehene Mensa 
Bonsu, had been deposed in 1883. However, he lost the contest to Kwaku 
Dua Kuma who was installed as Asantehene in 1884, but whose reign lasted 
for only 44 days, after which he died of smallpox, although there are 
allegations that Kofi Kakari had poisoned him. Just two weeks after that 
Kofi Kakari himself died. The official cause of death was dysentery, but it 
soon became publicly known that he had been put to death as punishment 
for killing his opponent (Wilks 1975, 560). The kingdom was now plunged 
into a murderous civil conflict between the supporters of two rival 
candidates for kingship, namely Agyeman Prempe and Yaw Twereboanna. 
Nkoransa remained neutral (PRO CO 879/39a).  
Agyeman Prempe came out victorious and in 1888 he called 
Nkoransahene Kwasi Poku to come to Kumase to “drink fetish” with him. 
Apparently, his loyalty to Kumase had been doubted since some of 
Prempe’s adversaries who were on the run had found their way to Nkoransa. 
Poku replied that there was no need to question his allegiance and to 
convince Prempe he promised to recover all of those areas in the north that 
                                                 
1
 Takyiman traditions claim that a Nkoransahene called Wiafe revolted against Asantehene 
Osei Bonsu about 1810-1811. The Asantehene suppressed the revolt and he was assisted by 
Takyiman forces who also captured the Nkoransahene. Afterwards, the Asantehene 
demanded that the prisoner should be given over to him, but the “Techimanhene however, 
being wistful of avenging the betrayal of his ancestors and their Bono kingdom by the 
ancestor of Nkoranzahene, refused the demand of Asantehene and himself executed 
Nkoranzahene” (PRO CO 96 8/3/12). Nkoransa traditions do not mention this. 
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had seceded from Asante after 1874. Prempe was satisfied and “presented 
Opoku with a gold sword and other decorations” (ibid.). Furthermore, Poku 
waged war against one of Prempe’s major enemies, namely the rebellious 
Mamponhene Owusu Sekyere II, who was defeated, and “part of the 
trophies captured by the Nkoranzas were on their way to Kumase” (ibid.).  It 
is also said that earlier the Mamponhene had requested assistance against 
Prempe, but the Nkoransahene refused him expressly because he could not 
fight against his father (Goody & Boateng 1965, 169). After the death of 
Kwasi Poku,2 Kofi Fa was put on the Nkoransa stool and when asked to 
come to Kumase to take an oath of allegiance to the Asantehene he refused 
and stated that “they should be better friends apart”. In Kumase this was 
interpreted as an open rebellion “and so Prempe determined to reduce the 
independence of Nkoransa by force of arms and declared war against that 
country about the middle 1892” (PRO CO 879/39a).3 
 
 
6.2 Living without father 
 
Modern historiography, relying mainly on external sources, traces the cause 
of the war to differing commercial interests of the core (Kumase) and 
periphery (Nkoransa). Already before the reign of Kwasi Poku the level of 
tribute collected from the market at Kintampo by the Asantehene had been a 
cause of worry to the Nkoransahene who controlled the town.4 More 
recently, the main concern of Kofi Fa and his supporters was the Kumase 
administration’s decision to favour the growth of Wankyi market at the 
                                                 
2
 What actually happened to Kwasi Poku seems to be a matter of dispute. G. E. Ferguson 
stated that he died of sickness and/or old age (PRO CO 879/39a). Tradition collected by 
Boateng asserts that he committed suicide along with some other Nkoransa royals because 
he was about to get deposed (Goody & Boateng 1965, 179) Rattray’s informants claimed 
that he was deposed after he had had his Gyaasehene, Adontenhene, and the queen mother’s 
husband killed (RAI MS 107: 9). Similarly, his reign has been dated variably. Ferguson 
claims that he was already on the stool during the title race between Kwaku Dua Kuma and 
Kofi Kakari (PRO CO 879/39a), whereas Ivor Wilks (1975, 296) says that he was installed 
sometime between 1885 and 1888. 
3
 The authoritative account of the war is a memorandum prepared by G. E. Ferguson (PRO 
CO 879/39a), who was the principal organizer of British reconnaissance operations in 
northern Asante at the time. See Arhin (1970) for the published, but abbreviated, version of 
the memorandum. There is also other useful correspondence by both Europeans and 
Africans who visited Nkoransa and its environs during the hostilities.    
4
 According to data gathered by Rattray, Nkoransa paid one third of the tolls collected from 
Kintampo market to the Asantehene. The tolls were paid in cowries (RAI MS 107: 9).  
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expense of Kintampo, which posed a major threat to the economy of 
Nkoransa (e.g., Lewin 1978, 107-108; 169-170). Also the intensification of 
German and French commercial interests in the area was a major concern 
for the British, who sought to strengthen their ties with Nkoransa (PRO CO 
879/39b), which understandably must have alarmed the Kumase 
administration. 
The chiefs and people whom I talked to were not so much concerned 
with the historical details. There prevailed a consensus on how Nkoransa 
had instigated the war and was brought back in line by the Asantehene. This 
applied to Nkoransa itself also. During my fieldwork Nkoransa was a 
member state of the Asanteman and on excellent terms with Kumase. The 
people that I spoke with, with a few exceptions, did not share the anti-
Asante sentiment common in some of the neighbouring chiefdoms. Most 
importantly, from the point of view of my informants, the war had been 
essentially a break between kinsmen. A son had been disrespectful to his 
father. “The son got too proud, he thought he could live without his father”, 
was a very typical assessment of the cause of the war, although most people 
could not really explain how this pride manifested itself in practical terms. 
In 1922 Kwasi Apea Nuama, the Akyeamehene of Kumase, described the 
events preceding the war: 
 
When Mensa Bonsu, King of Ashanti, was destooled, Prempeh sent 
a linguist by name of Kweku Coomassie to call the Omanhene of 
Nkoranza. The Omanhene sent a messenger to tell Prempeh what 
ornaments he was bringing to Coomassie. This was because on one 
occasion he came to Coomassie with a state umbrella and the 
Omanhin of Manpon [sic] seeing this, destroyed it. The reason being 
that he, Mampon, was head nifahene, and that he had not got such a 
good umbrella as Nkoranza had.5 The Ornaments were Gold 
Sandals, Gold Umbrella, Tiger skins to cover his drums, Gold Hat 
and certain villages [?]. Prempeh would not allow him to have the 
gold hat and Nkoranza did not agree and refused to come. He defied 
                                                 
5
 Mamponhene is the Nifahene, commander of the right wing, in the Asante army. Although 
Nkoransa belongs to the Adonten, the main body, on public occasions, like durbars, the 
Adonten chiefs sit with Nifa chiefs. When entering the meetings of the Asanteman Council, 
the Nifa chiefs are led by the Mamponhene and followed by Edwesohene, Agonahene, and 
Nkoransahene in this order. As the Nkoransahene himself put it: “Militarily I belong to 
Adonten, administratively I belong to Nifa”. So, in this sense Mamponhene can claim 
seniority to Nkoransahene, and thus a junior chief bringing excessive regalia to a public 
gathering can be said to have behaved disrespectfully. 
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Prempeh and said he would not serve him anymore, and he killed 
some of his subjects, who were trading in Kintampo. Prempeh called 
his Elders and said that he would fight against Nkoranza (PRAAD 
ARG 1/6/5/1/41a). 
 
Throughout the whole conflict Kofi Fa sought protection from the Gold 
Coast government and military assistance from the other northern 
chiefdoms. Early on, he had “invested in the castle” (koto aban mu) by 
sending some ivory and gold dust to the governor and expected this to 
guarantee Nkoransa’s safety (PRO CO 879/39a). A more important source 
of support was a union between “the fetish priest of Kraki and the 
confederate Kings”. It was a coalition formed under the spiritual leadership 
of a deity called Dente, who had its main shrine in Kete Krakye (or 
Krakyekrom), a town on the eastern shore of the Volta River.6 Dente had 
been known as a powerful god throughout the area for sometime, for 
instance, Ferguson noted that requests were “made to it from Ashanti and 
surrounding countries in matters relating to fetish and religion, to divination 
and charms, teleology, as well as in health, wealth, and disease” (ibid.). Its 
reputation as a war god was even more enhanced, when it became known 
publicly that Dente’s priest (bosomfo]) had prophesised the downfall 
Kumase in 1874.7  Subsequent to the war Krakye had allied with those 
Asante chiefdoms that sought to secede from the Asanteman. Principal 
among them were Dwaben and Nsuta, both recognized to have been among 
the founders of the kingdom, but which Kumase also managed to put down. 
Later on, after the civil war and Prempe’s installation many of the refugee 
chiefs and their supporters found a safe haven in Krakye or in Atebubu, 
which was the major Akan chiefdom in the coalition. Krakye people 
                                                 
6
 The actual shrine was located in a cave above the river, from which Dente was heard to 
speak. In late 1894 its priest Kwasi Gyantrubi was executed and the shrine was destroyed 
by the Germans (Maier 1981, 230), but apparently it was re-established rather quickly since 
Rattray (1916, 52-53) visited it sometime after Togoland had been conquered from the 
Germans in World War I. Also when a large part of Middle Volta Basin was changed into a 
reservoir in the mid-1960’s Kete Krakye was left under water, and the shrine was moved 
from its original place. I am told that the shrine is still active and its priest celebrates an 
annual festival.   
7
 Right after the war the priest of Dente explained that Queen Victoria of England had made 
a secret treaty with Dente and hence the successful British campaign against the Asante had 
been a result of Dente’s influence over the queen. He added that “the Grandfather [Dente] 
is so closely bound with the Queen of England that a division of the persons is impossible, 
and only they themselves can say whether the Queen is the Grandfather or Grandfather the 
Queen” (cited in Wilks 1975, 281). 
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themselves had also been under Asante before 1874. They were a non-Akan 
group like many of their neighbours and supporters, for example, Yegi and 
Pran (Maier 1981). In essence, the member chiefdoms comprised a 
multiethnic coalition, which was united by a common oath to the god Dente 
and their resentment towards Asante rule. Right in the beginning of the war, 
Kofi Fa approached the coalition by sending “12 slaves and gold to the 
fetish priest of Kraki, who in response sent charms and medicated 
gunpowder to Kofi Fa” (PRO CO 879/39a).  
The Asantehene launched the first attack on Nkoransa in the middle 
of 1892. During the first year of the war there were two or three (the number 
varies in different sources) major encounters between the Kumase and 
Nkoransa forces. Kofi Fa reported to the Governor of the Gold Coast that 
the first engagement had taken place in August, and “(2000) two thousands 
of my women and their babies were caught away, and (200) two hundred 
men also were caught and killed on the spot” (PRO CO 879/39c). Prempe’s 
army had been victorious, and Nkoransa town was ransacked, pillaged, and 
burned, while the chief and his people fled to the nearby town of Komfa, 
roughly 40 kilometres east of Nkoransa (ibid.). The second (or third?) battle 
was fought close to Komfa, where “the Kumasis suffered severely from the 
fire of the Nkoranzas in the swamp and marshes in the neighbourhood” 
(PRO CO 879/39a). The Kumase army was defeated and they retreated back 
to Asante territory, where they blamed smallpox and leopard attacks for 
their poor success. It was reported that “the Ashantis have lost several 
Chiefs” (PRO CO 879/39d) and later many of the Nkoransa people who 
were taken prisoners by the Kumase troops had been “sacrificed during the 
‘custom’ for those chiefs who fell in the war with Nkoranza” (PRO CO 
879/39e). Elsewhere it is said that the Kumase army lost 300 men captured 
and killed (PRAAD ARG 1/2/12/2a). In the meantime Kofi Fa attacked the 
northern Banda who had supported Kumase. Gifts were sent to Krakye “to 
thank the god Dente, as the success in both these wars [against Kumase and 
Banda] was ascribed by the Nkoranzas to the powers of fetish Dente” (PRO 
CO 879/39a). 
After an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate peace thorough the 
Krakye priest, Prempe started to prepare for a new campaign in June 1893. 
Although the past years had been marked by instability and unrest in 
Asante, Prempe was able to mobilize an expedition of considerable size. 
The army was led by Bantamahene Amankwatia IV, who left Kumase with 
a promise to bring “the king of Nkoranza” back with him. According to 
Ferguson, Kumase, Mampon, Nsuta, Abesim, Offinso, Kumawu, Edweso, 
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Agogo, Kwaman, Asokore, and Konongo supplied troops for the campaign 
(ibid). At least Agona, a brother, and Amakom, an uncle, to Nkoransa did 
not take part; other chiefs from the Asene clan might have done the same.8 
The following is an excerpt from a conversation with the present 
Amakomhene: 
 
TK: More than a hundred years ago the Asante went to war against 
Nkoransa. What was the position of Amakom at that time? How did 
you feel about it? 
 
AY II: Of course we felt very bad! But what could we do? Except to 
remain neutral…and try to solve the dispute amicably. 
 
TK: So, the Amakomhene worked as a middleman? 
 
AY II: Yes. This whole thing got started when the son, who had 
received all these lands from his father, started feeling too big. 
 
The situation of the uncle is described by referring to the tensions between 
kinship and allegiance. Amakomhene should fulfil his co-operative 
obligation to defend his nephew, but then again, he has to protect his own 
interests by remaining, at least formally, loyal to his overlord.9 And more 
importantly, he has to try to deal with the disgrace caused by the rebellious 
nephew and a possible future collective punishment from the part of the 
overlord, but also try to act as mediator in order to save his clansmen. This 
pressure conflict was also noticed on the other side of the battle lines. Nana 
Agyeman Kudom IV described the uneasy situation of his uncle: 
 
Of course it was painful for father and son to fight against each 
other, but also our brothers in Amakom suffered. They [the Kumase 
administration] were putting the pressure on them, asking “Why 
does your brother cause all this trouble?” So, they too had to try hard 
in order to end the war. 
 
                                                 
8
 However, Adonten traditions have it that Adontenhene Gyamfi “went to the Nkoranza war 
which was fought in the first part of the reign of King Prempeh I” (IAS/AS 95). 
9
 The idea that matrilineal relatives should not fight against each other is embodied in 
proverbs like ]sa wo ko no wo nko agya mma, “when one goes to war, it is against one's 
father's children” (i.e. brothers by one father but by different mothers) (Rattray 1916, 98). 
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Nevertheless, despite the war party sent after him, the Nkoransahene was 
not about to give up. He moved his main camp to the market town of 
Kintampo, a little less than 50 kilometres northwest from the chiefdom’s 
capital, where he was joined by a few reinforcements from other northern 
dissidents, who had been instructed to support Kofi Fa’s cause by the 
Krakye priest (PRO CO 879/39a). The capital of the chiefdom could not 
serve as headquarters anymore. Ferguson’s scouts, who had arrived at 
Nkoransa, reported the following:  
 
All the shade trees burnt, oil palms cut down and made into 
latrines.10 All houses in town burnt. We fired four rounds each, ten 
of us, to invite any enemy in the town. We stayed from early 
morning till late in the evening, saw no Ashantis and returned to 
Buabinmai [a village roughly 20 kilometres north from Nkoransa] 
(PRO CO 879/39f).  
 
Two engagements took place in the surroundings of Kintampo, after which 
the Nkoransahene was forced to retreat to Abease, where a decisive battle 
was to be fought. The Nkoransa troops suffered a defeat and lost “five men 
killed, and 2,000 to 3,000 women and children were taken captives to 
Kumasi, the Nkoranza Stool and State umbrellas became trophies of the 
conquerors” (PRO CO 879/39a). Around the middle of August 1893 Kofi 
Fa and his subjects fled to Atebubu. Close to the end of 1893 the 
Nkoransahene, accompanied by the Atebubuhene and the refugee 
Mamponhene, received messengers from Kumase, who announced that the 
                                                 
10
 The cutting of trees by the conqueror has several meanings. In a typical Akan town the 
main streets (abonten) are lined by “shade trees” (gyannua). The trees are there to provide 
dwo, “coolness”, which is seen as the opposite of ahohuru, “hotness”, of the bush. Both in a 
physical and metaphysical sense “coolness” is associated with home or dwelling, whereas 
“hotness” belongs to the realm of the “bush” (McCaskie 1992, 227). Thus by cutting down 
the “shade trees”, the enemy is not only making it physically more uncomfortable to live in 
the town, he is also transforming human dwellings into “bush”.  Secondly, the “big tree” 
(]dupon) is also an epithet used for a chief. Similarly, as the “shade tree” protects the 
townspeople from the “hotness” of the bush, the chief protects the community from their 
external enemies (McCaskie 1995b, 422-425). Hence the cutting of a “shade tree” also 
symbolizes the collapse of chiefly authority. Moreover, in the town of Nkoransa there are 
several trees that are considered to be inhabited by deities. In fear of possible supernatural 
punishments these trees might have been saved. There exists a considerable body of 
traditions about the “evil fortune” of those people who have violated the sanctity of the 
trees. However, the temporal range of these traditions does not extend to the time of the 
Kumase war. 
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“Nkoranza King is one with Ashanti King by relation, and if the former 
wishes to come and serve him then there will be peace” (PRO CO 879/39a). 
This is also how the present Nkoransahene related it:  
 
Those were terrible times for us. We had to flee to Atebubu. But it 
was right after the new Asantehene had been enstooled, that we 
made peace.11 It was he who invited us to come back home. He said 
that we are father and son, and so we should not fight like this. 
 
Now the Nkoransa people were able to return to their ancestral lands and 
this is usually considered to have been the end of hostilities. However, as 
late as spring 1894, when Basel missionary E. Perregaux visited Nkoransa, 
he was told that the local traders had not been able to travel to the coast 
through the Asante territory and had to use an alternative route through 
Atebubu, which took them from five to six days longer. Therefore they said 
that they had not had salt to put in their food for four years. Those people he 
talked to in Sekyedumase, an Asante town south of Nkoransa, told him that 
they were preparing a new attack on Nkoransa in order to “drive them away 
from their country” (PRO CO 879/39g). They also added that “the country 
did not belong to the Koranzas, but to Kumasi, and that the Koranzas were 
only slaves of Kumasi, and had no right to build their houses there again 
without permission from Kumasi” (PRO CO 879/39h). However, Perregaux 
predicted that Prempe would not launch a new attack before his final 
installation ceremonies: 
 
As the Kumase King is just making a custom for his predecessors, I 
do not think they will go just now, but they will soon after prepare 
for it, if they are not checked before by the government. I met many 
people on my way who were kept prisoners and destined to be 
brought to Kumase for the custom. No doubt they will be killed as so 
many Nkoranza women, who have been taken prisoners and were 
kept for this purpose (PRO CO 879/39g).12 
                                                 
11
  What the Nkoransahene meant by the “new Asantehene” remains unclear to me. I 
suspect he referred to the final installation rites of Prempe I that could not be performed 
until 1894 because of the civil unrest (Wilks 1975, 587).  
12
 Here Perregaux most likely refers to the “funeral custom” (ayie) of Prempe’s predecessor 
Asantehene Kwaku Dua Kuma, which took place in early May. Prempe’s installation was 
scheduled roughly a month later (Wilks 1975, 578). It was reported that during the 
installation ceremonies there were “over 100 headless bodies lying in the streets; these (…) 
were chiefly Koranzas” (PRO CO 879/39h). 
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On the 25th of January 1894 Nkoransa signed a “Treaty of Friendship and 
Freedom of Trade” with Great Britain (PRO CO 879/39i). In April of that 
same year, Kofi Fa wrote to Accra and informed the colonial government 
that the “King of Kumase will soon send his messengers to me to drink 
water as an oath” (PRO CO 879/39j), and he was told not to “drink fetish” 
or give any other promises without consulting the government first (PRO 
CO 879/39k). However, during the following year, the British plans for the 
invasion of Asante territory were well under way, and Nkoransa had 
become the least of its problems. 
 
 
6.3 Father who can punish 
 
Ideally, the relationship between father and son is characterised by 
affection. The father is considered to have a soft spot for his son, so that the 
son cannot be denied anything he asks for. However, in return, the father 
can expect obedience and impeccable behaviour from his son at all times, 
and he also has the right to discipline him. An important difference between 
the father-son and uncle-nephew relationships is that “a father can punish 
or, if the offence is grave, even curse an incorrigibly contumacious son”, but 
an uncle “can only censure an offending nephew or, in a grave case, submit 
his grievance to the arbitration of the lineage elders” (Fortes 1969a, 203). 
However, a son is as capable of disgracing his father as a nephew is his 
uncle, and the disgrace caused by the son extends to the patrilineal ancestry. 
“A man was often referred to as ‘the son or grandson of such-and-such a 
man’, and if this reference was an uncomplimentary one, the nsamanfo [i.e. 
the ancestors] were grieved, and they showed their resentment in the manner 
of all nsamanfo – by causing misfortune to befall the luckless offender” 
(Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 197). In the war of 1892-1893 there was a son 
(Nkoransa) who “had received all these lands from his father”, but 
afterwards started “feeling too big”, thinking that “he could live without his 
father”. The father (Kumase) tolerated the whims of his son for some time, 
but eventually he was left with no other option than to punish him. Soon, 
after the son had suffered the punishment due to him, the father relented and 
asked his son to return back home.  
In the narratives concerning the Nkoransa war one is able to see how 
the right order of things in society becomes a proposal for administrative 
relations. Reduction to a simple set of hierarchical relations takes place 
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because their usefulness in the process of legitimation: relations father/son 
and adult/child are used to confirm the relationship Asantehene 
(Kumase)/Nkoransahene (Nkoransa). Or more generally, hierarchies of the 
state are legitimated by drawing analogies to hierarchies of society. 
However, analogies of this type cannot be merely reduced to metaphorical 
variances of a one-sided relationship between the superior and subordinate. 
If I would have conducted my fieldwork somewhere else or if I had talked 
to different people, those who opposed to Nkoransa’s membership in 
Asanteman, I would most probably have collected traditions in which “the 
strong and clever minded son” tried to escape from his “cruel and unjust 
father”. Hence the same relationship having the same components can be 
made to instantiate different principles in different situations. It is true that 
sons should obey their fathers, but it is equally true that if the father neglects 
his son, he will leave the father and move to live with his abusua, and there 
is nothing the father can do to stop him (Rattray 1929, 10). But taken either 
way, the analogy seeks to liberate the actors “to the realm that transcends 
contingency” (McCaskie 1995a, 262-263), meaning that the actions taken 
were not incidental, the actors had no other alternative that could have made 
sense. And this, I think, is exactly what is meant by the flexibility of the 
ideology of kinship and descent. On the one hand, it assumes invariance and 
uniformity, but on the other, permits departure and conflict. In oral tradition, 
the contingent actions, their motives and progression, are legitimated by 
making analogies to rules, which are considered unambiguous and 
invariable. Thus a war can be reduced to an instance of kinship relation, 
which is regulated according to multiple, but nonetheless, constituted rules.  
However, there is another way of looking at it. According to Robert 
Netting (1974, 160), who has studied warfare among the Kofyar of Northern 
Nigeria, talking about warfare in kinship terms is a way of reducing “the 
impossible complexities of group conflict to a simple determinate set of 
oppositions”: 
 
Kinship categories are not an accidental or illogical framework for 
thinking about social conflict. For the Kofyar, the idiom of kinship 
serves as a means of organizing information about warfare. It 
communicates in terms of a structure whose ties and cleavages are 
presumably familiar to all the society’s adult members. Moreover, 
since relations are involved (in kinship among persons/ in warfare 
among village groups), the idiom functions as a calculus in terms of 
which relations at one level can be dealt with by an analogy with 
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relations at another. The basis of the analogy may be hidden or 
disguised and is thus metaphorical. The Kofyar seem to be saying 
that kinship causes warfare, whereas in fact kinship shares certain 
formal features with warfare and their similarity suggests an 
approach to understanding the relatively opaque and perplexing 
nature of conflict (Ibid., 161). 
 
Since the logic or philosophy of kinship is shared by all the actors and it has 
such a central position in their lives, it is easy to apply in other situations, 
which are not distinctively “kinship situations”. And so, as Robert 
McKinley (2001) has put it, kinship provides people with “practical theory” 
according to which relations on both levels, domestic and political, can be 
treated. However, to my mind, this nature of kinship has other consequences 
as well.   
 
 
6.4 Identifying the leopard 
 
Eyewitness accounts tell of rather strange events in the centre of Kumase 
that occurred during the critical moments of the war in 1893. In this case the 
Asante interpreted a perfectly innocent, accidental episode according to 
their own cultural conceptions and interests and associated it with war. As 
already mentioned, during the early stages of the war, the Kumase troops 
had blamed leopard attacks for their defeat. Similarly, during the latter part 
of the war, a rubber trader called George Apea reported that a “continual 
stream of Ashanti women and slaves bring food to the army at Kontampo, 
but the Kumasis have suffered severely from sickness, famine, and from the 
ravages of a leopard or leopards” (CO PRO 879/39l). This must have been 
partly expected since a significant part of the fighting took place in dense 
forests (ibid.), but what must have been quite unpredictable occurred when a 
leopard entered Kumase and killed two people and injured five before it was 
finally captured. It was a relatively insignificant occurrence in an otherwise 
turbulent era in the history of the kingdom, but it is remembered by many 
even today mainly because Prempe’s successor Asantehene Osei Agyeman 
Prempe II was born on that very same day and thus he was nicknamed 
Kyeretwie, “the leopard catcher” (McCaskie 1992, 228).13 One of the 
                                                 
13
 One of the most prestigious secondary schools in Kumase is Osei Kyeretwie Secondary 
School, popularly known as OKESS. Hence, in an indirect way, the school is a monument 
dedicated to these events.  
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surviving accounts is particularly interesting. Thomas Lewin (1978, 264) 
collected it in 1970 from an elderly Asante, who had spent his youth as a 
servant in the Asantehene’s palace. 
 
In the course of this war, the Nkoransahene changed himself into a 
leopard. It was juju. The leopard visited the house of Nana Prempe’s 
wives called Hiaa. News was brought to Prempe that a leopard was 
with his wives. Prempe instructed his asoamfo, or carriers, to kill the 
leopard. The asoamfo made torches from the dried palm leaves. 
They went up and down with torches. The leopard backed away 
from the torches and attempted to jump on one soamfoni [sing. of 
asoamfo]. The rest of the asoamfo caught the leopard in the air and 
cut off his head. They brought the head and placed it at the junction 
of Hiaa and Boagyawe wards in Kumase. They informed Prempe 
that the leopard had been killed. Prempe asked the young nhenkwaa, 
or servants, in the palace to follow him to the scene. I was one of the 
servants. Prempe put one foot on the leopard and sprinkled white 
clay on the leopard three times. Prempe then said, “if the leopard had 
brought bad luck to the Asantes, it must be cursed.” But, “if 
otherwise it would be good luck for the Asante warriors fighting in 
Nkoransa.” (…) If the asoamfo had not succeeded in killing the 
leopard, the Asantes felt that the Nkoransahene would have defeated 
them for the second time (ibid., 172-173). 
 
Why did (some of) the people of Kumase think that the leopard was the 
Nkoransahene? According to Lewin, the “popular Asante belief regarding 
the relationship between Nkoransahene Kofi Fa and the Kumase leopard” 
could be partly explained by the fact that the people of Kumase had been 
suffering from famine and diseases at the time, and thus the spiritual powers 
of the enemy could be held accountable for all of their misfortunes as a 
whole (ibid., 264).  
However, there is more to it than that. First, supernatural means 
were always employed in warfare, and Nkoransa was and is widely known 
as the home of some of the most powerful deities, a number of them renown 
as “war gods”. Earlier in the narrative Lewin’s (1978, 172) informant states 
that deities named “Susa Ntoa and Kukuma Ntoa” (i.e., Seseman Ntoa and 
Kokuma Ntoa) had been helping the Nkoransahene in the war. Also because 
Kofi Fa’s great predecessor, the first Nkoransahene Bafo Pim, had been the 
son of Osei Tutu, he had been introduced to Komfo Anokye in his 
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childhood and had become a close friend of his. That is how he had learned 
the art of magic, for which he also became famous. So, in this context it is 
quite safe to assume that people expected a significant part of the warfare to 
be carried out by magical means.  
 
 
PHOTOGRAPH 3. The priest of Seseman Ntoa on a palanquin. The famous “war god” 
is celebrated annually in Nkoransa.   
 
Secondly, the perception of the enemy as a human who had condescended to 
the level of an animal was part of the ideology of warfare. The ordered 
behaviour of human beings (nnipa, sing. onipa) is kept categorically distinct 
from that of animals (mmoa, sing. amoa), which connotes “disorder, licence, 
excess, indulgence, and sensuality” (McCaskie 1992, 222). Hence to speak 
of any person as an animal is considered offensive, and an expression aboa 
onipa, the “animal man” carries “suggestions of boorish crudeness, of 
uncivilised status, and of an absolute ignorance of behavioural norms and 
properties” (ibid.).14 In the execution of a captured enemy chief, he was 
ritually dehumanised, transformed into an animal. The logic resulting in the 
transformation is evident in a recitation used in pronouncing the death 
sentence: 
 
‘Since you (had a quarrel with some one and) did not allow us to 
take good ears to hear the case, it is as if you had taken a stick and 
beat the Okyeame [chief’s linguist] with it to kill him; thus have you 
dealt with him as if he were a beast.’ (Rattray 1929, 125). 
                                                 
14
 In some formulaic ritual recitations used in the chiefly installation ceremonies the elders 
tell the chief specifically not to “call us beasts”.  Conversely, it is regarded as highly 
improper to give human names to dogs, cats, or other animals that would in some respects 
fit the Western category of pets. 
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After the beheading, the dead body of the chief was cut into pieces in a 
similar manner as an animal killed by hunters. This type of trial and 
execution was arranged even for the dead body of the enemy chief slain in 
the battlefield (McCaskie 1995a, 82-83). The body parts were distributed 
among different chiefs, so that the paramount took the head, commander of 
the right wing took the right leg, and so forth. Sometimes the flesh was 
consumed (Bowdich 1966, 300-301).15 This resembles the way in which 
certain parts of the animal carcass are divided between the chiefs controlling 
the land, where the animal was shot (PRAAD ARG 1/6/5/1/41a). By 
resorting to war instead of bringing his grievances to court, the enemy chief 
is seen to have deliberately chosen to treat his adversaries as if they were 
animals, and in return he himself is treated as an animal.  
Of all possible animals, the leopard (]seb]) is unambiguously a wild 
animal, or “bush animal”.16 Even though it resides and preys in nature, it 
sometimes attacks human beings and makes intrusions to human 
habitations, like in the case at hand. This haphazard “shuttling” between 
nature and culture makes it particularly unpredictable and feared. A 
common understanding among the Asante hunters is that leopards are “left-
handed”, they stalk and attack their victims always from the left (Rattray 
1916, 62). This is highly illustrative in terms of the superior “right” (nifa) 
and inferior “left” (benkum). Accordingly, catching a leopard alive, 
imprisoning it, and possibly even taming it, would be the highest possible 
expression of human mastery over the “bush”.17 Such incidents are 
commemorated, for example, in a textile design called Kyeretwie, which 
refers to Asantehene Kwaku Dua Panin’s order to catch a leopard alive 
(Rattray 1959, 245-246). Using leopard skins as part of regalia or clothing 
also has the same connotations. In the quotation above about the excessive 
regalia of the Nkoransahene, the “Tiger skins” that covered his drums, were 
specifically leopard skins. 
                                                 
15
 I have heard eyewitness accounts of similar practices in the civil war of Sierra Leone 
during 1991-2001. 
16
 The Akan have two basic categories for animals: fiemmoa, “house animals”, and 
wurammoa, “bush animals”. The categorisation of a particular animal species depends on 
how its appearance, habits, and territory relate to human culture. These categories are not 
entirely comparable to the Western categories of domesticated animals and wild animals. 
For example, a vulture (pete) is considered a “house animal” (McCaskie 1992, 228). 
17
 Rattray’s (1929, 264) photograph of Nsutahene Kwame Gyima holding a leopard cub is 
very expressive in this sense.  
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However, the human-animal relationship has its reverse side as well. 
Although humans are considered superior to animals, the latter are still 
considered “phenomenologically living entities like people” (McCaskie 
1992, 221). Furthermore, animals are thought to have something that might 
be called “traits of character” that are shared with humans. In the case of a 
leopard, the Akan clearly see something “chiefly” in it. One of the many 
words meaning a leopard, kurotwiamansa (also etwie and okyem), is also a 
title bestowed on chiefs. This can be explained by its alleged “guardian 
instincts”. Despite its hostility towards human culture the leopard is 
considered “a good parent ever-ready to protect its offspring so well that 
any attempt to steal the cub invites its wrath” (Ayim 2000, 14). When its 
fierceness and insidiousness are employed in the defence of its own, a 
leopard can also be seen as an admirable creature, resembling the chief who 
was expected to fight to his death when defending his subjects.18   
Finally, the narrative refers indirectly to the relationship between 
father and son when describing how the leopard visits, not attacks, the wives 
of the Asantehene. Prempe is informed that “the leopard is with his wives”, 
not clawing his wives, for example. I interpret this as a reference to the 
formal kin relation between the Nkoransahene and the royal wives of 
Kumase, which was established historically through the marriage between 
Osei Tutu and his first wife Afua Sapon, which, as noted before, produced 
Nkoransahene Bafo Pim. According to Akan kinship terminology, a child 
can refer to all his/her father’s wives with the same term “mother” (ena, 
maame), which he/she uses to call his/her biological mother. Since the 
Asantehene is a father to the Nkoransahene, it follows that his wives are all 
classificatory mothers to his son. What is intended in the narrative by this 
odd visit is up to one’s own guesswork. Is the son begging his mothers to 
speak in favour of him to his father? Or is the son trying to convince his 
mothers to leave his father? Nevertheless, the relationship between mother 
and child is seen to be the most unselfish and morally binding of all kinship 
ties. It is precisely the mother who “importunes her husband” to make sure 
that he fulfils his responsibilities to their children (Fortes 1962, 263). 
The Kumase leopard, both as a beast and leopard, is a forceful 
symbol for the enemy chief, and when taking into consideration the 
                                                 
18
 The Akan kingdom of Akyem Abuakwa is also called Okyeman, “the leopard state”, and 
its ruler Okyenhene, “the leopard king”. This allegedly refers to the career of the first king 
Apeanin Kwaframoa or Atta Apeanin as “courageous, shrewd and unconquerable” warrior 
who attracted the attention of “other clans who felt cheated or threatened and looked up to 
him for succour and protection” (Ayim 2000,12-14). 
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leopard’s interaction with the Asantehene’s wives in the narrative, it 
becomes identifiable as the Nkoransahene, the son. However, the old 
servant’s narrative is a description of real life events; it is not a metaphor for 
the Nkoransa war as such. And I suppose mostly leopards are just leopards 
and not chiefs who have undergone magical metamorphosis. The question 
here is how a “happening” is made into an “event” through cultural 
interpretation (Sahlins 1985, 153-154). Above I have discussed the symbolic 
system that gives the frame for the interpretation, but what is more 
important here is that interpretations vary also according to interests. 
Naturally, the confused and starved animal could not have had any political 
intentions when creating havoc in the capital, but in the narrative it is made 
into a thinking subject, a rebellious chief and an estranged son, by the 
narrator who shared the interests of those in power.19  
The power of the symbolism in the narrative is in the way it opens a 
whole new field of reference, piling up a number of new sets of hierarchical 
cultural categories: human > animal, village (city) > bush, cool > hot, order 
> disorder, which are used in justifying the violent repression of Nkoransa’s 
attempts to secede from the confederacy led by the Asantehene. The 
important thing to note here are the linkages made between hierarchical 
categories of different symbolic systems. Since the Asantehene is the father 
and thus superior to the son, the Nkoransahene, it follows that in all other 
imaginable analogies he is made to take the place of the superior, while the 
Nkoransahene is made to take that of the inferior. The Asantehene is the 
human, cool, and orderly one, who will preside over the animalistic, hot, 
and disorderly one. Through these associations the process of legitimation 
not only entails the right order of things in society but also nature. Of 
course, I am not suggesting that the Asante always and necessarily associate 
the kinship status of a son with animals. Usually they do not. What I am 
suggesting is that there is a cultural logic that makes such associations 
possible in certain situations. Since kinship logic has such a central place in 
peoples’ lives and it is shared by the whole society, it also means that people 
apply it in various and very different situations. Hence, the father-son 
relationship, which on the surface seems irrelevant, can be used as one 
implicit component of the argumentation used in the narrative about the 
Nkoransahene changing himself into a leopard. Thus, in addition to its 
                                                 
19
 The political stance of the narrator, Adu Gyamera, cannot be directly read from my 
quotation. However, elsewhere in Lewin’s (1978) book it becomes clear. For instance, he is 
characterised as a “nationalist” from Atwema (ibid., 233), people of which “took particular 
pride in their long association with the civil arm of the bureaucratic apparatus” (ibid., 29).  
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flexibility, I think the power of the ideology of kinship and descent is in its 
connectedness to other symbolic systems. 
Although major historic changes have taken place between the time 
of the Nkoransa war and the present, the cultural logic that allows people to 
talk about the conflict as strife between kinsmen has not disappeared. The 
profit distribution of markets, the maintenance of trade routes, the presence 
of rival colonial powers, and other causes for war mentioned by modern 
historians might not be so familiar to the ordinary present-day Asante. 
However, what they do know is that the Asantehene is a father of the 
Nkoransahene and they once waged war against each other. They know that 
sons are sometimes disobedient and fathers have to tolerate their whims, but 
eventually they will be brought back in line. Hence they are able to think 
and talk about events that took place more than one hundred years ago as if 
it had happened to them. 
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7 SACRIFICE AND HIERARCHY: DEFINING AUTHORITY 
THROUGH RITUAL EXCHANGE 
 
In the introduction to African Political Systems Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 
(1969, 23) argue that what gives “political structure” its dominance over 
“social structure” is its “attachment to mystical symbols”. 
 
An administrative organization backed up by coercive sanctions, 
clanship, lineage and age-set ties, the fine-spun web of kinship – all 
these unite people who have different or even opposed sectional and 
private interest (…) Always there are common ritual values, the 
ideological superstructure of political organization. 
Members of an African society feel their unity and perceive 
their common interests in symbols, and it is their attachment to these 
symbols which more than anything else gives their society cohesion 
and persistence. In the form of myths, fictions, dogmas, ritual, sacred 
places and persons, these symbols represent the unity and 
exclusiveness of the groups which respect them (…) 
Furthermore, these sacred symbols, which reflect the social 
system, endow with it mystical values which evoke acceptance of 
the social order that goes far beyond the obedience exacted by the 
secular sanction of force. The social system is, as it were, removed 
to a mystical plane, where it figures a system of sacred values 
beyond criticism or revision (ibid., 17-18). 
 
Those who have later commented on Fortes’ and Evans-Pritchard’s views 
on religion and politics have not been in agreement on the fundamental 
importance of their contribution. On the one hand, there are those who claim 
that for the descent theorists political power was, by definition, power to 
coerce. Moral or affective norms that lacked coercive backup belonged to 
the domestic sphere. In a similar manner, religion and ritual were separated 
from the political sphere and seen as a part of cultural superstructure, which 
only reflects the more fundamental social order (McKinnon 2000, 41-42). 
On the other hand, there are those who consider Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 
to have been among the first to understand the cultural significance of 
chiefly offices and their incumbents as “symbolic mediators” between 
opposed spheres of the indigenous cosmology. Thus, an alternative 
definition of power was implicit in their writings (Arens & Karp 1989, xvii). 
However, what is clear to all is that Western notions of power and political 
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relationships tend to be secularly based, and religion is often seen only seen 
as an aspect of politics. Thus they fail to explain how religion and ritual are 
used in directing actions, defining goals, and constituting relationships. 
Although power probably always involves the exercise of one person’s or 
group’s will over another’s, the underlying principles of domination, 
consent, submission, and resistance vary considerable from one culture to 
another. These are matters that the established political theory rarely takes 
into account (ibid., xiii-xv). 
The more conventional notions of religion and state in Asante and 
the Asantehene as a divine king focus on the ways in which secular 
hierarchies are ritualized. However, my own understanding is that among 
the Asante the chiefly hierarchies are in one important sense ritually 
produced when power is obtained by engaging in exchange with the 
supernatural. Hence, an opposite approach becomes much more appealing. 
How are ritual hierarchies secularized?  
 
 
7.1 Making the divine state  
 
Fortes (1969a, 142) – like many before and after him – attributed the 
superiority of the Asantehene’s office to its “aura of mystical preeminence”, 
which is derived from its connection to the Golden Stool (Sika Dwa Kofi, lit. 
“Friday’s Golden Stool”). The tradition concerning the emergence of the 
stool is widely known and it can be summarized as follows.1 After Osei 
Tutu had returned from exile and the neighbouring Domaa had been 
defeated, it was time to direct attention to Denkyira, which still held 
Kwaman and other chiefdoms of the region under its sway. During the reign 
of Denkyirahene Ntim Gyakari the level of tribute became intolerable, and 
the chiefdoms serving Denkyira decided to rise to arms with Osei Tutu as 
their leader. This coalition has often been called Asante Aman Nnum, “the 
five Asante states”, although there is no general agreement on the exact 
number or names of the original member states.2 Consequently, Denkyira 
was defeated after a decisive victory in the battle of Feyiase around 1701, 
and the military alliance was transformed into a political union called 
Asanteman, the Asante state. Osei Tutu, the head of the coalition, became 
                                                 
1
 The classical account is by Rattray (1955, 288-290), who has also recorded a second, 
somewhat different version (Rattray 1929, 276-277). 
2
 Rattray has compiled at least five different lists (see RAI MS 107: 1: 1679; Rattray 1929, 
73, 99, 132, 235). 
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the Asantehene, the king of Asante. Right before the decisive battle Komfo 
Anokye informed the Asante chiefs that “he had a special mission from 
Onyame, the God of the Sky” (Rattray 1955, 288-289). A big meeting was 
held in Kumase, where Anokye “brought down from the sky, in a black 
cloud, and amid rumblings, and in air thick with white dust, a wooden stool 
with three supports and partly covered with gold” (ibid., 290). Anokye told 
the chiefs that the stool contained the sunsum, the “spiritual backing”, of the 
Asante nation, and Osei Tutu was to become its first custodian and thus the 
chosen head of the newly formed state. At the same time Anokye also 
decreed the taboos of the stool and stated that if they were violated 
Asanteman would “sicken and lose its vitality and power” (ibid., 290).3 
Hence by guarding the Golden Stool the Asantehene also protects the 
“character” or “health” of the state. Regular sacrifices are made to it in order 
to preserve and enhance its spiritual powers (e.g., Akyeampong & Obeng 
1995, 495-496). 
These events were paired with the destruction of old stools. The 
stool history of Hia has it that: 
 
In order to eradicate off the existence of the memory of all the 
irregularities, the defeats and discomfitures that the other enemy 
nations had previously inflicted upon Ashanti, especially, in the war 
that took place between the Ashanti and Dormas (…), fought in 
Ashanti during the reign of the Asantehene Nana Obiri Yeboa 
Manwu, Komfo Anokye, with the consent of the Asantehene Nana 
Osei Tutu and the Asanteman, buried all the then existing black 
Stools being then occupied by all Native Rulers in Ashanti in a deep 
trench-hole dug in the ground at a place near the present Kumasi 
Central Hospital upon which, Komfu Anokye placed and planted an 
Ashanti State Sword which is still there to this day.4 
In substitution for the said buried Stools, Komfuo Anokye 
caused new Black Stools to be made for all chiefs in Ashanti at that 
time, and on every one of the Stools, he nailed “Dadikro” (i.e. 
                                                 
3
 See Kurankyi-Taylor (1951, 44) for the list of taboos “surrounding and protecting the 
Golden Stool”. 
4
 The tradition has it that if the sword is removed it will mean “the collapse of the Asante 
Empire”. There are several recent stories about failed attempts remove it. It is said that 
during the 1950’s, when the hospital was built, a building contractor tried to remove it with 
bulldozers and other such machinery. Also in 1964, when the world heavyweight boxing 
champion Mohammed Ali allegedly visited Kumase, he gave it a try, but in vain (see 
Kwame Ofori n.d., 7).  
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Ashanti native made) nails, signifying that, those were the very first 
and original Stools in Ashanti solely being occupied by chiefs whose 
official appellations should thenceforth be known as “ABREMPON” 
[i.e., big men] (IAS/AS 154). 
 
The combination of these two events can be read as a realization of (some 
formulations of) the idea of divine kingship, where the problem of 
segmentary or particularistic interests is overcome by elevating leadership to 
“a mystical plane” (e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1962, 66-86). The segmentary 
interests, materialized in the form of the blackened ancestral stools of the 
chiefly lineages, are buried under ground and their “tomb” is sealed with a 
state sword, removal of which is decreed by a taboo. A superior, golden 
stool is received from the Sky God, and it is said to contain the spiritual core 
of the emergent polity. Similarly, new, “first” stools are made for the 
lineages, which commemorate a new beginning under the Golden Stool. A 
leader of a temporary alliance is made into a hereditary king by appointing 
him as custodian of the stool. One could also argue that a diarchic structure 
was established, where the historyless, sacred, absolute, but passive aspects 
of power are embodied in the Golden Stool and the historical, secular, 
relative, but active aspects of power are embodied in its occupant, the 
Asantehene (cf., Valeri 1990, 46-47).  
The most important ritual occasion, when the Golden Stool was 
celebrated, together with a magical charm called Apafram, was Odwira, a 
harvest festival originally dedicated to the ritual consumption of new-season 
yams. Thus the general timing of the festival followed the agricultural cycle 
marking the closure and beginning of a “year” (afe). During Odwira all of 
the paramount chiefs travelled to the state capital and renewed their oaths of 
allegiance to the Asantehene. Meetings of the assembly of chiefs 
(Asantemanhyiamu) usually also coincided with Odwira (McCaskie 1995a, 
144-146). The ritual highlight of the festival took place on “Apafram 
Sunday”, when the Asantehene made sacrifices to the Apafram charm in 
front of the skulls of the dead enemy chiefs, and made a plea to it that if 
there is “[a]ny king who does not like to serve me, let me get the chance of 
killing him and put his head into you” (Wilks 1993, 116). On the following 
day the chiefs “returned each to their own country, there to continue and 
complete” the Odwira by ritually “purifying” their own ancestral stools, 
shrines of the local deities, and the regalia of their offices (Rattray 1959, 
137). In 1933 one paramount chief described the origins and later 
developments of Odwira in a following manner:  
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Before all the chiefs who took part in this campaign [against 
Denkyira] could scatter to their several seats [they] were told by 
Komfu-Anokyi that the skull of Ntim Jakari would be kept at 
Kumasi to be worshiped yearly. This was the beginning of the 
“Odwira” custom or “Apafram” at Kumasi at which all members of 
the Confederacy were present… 
This occasional meeting at Kumasi for the observance of the 
“Odwira” custom was the beginning of what was later to be 
subordinated to the Kumasi Stool, and since that time Kumasi had 
ever continued to be the central meeting place of the Ashanti Chiefs. 
From the foregoing it would be seen that the meeting at Kumasi was 
decreed by Komfo Anokyi after the fall of Denkyira (PRRAC, 
Appendix 50).  
  
Hence the unity of the new state had its ritual expression in Odwira, where 
its core symbols were venerated and which superseded those rituals 
associated with the ancestral spirits and/or local deities of the component 
chiefdoms. This, of course, is closely related to more general processes 
when religion becomes divided into public, “state religion”, and private, 
“family religion”. For instance, Michael Jackson (1977, 133-134) has 
suggested that when political groups are not coextensive with the pattern of 
descent grouping, there also occurs a shift in the ritual orientation. Ancestor 
cults, which are thus considered “segmentary”, will be significant only at 
the level of domestic organization, whereas group rituals of larger scale 
become centered on “desocialised categories”, such as high-gods. Jackson 
claims that in states like Asante “ancestor cults were ritual foci for kinship 
groups but pantheons of gods and nature divinities dominated the religious 
system at the higher levels of community organisation” (ibid.,135).  
There is a substantial body of literature, both anthropological and 
historical, on the history and meaning of both the Golden Stool and Odwira 
(e.g. McCaskie 1995a, 144-242).5 Despite the obvious merits of some of 
these studies, by concentrating on them alone, one is at risk of getting a very 
simplified picture of religion and polity in Asante. Namely, the discussions 
seem to revolve around the centralization of government, reduced to 
state/society or kingship/chiefship dichotomies, and how its hierarchical 
structure is “sacralized”, enforced, and reproduced in ritual. Asante ideas 
                                                 
5
 Studies of how the Golden Stool has been understood as a historical artefact, which 
meanings were subject to change, have been particularly interesting (e.g., McCaskie 1986). 
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about the relationship between political hierarchy and the supernatural are, 
however, far more complicated than that.   
 
 
7.2 “Emergence through gift” 
 
The hierarchy of the fekuo heads of Kumase (see Figure 8) has been the 
subject of constant dispute (e.g., Rattray 1959, 86-87, 90-92).6 What seems 
to be approved by most is that the office of Krontihene is the senior among 
them, and in the absence of the Asantehene he presides over the 
administration of the capital. Thus the Asantehene often refers to him by 
terms like “my right hand man” or “my second in command”. The seat of 
the Krontihene is located at the village of Bantama, now one of the central 
districts of Kumase, and hence its holder is in most cases called the 
Bantamahene. Despite its high status, the Bantama stool is not an ancestral 
stool, it is mmamma dwa, an office that is not filled according to matrilineal 
succession. The first occupant of the office, a man called Amankwatia was 
of slave origin and therefore he was not eligible for any hereditary office 
(Wilks 1993, 244). As recalled by Bantamahene Kwame Kyem in 1924, 
Amankwatia worked as a servant and a stool carrier for Osei Tutu when he 
was appointed as the Krontihene of Kwaman/Kumase forces in the war 
against Domaa: 
 
[W]ar followed and Amankwatia who had had Osei-Tutu’s favour to 
be created as his principal stool carrier was asked to go and fight 
King Domina Kusi [Domaahene Domaa Kusi] as a result of an 
injunction from Komfo Anokye. Komfo Anokye as a prophet asked 
King Osei-Tutu to give him with 7 men who would be created 
Asafohene; these 7 men were supplied as follows:- Osafo, Ofram, 
Akyerapong Kwasi, Gyedu, Brofo Apau, Amponsa-Akusaa, 
Twafoobaah.7 These are the 7 Kurontie [Kronti] Asafohene whom 
Komfo Anokye made for Amankwatia to fight against Domina Kusi. 
(…) King Osei-Tutu as a token of remembrance and of good service 
presented to Amankwatia all the lands stretching from Bantama to 
                                                 
6
 Nowadays, in the Kumasi Traditional Council the order of precedence is the following: 
Kronti, Akwamu, Nifa, Adonten, Benkum, Oyoko, Kyidom, Gyaase, Ankobea, Manwere, 
Nkosuo (Asante Tribune Aug. 22 – Aug. 28, 2000). 
7
 These are the names of the chiefs, also known as “the seven gunners” (atuo nson), who 
originally constituted the Kronti fekuo of Kumase. See Wilks (1993, 245-246) for an 
alternative composition. 
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Komon [?]. All the lands stretching from Bantama to Komonano are 
for Bantamahene. King Osei-Tutu dashed [i.e., gave] all these lands 
to Amankwatia (…) and created him (…) as his Colonel… (PRAAD 
ARG 3/2/38a).  
 
After helping Osei Tutu in the Domaa war, Amankwatia was awarded with 
a chiefly title and land. In addition to this, he was “given” seven chiefs, who 
fought alongside him as “friends”. Thereafter they formed an administrative 
and military group, in which the Bantamahene holds the position of the 
senior. This tradition about Amankwatia exemplifies what Kyerematen 
(1971, 17) has called an emergence of a new chiefdom “through gift”. 
According to his research, based on traditional accounts about the origins of 
different Asante chiefdoms, it was a practice for the Asantehene to award 
offices and land to persons “who had distinguished themselves in battle or 
had rendered some significant political service” (ibid., 18). Hence it is 
understood by him that hierarchy is established by political means. 
However, other traditions reveal something very interesting about 
the nature of Amankwatia’s services to his overlord. Namely, it is said that 
Amankwatia accompanied Osei Tutu to exile in Akwamu. When Osei Tutu 
heard the news of his uncle’s death, he decided to return home, succeed his 
uncle and revenge his death. But before he could be installed as a chief and 
could attack the Domaa, his first duty was to celebrate the funeral of his late 
uncle. It was precisely that duty which almost proved fatal to his trusted 
friend Amankwatia: 
 
According to the custom those days, Nana Osei Tutu was to present 
a person with dignity to accompany his uncle to the land of the dead, 
but since he had been away from home for years, he knew no such 
person than his friend Amankwaatia. Therefore on his arrival he 
smeared red clay for the offer,8 but the Asafohene9 sent one of his 
servants to be smeared with red clay instead of Amankwaatia (…) 
When Nana Osei Tutu was enstooled as Kumasehene he decided to 
create a stool for his friend Amankwaatia who had helped him so 
much in life and had even given himself for the sacrifice (Kwadwo 
2000, 32).   
 
                                                 
8
 Red clay is a sign of mourning. Victims prepared for human sacrifice were daubed with 
red clay (Rattray 1959, 214). 
9
 The Akwamuhene and the head of Akwamu fekuo of Kumase.   
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In Asante thought the spirit world is seen as an extension of the lived world, 
and the hierarchies that prevail among the living are also considered to 
prevail among the ancestors. Hence a dead chief was still a chief: “he 
occupied the same status and role, and had the same needs and requirements 
– wives, servants, cloths, gold, food – as he had had in his biological 
existence” (McCaskie 1989, 428). In order to provide for some of these 
needs human sacrifices had to be performed, and in the past they formed a 
significant part of the chiefly funerals. It was explicitly the duty of the dead 
chief’s successor to see to it, that the sacrifices were carried out properly, 
and thus the departed spirit of the deceased was able to continue his life in 
the spirit world. Otherwise, the ancestor(s) would have been disgraced and 
they would withdraw their spiritual support, and the crucial connection 
between the living and the dead mediated by the chief would be at risk of 
collapsing. 
Consequently, in the tradition at hand, Osei Tutu has to establish a 
relationship with his ancestors through sacrifice so that he can fully function 
as a chief. A human sacrifice is needed to do that, and Amankwatia offers 
himself. So, the service that Amankwatia provides is not “political”, but 
rather “ritual”. Accidentally, Amankwatia is saved, but he is still given an 
award for his readiness, and he himself becomes a chief. Clearly, this is not 
merely a system of services and awards. It is rather a network of exchanges 
that connects the ancestral spirits, the chief, and his subject. There is also a 
similar network between the gods, the Asantehene, and his chiefs.  
 
 
7.3 Chiefly sacrifice 
 
Perhaps the most famous ethnographic example of divine kingship is that of 
the Shilluk of Sudan described by Evans-Pritchard (1962, 66-86). There the 
king is a symbol of national unity and forms a link between the secular and 
supernatural, since the ancient founder of the Shilluk polity is immanent in 
every king. However, the Shilluk king does not have organized force at his 
disposal to enforce his authority. His reign is dependent on the approval of 
the constituent political segments. The Asantehene, on the other hand, as 
well as other Akan paramounts, was, and to some extent still is, a ruler with 
considerable secular powers, but one of his main responsibilities was, and 
is, to communicate with the supernatural. As one of my priestly informants 
so aptly put it, “a chief without gods is no different from an ordinary man”, 
and in that respect he is not that different from the divine kings whose roles 
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are mainly sacerdotal. The ritual duties of Akan chiefs can be classified in a 
similar manner as Michael Young (1966, 146) has done in the case of the 
Jukun kingship in Northern Nigeria, which in other respects resembles more 
the “Shilluk-type” than the Akan. The Asantehene performs those rituals for 
which he is exclusively qualified by his office (e.g., veneration of the 
Golden Stool). He also provides for other rituals (e.g., by sending objects to 
be sacrificed elsewhere in Asante) and maintains his own spiritual potency 
(e.g., by observing the taboos of his office, descent group, and nt]r] 
division). Nevertheless, his role is essentially different from the liminal 
existence of a priest (]k]mfo, pl. ak]mfo]). Unlike the priests who get 
possessed by the deities, and thus render their bodies as “vehicles” for the 
supernatural, the chiefs mainly perform sacrifices and therefore stand firmly 
on the side of human culture. Clearly for the Akan divinity is transcendent; 
it is not immanent in the human ruler himself. Ideally, the chief and priests 
co-operate in providing well-being and success for the people. The 
relationship between the two was once defined by a council of village elders 
in the following way: 
 
[I]n accordance with the Ashanti Customary Law and Assigns, the 
Chief of a town is the Custodian of any FETISH within his town, 
and that, any Fetish Priest of a town, prays for the prosperity and 
good health of the Chief and People of the town. The said Fetish 
Priest never takes any grudge of any person within the town 
(PRAAD ARG 2/2/119a). 
 
In the affairs of state chiefs make sacrifices to three categories of spirits: 
deities called abosom (sing. ]bosom), sometimes characterized as tutelary 
spirits or “fetishes”, the ancestral spirits, and magical charms (asuman, sing. 
suman). All of these are seen as potential sources of power.10 Here I am 
primarily interested in the first category. The abosom have their origins in 
nature, but since they have come to live with people, they are expected “to 
help the state” (boa ]man),11 and thus it would be highly irresponsible on 
                                                 
10
 However, see Gilbert (1989) for the problems involved with classifications of this type. 
11
 McCaskie (1995, 118) emphasizes the ambiguous nature of the abosom by stating that 
“[t]he expectation that they might prove cooperative and consoling when petitioned to 
assist in human affairs was tempered by recognition of their origin in an antagonism to 
culture”. Although the abosom are considered to be unpredictable and potentially 
dangerous, some of them are seen to have made a conscious decision to live with people 
and thus to become associated with a group of people. Contrary to them, there are those 
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the part of the chief to engage himself and his subjects in any important 
activities without consulting the deities. Especially for crucial matters, such 
as war and peace, a chief had to ask for guidance from the abosom through a 
priest, and as many traditions testify, the priests were “punished by death in 
the olden days when they told lies to the King on consultation” (IAS/AS 
194). 
In the Denkyira war Osei Tutu and his allies did not make an 
exception in this respect. In order to ensure final victory over their 
oppressors they turned to the priest, Komfo Anokye. According to one 
tradition:       
 
Okomfo Anokye when consulted assured them that they would be 
victorious provided some men would give themselves up for 
sacrifices. Three men would be needed for sacrifice. One would be 
buried alive. His hands would appear at the surface of the earth and 
two brass pans full of war medicine mixed in water would be put in 
the two palms for the warriors to bath before they left for the war 
front. The second volunteer would be butchered to death and his 
flesh thrown away for vultures to take to Denkyira land. Wherever 
any piece of the flesh would fall the men of the place would lose 
their bravery and become cowards. The third volunteer should be a 
Paramount chief. He would be armed and he would be in front of the 
marching soldiers. He was not to fire a shot even if he met an 
enemy. He should look on for the enemy to shoot him (Kwadwo 
1994, 7-8). 
 
The three chiefs who volunteered to give their lives were Asenso Kofo, the 
chief of Adwumakase Kese, Edwesohene Diko Pim, and Kumawuhene 
Tweneboa Kodia.12 Variations of the same theme can be found elsewhere. A 
tradition from Kwaso accounts that a royal “who was a left-handed person 
should be sacrificed to the gods of the nation to guarantee victory in all the 
ensuing wars to establish the Dynasty”. In addition to this, seven chiefs 
from the Aduana clan, known as “the bearers of the seven Fetish Pots”, were 
                                                                                                                            
abosom who have decided to stay in nature, of whose existence people do not usually 
know.  
12
 The name Tweneboa Kodia is synonymous with self-sacrifice even among contemporary 
Asante. Recently a local newspaper published an article, where the writer urged the readers 
not to think of costs when the development of modern infrastructure was in question. The 
article was titled “The Spirit of Tweneboah Kodua must be re-incarnated” (Asante Tribune, 
Aug.1 – Aug. 7, 2000).    
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“killed to further appease the gods” (PRAAD ARG 2/2/105a). Similarly, 
traditions of Mampon mention that Mamponhene Boahen Anantuo took 
command of the Asante army in Feyiase instead of Osei Tutu himself 
because Komfo Anokye had prophesized that whoever led the troops to the 
battle would not live longer than seven days after the war. Consequently, 
Boahentuo was badly wounded and died three days after the guns had fell 
silent (Kwadwo 1994, 84). These are the most widely known stories of 
chiefly self-sacrifice preceding the crucial battle, but there are other similar 
accounts.  
The most interesting point common to all traditions is the contractual 
nature of the proceedings. Before sacrificing his life for the sake of the 
others, Asenso Kofo requested that from then on no one from his town 
should ever be executed.13 Edwesohene Diko Pim was promised that no 
person of the Asona matriclan, which he belonged to, would be condemned 
to death. Kumawuhene Tweneboa Kodia asked the same for the citizens of 
his own chiefdom (Kwadwo 1994, 8).14 According to the traditions from 
Kwaso, the successors of the seven chiefs from Aduana matriclan became 
recognized as paramount chiefs, and all of their descendants were spared of 
executions (PRAAD ARG 2/2/105a). Mamponhene Boahen Anantuo 
demanded that his chiefdom should have a senior position over other 
chiefdoms of the same rank. Thus his successors became the custodians of 
the Silver Stool (Sika Dwa Pete), and in the absence of the Asantehene it is 
the Mamponhene who presides over the affairs of the kingdom (Kwadwo 
1994, 8). To put it briefly, in the sacrifices preceding the final battle the 
hierarchy of chiefly offices was constituted, and certain chiefs, members of 
certain descent groups, and subjects of certain chiefs were given privileges. 
Performing human sacrifices in order to guarantee success in warfare 
is nothing unheard of (e.g., Turney-High 1949, 220), and it was commonly 
practised among the Asante (Akyeampong & Obeng 1995, 498-501). Often 
the victims were “dependent humans”, i.e., prisoners, slaves, women, and 
                                                 
13
  “Executions” usually refer to both judicial executions of criminals as well as mortuary 
slayings, in which the (slave) victims were expected to accompany the ancestors in the 
spirit world. Wilks (1993, 215-217) claims that in the nineteenth century human beings 
were not used as offerings to abosom anymore, but other sources state the opposite (e.g., 
Akyeampong & Obeng 1995, 498-501). In terms of the general situation in West Africa, 
Robin Law (1985) has claimed that the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade in 1862 
created a “domestic surplus” of slaves and also an increase in human sacrifices.  
14
 Even nowadays, some of the Kumawu people have three horizontal scars on the left 
corner of their mouths. I am told that this is a sign showing the executioners (abrafo]) that 
they are protected by the ancient contract made by Tweneboa Kodia and Osei Tutu! 
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children (Godelier 1999, 180), but in this case those sacrificed were 
“humans depended on”, chiefs whose duty it was to sacrifice in order to 
make the state prosper. The Asante usually explain the nature of objects 
used as sacrifices by stating what the deity in question likes (pe) or dislikes 
(mpe). Accordingly, there is a group of deities known as abosom abrafo], 
the “executioner-gods”, which are said to have a taste for human blood. But 
why should the humans sacrificed be of high rank? I can answer this only by 
referring to some general theories concerning sacrifice. Namely, if it is 
accepted that in sacrifice the victim(s) stand for the person or group making 
the sacrifice (Beattie 1980, 30), it is then apparent that in Osei Tutu’s 
sacrifice the victims substitute for the whole coalition of chiefdoms, “the 
nation in the making”. And if Jackson’s (1977, 129) observation that 
generally “as the social scale of the participant group increases, the relative 
value of the thing offered increases” is valid, then it is also evident that 
“stately” sacrifices require the most “valuable” victims. Obviously, Osei 
Tutu could not offer himself to be sacrificed, since he had already been 
chosen as the future ruler of the Asanteman by Komfo Anokye, who was the 
intermediary between the human realm and the supernatural. To employ the 
terminology introduced by Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss (1968, 19-49), 
Osei Tutu could not be the victim since he had been chosen to be the 
sacrifier by Komfo Anokye, the sacrificer. Nevertheless, some of his allies 
volunteered to sacrifice themselves if he would give them something in 
return, and in the absence of a better term I call that something “jural 
rights”. By involving himself in exchange with both gods and humans Osei 
Tutu was finally able to “establish his dynasty”. 
 
 
7.4 Gods as exchange partners 
 
Marcel Mauss (1990, 16-17) asserted that the first group with whom 
humans were to establish a reciprocal relationship were “the spirits of both 
dead and of the gods”, since they “are the true owners of the things and 
possessions of this world”. Furthermore, the gods do not merely reciprocate 
a gift, they “give a considerable thing in place of a small one”. Mauss called 
this type of exchange contract sacrifice. In his critical reading of Mauss, 
Maurice Godelier (1999, 186) concludes that “sacrifices to God or to the 
gods are not fundamentally a business deal”. If gods are really seen as “the 
true owners of things”, they would not be in anyway obliged to receive, let 
alone repay, gifts consisting of things they already own. On the contrary, 
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humans have received everything they have, even life itself, from gods, to 
whom they are thus forever indebted. Willingness to obey gods derives not 
only from the human desire to become favoured by the acts of gods, but also 
from that primordial debt, as Godelier named it. In this respect, contract 
sacrifices are a “correct etiquette” set by the gods themselves, and which 
humans necessarily have to follow in order to get heard by their spiritual 
superiors. According to this line of thinking, humans do not slaughter sheep 
for gods, so that gods would get sheep, they do it because they have been 
instructed by gods to slaughter sheep when communicating with them (ibid., 
192-196). What can be then said about the victory insurance rites of Osei 
Tutu? To answer that one has to look into the Asante cosmic order and what 
Godelier actually says about gods. 
In his study of the sacred Godelier suggests that “the sacred is a 
relationship that humans entertain with origins” of both themselves and 
everything around them, and the debt mentioned above is precisely to those 
powers that originated everything (ibid., 179-180). According to Godelier, 
the idea of contract is incompatible with this kind of relationship. On the 
other hand, he writes of “minor powers, forest spirits, for instance”, who 
“can be entrapped, made fun of, tricked, or, on the contrary, one can make 
friends with them, associate with them and exchange presents and gestures 
of affection, as between humans” (ibid., 185). One could say that for his 
purposes Godelier has divided supernatural beings into those who have 
created and those who have not.  
According to the Akan belief system the universe is created by 
Onyame, the superior being, who has also impregnated it with his own 
power (tumi, “ability to change things”). Onyame has been described as 
typical a “withdrawn god”, who distanced himself from worldly affairs 
instantly after he had completed his works of creation (McCaskie 1995a, 
105).15 So, Onyame is the source of all power, but anybody with the right 
knowledge about the means can obtain some of that power (Akyeampong & 
Obeng 1995, 483-484).  Among those are the children and grandchildren of 
Onyame, the abosom. Together they all form “a spiritual family”, as one of 
my informants called it. Although the abosom are essentially mobile, 
capable of leaving and returning at their own will, they have their own 
places of origin in nature, and they can be classified accordingly: 
 
1. Asuo (rivers).  Deities that originate from water, most often rivers. 
The biggest subdivision of these abosom is called Tano (or Taa), 
                                                 
15
 See Rattray (1916, 20-21) for a tradition explaining how and why Onyame left the earth.  
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which refers to the Tano River in central Ghana. Many of the gods 
that the Asante consider “ancient” (tete) belong to this subdivision. 
 
2. Mframa (winds). Deities that originate from air or the sky. 
 
3. Abo (rocks, stones). Deities originating from the forest. They are 
considered to have a special relationship with “dwarfs” (mmoatia) 
and some of my informants actually equate the two.16 
 
Their superiority to humans is based on their immortality and their 
extraordinary powers: they are capable of “striking you dead”, as I have 
often been told. They are difficult to fit into Godelier’s categories; on the 
one hand, they are not creator-gods responsible for originating the world, 
but, on the other hand, they are clearly above the everyday lives of the 
people. There are significant differences in their powers as well as their 
character. For example, some of them are known as “war gods”, and some 
as “witch-hunters”. Some are known as “gentlemen”, some as “rascals”. 
Human beings can form relationships with the abosom; for example, a 
group of people, who have settled in a place already inhabited by a god, are 
indebted to him/her as the original “owner” of the land, and are thus 
committed to obey the rules formulated by the god. Such rules become 
evident in the first encounter between the deity and the human community, 
or at the latest, when a permanent, formal tie between the two has been 
established. 
For instance, in the village of Dendwa, located in Nkoransa, the 
local deity, called Asuo Akruma (also known as Kwaku Akruma or Dendwa 
Akruma), was living in a nearby river long before the first human settlers 
arrived there. At that time, I am told, monkeys instead of human beings 
served him. They brought him food and kept the dwelling of the deity (a 
cave behind a waterfall) clean. The founder and first headman of the village 
was a man called Adu Abo, who was originally a servant of the paramount 
chief of Nkoransa. One of his duties was to hunt elephants for his master, 
and during one of his hunting expeditions he noticed something out of the 
ordinary. One of the descendants of Adu Abo described the events in the 
following way: 
 
                                                 
16
 Descriptions given by McCaskie (1995, 108-110) and Jane Parish (2000, 489) differ from 
mine in some details, but the basic idea of three different natural loci is common to all. 
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Our ancestors were hunters. The Nkoransahene sent them here to 
hunt elephants. They sent their quarries to him directly. One time 
they stopped here to rest. Nana17 [Adu Abo] was thirsty. He told his 
people to go and get water for him to drink. They took a brass cup 
and went to the river to fetch water. But as soon as the cup touched 
the surface of the water, the water turned brown. They went back 
and reported this to Nana. He said: “Why don’t you use a calabash 
instead of a brass cup”. They took a calabash and went back to the 
river. This time nothing happened, and the water was pure and 
refreshing. Later some women went to the river to fetch water. Some 
of the women were having their menstrual periods. When they 
touched the water, the river stopped flowing and there was no more 
water coming down from the waterfall. It looked like the whole river 
was going to run dry. This was reported to Nana and he said: “There 
must be a god here”. He reported this to the Nkoransahene, who said 
that they should settle there and serve the god.   
 
Later the deity possessed one of the settlers, and that person became his first 
priest.18 Through the priest the villagers learned the taboos of the god, 
which are, in addition to brass vessels and menstruation, dogs, goats, and 
farming on Wednesdays. Conversely, it is known that the deity likes sheep 
and palm wine, and hence these items are given to him in sacrifices. To this 
day, the taboos are carefully observed. Dogs and goats, which are 
characteristic to Ghanaian villages in general, are totally absent in Dendwa. 
On a Wednesday one is certain to meet all the villagers at their houses, 
because no one would even think of farming on such a “bad day” (da b]ne). 
Even the quite considerable Christian and Muslim populations of the 
village, who do not usually take active part in the rituals connected to Asuo 
Akruma, observe the taboos strictly, because, as the traditionalists say, “they 
know that they are living on his land, and if they break the rules, he will 
punish them severely”. 
However, the relationship between humans and the abosom is never 
one-sided. Human communities do not entertain the abosom simply out of 
                                                 
17
 “Grandparent”, a respectful appellation used when referring to elders, officeholders, 
ancestors, and deities. 
18
 Or maybe “priestess” would be more appropriate term here, since according to Akruma’s 
specific instructions he should always be served by females. The term ]k]mfo refers to both 
male and female ritual specialists. This instruction does not contradict the notion of 
menstrual blood as one of Akruma’s taboos, since I was told that the priestesses will stop 
menstruating immediately after they have become in contact with the deity. 
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fear. This is well exemplified by a ritual recitation that was performed 
during the consecration of a new shrine of a deity called Taa Kwesi. It was 
recorded by Rattray (1955, 148-149), and I quote it at length: 
 
When we call you upon darkness, when we call upon you in the 
sunlight, and say, “Do such a thing for us”, you will do so.  
And the laws that we are decreeing for you, you, this god of ours, are 
these – if in our time, or in our children’s, and our grandchildren’s 
time a king should arise from somewhere, and come to us, and say 
he is going to war, when he tells you, and you well know that should 
he go to the fight he will not gain the victory, you must tell us so; 
and should you know that he will go and conquer, then also state that 
truth. 
And yet again, if a man be ill in the night, or in the daytime, and we 
raise you aloft and place upon the head [refers to a consultation 
through a priest], and we inquire of you saying, “Is So-and-so about 
to die?”, let the cause of the misfortune which you tell him has come 
upon him be the real cause of the evil and not lies. 
To-day, we all in this town, all our elders, and all our children, have 
consulted together and agreed without dissent among us, we have all 
united and with one accord decided to establish your shrine, you, Ta 
Kwesi, upon this, a sacred Friday. 
We have taken a sheep, and a fowl, we have taken wine, we are 
about to give them to you that you may reside in this town and 
preserve its life. From this day, and so on to any future day, you 
must not fly and leave us. (…) To-day you become a god for the 
chief, to-day you have become a god for our spirit ancestors. Perhaps 
upon some to-morrow the Ashanti King may come and say, “My 
child So-and-so (or it may be an elder) is sick”, and ask you to go 
with him, or may be he will send a messenger here for you; in such a 
case you may go and we will not think that you are fleeing from us. 
 
Here it is the people who are setting the rules of conduct for the god and not 
vice versa. Taa Kwesi is being explicitly told that he should inform the 
people about the outcome of any possible war and also reveal the true cause 
of death if somebody in the community is about to die. Even the movements 
of the god have been restricted with one exception: when he is summoned 
by a higher, but still human, authority! Nevertheless, he is asked to preserve 
the life of the town, but not because he had originated it (or anything else), 
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but because he is presumed to possess the power to do so. Similarly, the 
inhabitants of Dendwa expect Asuo Akruma to help the village by making 
“barren women to give birth” and catching thieves. 
 
 
PHOTOGRAPH 4. A priest possessed by a deity dancing in the installation ceremony 
of a new priestess of Asuo Akruma. 
 
Evans-Pritchard’s (1956, 210-211) observation was that Nuer invocations to 
god are rather declarations than petitions; the Akan take this a step further. 
In the climax of the invocation that concludes a sacrifice, the Akan priest 
literally shouts at the god, questioning whether he/she is even able to do the 
things asked (cf., Rattray 1929, 122). Gods certainly are mightier than men, 
but it does not necessarily mean that the less powerful are indebted to the 
more powerful. More likely, the gods are here to establish and control a 
system of exchanges, where power is being distributed. As Rattray (1955, 
146) once put it, they initially came to earth “in order that they might 
receive benefits from, and confer them upon, mankind”. To my mind, the 
most important thing is that after the relationship between the human 
community and deities is fully established, the latter become strongly 
associated with a specific group of people, for example, their shrines are 
often the corporate property of a particular lineage, or they may be attached 
to an office of chief or priest. Although Onyame, as the original source of all 
power, could be defined as belonging to an “extra-social” or “desocial” 
category (see Jackson 1977, 134-135), the abosom are considered by the 
Asante as exchange partners and thus very social, even though not exactly in 
the same sense as humans. 
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I do not know precisely which gods were meant in the traditional accounts 
when they refer to “gods of the nations” who demanded the sacrifices of the 
chiefs.19 The Golden Stool, containing the spiritual backing of Asanteman, 
is said to derive its powers from Onyame, but ultimately this statement is 
valid for anything/anybody powerful. Although sacrifices can be made to 
Onyame as well, he is excluded from the sphere of contractual sacrifice. He 
has no temples or priests of his own.20 Communication with Onyame and his 
powers takes place through the abosom, and from other instances we know 
that deities called “state gods” are specifically abosom. But still, the tumi 
used in executing the contracts is the same power that was used in the 
creation of things. The abosom seem to be able to do exchange with power, 
just like humans are able to exchange creations of divine powers (people, 
animals, food stuffs, etc.) with other humans. Similarly, human leaders 
transform the power obtained from the supernatural to authority and 
redistribute it to their followers, for example by creating subordinate 
political offices, as was the case with Osei Tutu granting a chiefly title to his 
servant Amankwatia. In exchange, the subordinates assist their superiors in 
dealing with the supernatural, just like Amankwatia was ready to follow 
Obiri Yeboa to the land of the dead, and are thus connected to the chain 
exchanges that cross the border between the spirit world and the living.  
To fully understand the seeming contradiction between Godelier’s 
ideas of the sacred and contract sacrifices, one has to make a distinction 
between personalized power and non-personalized power. In the former 
case power is considered to be inseparably vested in a spiritual being of 
some sort, but in the latter, power is conceived as “a kind of impersonal 
diffused quality or force” (Beattie 1980, 38). As Marcel Griaule has 
observed of the Dogon of Mali, in their sacrifices, at the moment of the 
death of the sacrificed animal, a certain quantity of impersonal and 
unconscious power is believed to be released and subsequently incorporated 
into the people performing the sacrifices (ibid., 41-42). So, ultimately, for 
the Dogon sacrifice is a kind of “power management”, and in that respect 
they are not very different from the Akan. The inference from this is that 
                                                 
19
 I am told that the god Komfo Anokye served is called Boabuduro. The cult of Boabuduro 
is still active in Agona, Anokye’s home chiefdom, and my informants tell me that it is “the 
god of the Asene clan in Agona”.  However, Komfo Anokye, like other priests, most 
probably served several deities, and Boabuduro is not mentioned by name in any of the 
traditions that I know about the sacrifices preceding the Denkyira war. 
20
 Rattray (1954, 141-144) speaks of, and has actually taken a photograph of, an alleged 
priest and temple of Onyame, but there is no other reference to anything similar elsewhere 
(cf. McCaskie 1995a, 382). 
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power thus obtained can be used in alternate ways, creatively or non-
creatively, for good or bad. But as Hubert and Mauss (1968, 13) asserted, 
sacrifice involves a “moral person” and expresses the values of his/her 
community. This view is surely connected to Durkheim’s (1964, 43-45) 
separation between magic, which is practiced privately towards private 
ends, and religion, which is always related to a group or community. So, a 
contract sacrifice performed by a chief in office should be considered a 
religious sacrifice towards communal ends and expressing communal 
values. I want to stress that “the relationship humans entertain with origins” 
is not restricted to a single debt. Indeed humans are unable to repay “the 
powers and forces which made the universe”, but the way these powers are 
re-channelled among “lesser gods” and human rulers certainly involves the 
idea of contract. 
Goody (1962, 389) has pointed out that sacrifices can be 
distinguished as those that are made regularly and those that are made only 
in special circumstances. The process described above clearly belongs to the 
second category, and it resembles in many ways the idea of reciprocity as “a 
starting mechanism” in forming relations of authority. The term “starting 
mechanism” was originally used to describe how a person achieves a 
position as a leader through generosity (Sahlins 1972, 204-210). In Osei 
Tutu’s sacrifice the victims were already hereditary chiefs, but by giving a 
gift to their followers they connect them to a hierarchy of greater scale. In 
exchange for their lives the chiefs, or rather their own and their subjects’ 
descendants, were given jural rights. 21 In the case of exemption from 
executions, the essence of the jural rights received was that no such 
exchange should ever be conducted in the future. Thus the right is the 
negation of the sacrifice (see Figure 11). It is the uniqueness of the whole 
event which is important; it could not be repeated, nor was it re-enacted. 
This is in contrast to reproductive sacrifice, like among the Aztecs, for 
                                                 
21
 One particularly interesting tradition is from Dwansa. Customarily, the Dwansahene was 
responsible for carrying the gunpowder of the Asantehene’s army. Before the Denkyira war 
Komfo Anokye prophesized that the carrier of the gunpowder would certainly become 
barren, but still the Dwansahene “preferred to be sterile rather than lose the dignity of the 
Nation”. In exchange for his sacrifice the Dwansahene was given the elephant tail (the 
insignia of the “big men”), a shield (a symbol of chieftaincy, much like the stool) and a 
“golden calabash” (IAS/AS 61). It is important to note that here the “human sacrifice” 
involves the unborn instead of the living. What is even more remarkable is that those 
sacrificed are the future patrilineal offspring of the Dwansahene (or the matrilineal 
descendants of his wives), but the title and regalia received are attached to his office, which 
is vested in his own matrilineage. 
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example, where divine beings were considered to have been created by 
sacrifice, and consequently sustained, renewed, and commemorated by 
sacrifice (Sahlins 1978, 47-48). 
 
 
FIGURE 11. The exchange economy of human sacrifices in the victory insurance rites 
preceding the Denkyira war. 
 
 
7.5 Sacrifice as struggle for power 
 
In his study of the Shilluk kingship Evans-Pritchard treated regicide, the 
killing of the king who had lost his divine powers, as a structural problem. 
In order to question James Frazer’s theories on institutionalized ritual 
regicide, he claimed that among the Shilluk regicides did not really exist. It 
was rather a case of political assassination or armed rebellion. In an alleged 
regicide, the segmentary interests inherent in society have resurfaced, and 
the king as a person becomes once again associated with the particular 
segment of society he is coming from and not the divinity. During and after 
the violent elimination of the king, the kingship still remains divine, and a 
new person will be selected to fill it. So, when the king is considered to have 
lost his divine powers, in actuality, he has lost his overall support (Evans-
Pritchard 1962, 84-85). Valeri has also discussed the political factors 
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connected to the human sacrifices performed by the Hawaiian kings. 
According to him “the king is recognized as divine by virtue of the 
successful performance of certain sacrificial ritual” and his ability to do that 
depends on certain political actions (Valeri 1985, 153). Namely, every king 
was considered a conquering king in the sense that he had defeated all the 
other contenders to the throne and was ready to defend it by force. So, the 
victory in a “succession war” that makes one of the contenders a “divine 
king” also implies the demise of others: 
 
But these rivals were not simply killed; they are sacrificed, hence 
incorporated into the god, reduced to him. Moreover, they are not 
only enemies, but also close relatives of the victor. Hence they are 
his doubles. Thus, by sacrificing them the victor is indirectly 
incorporated into god, given a divine status. In sum, he becomes a 
divine king (ibid., 161).  
 
So, the fratricidal nature of the Hawaiian kingly sacrifice is very important. 
By substituting himself in sacrifice with the closest possible “imitation” of 
himself, the king gives the best possible offering and thus becomes capable 
of entertaining a closer relationship with the supernatural. At the same time, 
on the level of realpolitik, he rids himself of challengers. 
Could the sacrifice of Osei Tutu be regarded as a ritual context 
provided for the elimination of possible rivals and transgressors? Certainly, 
none of the chiefs who are mentioned in the traditions as having been 
sacrificed were legitimate contenders to Osei Tutu’s office. In all of the 
traditions that I know, only two of the sacrificed chiefs were somehow 
related to Osei Tutu. The first one was a “half-brother” of Osei Tutu, a chief 
of a town called Bonwere. In exchange, his descendants were exempted 
from the death penalty and also given the right to use a specific type of 
regalia usually reserved for Kumase royals (Rattray 1929, 277). 
Nonetheless, the Bonwerehene was only a “half-brother”, not a member of 
the same clan, and consequently not eligible for the office of the 
Asantehene. The second one was the junior brother of the Kuntanasehene, 
whose lineage was given a subordinate office in the capital in return 
(PRAAD ARG 3/2/64a). The ruling lineage of Kuntanase does belong to the 
same clan as Osei Tutu’s lineage, but to the opposite Dako moiety, and thus 
its members are highly unlikely to become considered eligible. However, in 
other instances royals are known to have been sacrificed. Missionaries who 
witnessed a funeral of a royal in Kumase in 1873 reported that the “King 
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himself killed some members of the royal house” (Ramseyer & Kühne 
1875, 236-237). Unfortunately, the limited material at hand does not allow 
any advanced generalizations.22  
If sacrifice is to be seen as an instrument of political struggle, one 
has to approach the question by investigating who has direct access to and 
control of the shrines of those deities to which sacrifices are usually made. It 
is already evident that in Asante thought, power transcends human agency. 
Although originating from the spiritual realm it is, in principle, accessible to 
all, but in practice access to it is restricted by limited knowledge and 
material means. This explains the high value given to esoteric knowledge in 
Asante society, namely the admiration of people who “know secrets” (nim 
asisem). However, this notion of general accessibility to power has 
represented a constant spiritual threat to the rulers. Their own powers have 
to be protected from witchcraft (baiy), sorcery, and other malevolent forces 
used by their opponents. Accordingly, chiefly councils have made decisions 
on which “jujus” are “harmless” and “can be allowed to remain” and which 
are considered dangerous and thus should be abolished (e.g., PRAAD ARG 
1/30/1/18a). Similarly, rules have been formulated in order to limit the 
monetary value of objects used in sacrifices (e.g., PRAAD ARG 
1/30/1/18b). In short, secular means have been employed in order to limit 
subjects’ access to spiritual power.  
The other way has been to enhance one’s own spiritual potency in 
order to defend oneself against attacks of the same kind. Especially during 
the early colonial period, when mass movements for the deposition of chiefs 
emerged in various localities, one method used by the chiefs in fighting 
back was attaching new shrines to their offices (e.g., McCaskie 1981a, 139-
140). For example, in 1934 the chief and elders of the chiefdom of Kumawu 
had acquired the shrine of a new, supposedly more powerful, ]bosom in 
order to keep their subjects in check. They were clearly satisfied with the 
results: 
 
In the former days youngmen of this Division were in practice of 
bringing into this Division bad native medicines that got the power 
of compelling others to rebel against the Omanhene and their elders 
                                                 
22
 In the funerals of the Asantehene the haphazard killings that marked the beginning of the 
“primary funeral” were committed by the sons and grandsons of the Asantehene, and royals 
were expressly a forbidden category to them. Those persons who were sacrificed in order to 
send them to accompany the deceased in the spirit world were mainly royal wives and 
servants (McCaskie 1989, 432-443). 
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which sometimes resulted in destoolment and etc. but since the 
practise of these fetishes started nothing of these sort has occurred 
(PRAAD ARG 1/30/1/18c). 
 
In Asante thought, obtaining power requires communication with the 
supernatural, which is usually done through sacrifice. Power connotes the 
ability to change things and access to its sources is regulated by secular 
means: not only in the sense that rulers sacrifice in order to secure the 
protection and prosperity of the entire society, but also in the sense that 
rulers seek to monopolize sacrifices, thus denying rest of the society access 
to higher powers. To put it bluntly, authority is used in order to get more 
power. And here one clearly comes to Godelier’s (1999, 194) point about 
how “[t]he castes and classes of antiquity could not have emerged had not 
these groups and these men appeared to have advanced further than other 
men into the space which from the outset separates man from the gods”.  
But despite the objectives of self-aggrandizement, there is always a 
social aspect in sacrifice. Nevertheless, in sacrifice the individual 
acknowledges that his/her fortunes depend on powers other than his/her 
own, not only those of the supernatural, but also his/her allies – those who 
help him/her sacrifice (cf., Hubert & Mauss 1968, 102). Hence the 
attainment of power is seen as much a matter of exchange as it is a matter of 
coercion. When hierarchy is constituted in sacrifice, one is able to see both 
of these processes at work: the superior authority of kingship over chiefship 
is established through exchange between the king and the gods, but the king 
cannot engage in exchange without the help of his chiefs, who are 
compensated by jural rights, which include, among other things, limitations 
of the kingly authority. The status of chiefly offices, which is comprised of 
these jural rights, is determined in the emerging hierarchy by their 
participation in and contribution to the sacrifice. The kings’ and chiefs’ 
ability and charter to rule arises from their transactions with the 
supernatural, and thus the state is not elevated to a “mystical plane”, but the 
“mystical” alliance descends to the political plane. 
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8 “A PRAYER FOR PROSPERITY”: AUTHORITY OUTSIDE THE 
HIERARCHIES 
 
In her study of the political systems of the region Paula Brown (1951, 261) 
states that in West Africa “authority is exercised by persons holding 
positions in kinship groups, associations, and states”. In the case of African 
kingdoms like Asante, she adds, authority was “a monopoly of state 
organization” (ibid., 276). Similarly, Fortes did not consider the hierarchies 
among offices of the same clan as political hierarchies, because status in 
them did not entail “politico-jural” authority in an accepted sense. They 
were not state hierarchies. Hence, they were seen to be less significant in 
comparison with the chain of allegiance for the political system. This view 
embodies the basic assumption of classical political anthropology that in 
state societies authority is vested in a formal structure. This, of course, is in 
alignment with the Western idea that in the bureaucratic machinery of a 
modern nation state authority is an allocated right attached to certain official 
positions. However, many recent studies have shown that centralized power 
is an illusion and “social formations are composed of competing epicentres 
of power whose relative strength may change over different spans of time” 
(Arens & Karp 1989, xxiii). This not only means political change or 
structural transformations in the long run, but also “moments in repetitive 
social processes when duly constituted authorities leave the center stage to 
the seemingly powerless” (ibid.). For instance, Victoria Ebin (1989) has 
shown in her study of the Dou secret societies of southwest Ghana how a 
new group of actors steps forward in a crisis situation (in her example, an 
increase in witchcraft), where the formal authorities, such as chiefs and 
diviners, are considered helpless. She claims that authority is diffused 
throughout the society and many of its members have “occasional” authority 
instead of the more permanent authority of the officeholders.  In a similar 
way among the Asante, something as political as participation in warfare 
was actually sanctioned in ritual by ordinary women instead of the male 
officeholders, who are the established military leaders of the Asante society. 
This process involves the ritual movement of actors between hierarchical 
social and cultural categories. 
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8.1 Warfare and status 
 
As Jérôme Rousseau (2001, 121) has pointed out, in a society where success 
in warfare provides status, the rulers are able to regulate the subjects’ ability 
to gain status by regulating warfare. Certainly, in pre-colonial Asante 
warfare was one of the major sources of status. Chiefly titles, rights to land 
and subjects were gained by military achievements. However, not 
everybody had the right to take part in warfare and seek higher status that 
way. The differing abilities to fight were congruent with the main cleavages 
in the society. Fighting separated chiefs from their subjects, free men from 
unfree, adult men from adolescent, and finally, men from women. 
Physical violence in general was regulated by the political 
authorities. There was no tradition of blood feuding, and the jural custom in 
most cases disapproved of the idea of self-help by the offended party.1 
Quarrels between individuals belonging to different communities were, if at 
all possible, arbitrated by a third a party (Kurankyi-Taylor 1951, 53-54). 
Those not satisfied with arbitration brought their cases before a chief’s court 
(ibid., 38-39). In terms of open warfare, the lineage elders were military 
commanders in the army of their chiefdom, but, individually, they could not 
mobilize their lineages. Of course, as councillors of the chief they had great 
influence in the matters of war and peace, but the final decision on war was 
made by the chief. Hence the person who “fought” (ko) wars was the chief, 
and he was perceived by his subjects as the supreme warrior. His exploits in 
war were always considered superior to those of his sub-chiefs or subjects. 
These merits were commemorated in chiefly titles, horn calls, drum 
histories, praise poems, regalia, and such. For example, the present 
Nkoransahene uses the title Okatakyei, “the gallant one”, which was 
originally bestowed on one of his predecessors. When he is moving on 
ceremonial occasions, his entourage is led by men carrying blackened 
elephant hides (bahoma), which are the insignia of Okatakyei. The horn call 
of the Okatakyei is Katakye wo pe ko pa pa (Rattray 1929, 225), meaning 
“the gallant one loves to fight”. Individual chiefs were also known by 
appellations that emphasized heroic deeds in war, for instance, the first 
Nkoransahene, Bafo Pim, was known as Bron Kyempem Duoduakwahene, 
freely translated as “the conqueror of thousand Bron peoples” (Goody & 
Boateng 1965, 175). This refers to his victory over the Takyimanhene, who 
                                                 
1
 For example, one was allowed to hit a thief or an adulterer when apprehending him/her, 
but killing him/her would not have been any different from a murder (Kurankyi-Taylor 
1951, 54).  
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was considered to have been the most powerful chief coming from the Bono 
(Bron) ethnic group.2 In conclusion, it can be said that the ability to make 
decisions about war, to wage war on other people, separated the chief from 
his subjects. Of course, in a ladder of command the subordinate chief 
needed the permission of his superior before going to war, but nonetheless, 
he was still considered to fight on his own (e.g., RAI MS 107: 9).   
For the ordinary men fighting meant a different thing. In their case it 
referred to the physical ability to fight, and more specifically, to the ability 
to own and operate a gun. The gun (otuo, pl. atuo) was, and to some extent 
still is, a symbol of manhood and authority.3 Possession and use of a gun 
were the mark of a free adult male. The boys learned their gun skills from 
their fathers during adolescence, but it was only in their late teens that they 
could own one. When negotiating marriages, the lineage elders had good 
grounds to forbid a girl to marry if they found out that the suitor did not own 
a gun (Arhin 1980, 26). Sometimes adolescent boys and women took part in 
military expeditions and performed various maintenance tasks, but the 
actual fighting was carried out exclusively by men. Also a slave might have 
carried his master’s gun to war, but he never had the right to own one. 
Accordingly, a slave could not join the fighting.4 As a symbol of authority, 
the gun did not have the same significance as the stool with its strong 
connections to the spirit world, but the inheritance of a man’s gun meant 
that, not only the weapon itself, but also the social and political status of the 
deceased had been transferred to his heir (Fortes 1969a, 149-150). This 
applied to chiefs and subjects alike. Even nowadays one of the highlights of 
a chief’s installation ceremony is when the new chief parades through a 
crowd showing his gun to the public. “You have handed over his gun to me” 
(mode ne tuo a amame) - a locution used in installation ceremonies - means 
that the person speaking is taking his predecessor’s place as a chief. Hence 
the gun also connected a man to his ancestors. 
The relationship between men and women in Asante society could 
be characterized as complementary but hierarchical (cf., Piot 1999, 121). 
This was already noted by Fortes (1962b, 269), when he maintained that 
“[m]en have greater political power than women; but political status comes 
                                                 
2
 The term Bono refers to the Akan peoples inhabiting the areas north and northeast from 
Asante. 
3
 Guns are still important in hunting and protecting farms from pests. Gunfire is also an 
important part of funerals and some other ritual occasions. 
4
 This rule probably applied only to so-called domestic slaves, since some sources indicate 
that the contingents of the Asante army consisted of enslaved captives (e.g. Rattay 1929, 
120-121). 
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from lineage affiliation which is conferred by women, and this redresses the 
balance”. The principle of complementarity also characterizes the 
relationship between the male office of chief and the female office of queen 
mother. For instance, a queen mother elects the candidate for the chiefly 
stool, and conversely, the queen mother is appointed by the chief. Similarly, 
a dead chief has to be buried by the queen mother and vice versa. This idea 
is also expressed in proverbs like ]baa na owoo ]hene, “it was the woman 
who gave birth to a chief” (Akyeampong & Obeng 1995, 481). However, 
the notion that a man is a product of a woman is also constitutive for the 
hierarchal relation between the two categories of office. It is often said that 
the female stool is also the elder stool (akonnua panin), and hence the 
female ruler is perceived explicitly as a mother to the chief and not a sister 
regardless of their biological kin relation (Rattray 1955, 80).5  
How is it then established that the most important political and ritual 
authority is vested in the male office, which cannot, at least in principle, be 
occupied by a female? The first reason is the ritual inferiority of women, 
which is due to the polluting effect of menstruation. Women of reproductive 
age cannot fully perform the ritual duties of a chief because their 
relationship to the ancestral spirits and deities would be interrupted by their 
periods.6 However, this does not concern women past the stage of 
menopause, who can acquire privileges of elderly men such as the right to 
“cut their hair short (dansikra), wear their cloths in a male fashion, drink 
                                                 
5
 Arhin (1983, 93) claims that the female offices complement the hierarchy of male offices. 
This would then suggest that, for example, the female stool of Adonten is (or is not) senior 
to the Amakom female stool on the same grounds as in the case of the male stools. My 
understanding is that female stools can hold privileges distinct from their corresponding 
male stools, and the whole polity is not identified with the female stool in a similar manner 
as in the case of the male stool. For instance, the chief of Nkoransa is a son and the queen 
mother a wife to the Asantehene, but people talk about Kumase-Nkoransa relations as 
father-son relations. However, due to her status as a wife the queen mother has certain ritual 
duties to perform when the Asantehene is sick (Rattray 1955, 153) and hence the female 
stool has a relationship to the Asantehene that is independent from the male stool. Thus the 
complementary aspect would be limited to the chain of allegiance. This is certainly a matter 
that requires further research.  
6
 There are some indications of relativity concerning the menstruation taboo. An interesting 
point came up in a discussion with an informant concerning the difference between left and 
right. To do things only with one’s left hand is considered to be an offence. Of course, in 
practice there are innumerable exceptions to this. When I was urging how does one really 
know when it is acceptable to use one’s left hand, I was given this allegory in reply: “Look, 
when women are menstruating we don’t allow them in the chief’s palace. But what 
happens, if all the men have gone to war, and there is something to be done in the palace? 
Then the women just have to go there!” 
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liquor, and pour libations” (Akyeampong & Obeng 1995, 491). They are 
also able occupy male stools, although most often as regents, and carry out 
the required ritual duties (cf., Arhin 1983, 95).7 The second reason, and to 
my mind the most important one, is the notion that women cannot fight. 
This seems to go beyond any considerations of the physical strength of 
women (e.g., Rattray 1955, 81) and is rather a matter of strength of 
character.8 A woman is seen to be defenceless against outside threats and 
incapable of acting without support. Hence, she is considered to be in 
constant need of protection from men, most importantly from her own 
lineage. This reduced autonomy does not result in a lack of rights, but as 
McCaskie (2000, 162) has noted on women’s position in the pre-colonial 
era, it suggests that “individual women who tried to venture autonomy 
outside the perimeter of ascribed jural rights as defined by matriliny were 
commonly and prejudicially disadvantaged in their encounters with both the 
explicit facts of male political power and the implicit understandings and 
assumption of patriarchy”. The provision of support and protection by men 
is seen to be equalized by the respect and submission from the part of the 
women. This balance in gender relations is illustrated by several of 
Rattray’s (1929, 310) informants who told him that a woman should never 
insult a man because “a man must fight to protect a woman, and as a woman 
cannot fight she has therefore not any right to abuse one on whom her life 
and safety ultimately depended”. 
That this “weakness” is ultimately seen to be spiritual and not 
physical is apparent in one of the traditional accounts about how Komfo 
Anokye helped the Asante to win the Denkyira war. 
 
All the people now asked Komfo Anotche what they should do. He 
said he would help them, provided he was given one thousand of 
everything in the world. To this they agreed. Anotche said they must 
prepare for three years (…) Meanwhile Anotche went to Denkyira, 
                                                 
7
 Women who occupied male offices took part in fighting. The most famous example would 
be, of course, Edwesohemaa (and Edwesohene) Yaa Asantewaa, who led the Asante troops 
in 1900-1901 uprising against the British. Reportedly, she agitated some of the hesitant 
chiefs by telling them: “If you, the chiefs of Asante, are going to behave like cowards and 
not fight, you should exchange your loincloths for my undergarments”. Interestingly 
enough, there are traditions in Edweso, which maintain that Yaa Asantewaa was actually a 
man dressed as a woman (Akyeampong & Obeng 1995, 504-506). 
8
 As Rattray (1929, 11) observed, boys who spoke in a feminine manner were ridiculed, but 
girls who spoke in a masculine manner were admired and complimented by saying, “she is 
brave” or “she has strong eyes”.  
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where he turned into a red-skinned girl and sat in the market selling 
fish. Ntim Gyakari’s servants saw her, and reported to their master 
that they had seen a beautiful fair-skinned girl in the market selling 
fish. The fish Anotche was selling he had mixed with medicine so 
that the heart of any one who ate them would become like that of a 
woman. Ntim Gyakari took the fish seller as his concubine, and 
while he was asleep Anotche took his heart and then escaped and 
returned to Kumasi (Rattray 1929, 276). 
 
Here the “male heart” of the Denkyirahene is transformed into a “female 
heart”, and hence he becomes open to the plot of Komfo Anokye.9 
However, this observation on the inherent “weakness” of women is not 
meant to be a conclusive statement on women’s position in pre-colonial 
Asante society. On the contrary, what I am merely pointing out is that, in 
terms of status derived from warfare, men stood in a privileged position. 
 
 
8.2 Men and women in war 
 
Lucy Mair (1977, 66) has divided the indigenous African states into “those 
in which a ‘citizen army’ was summoned from its everyday avocation when 
it was needed, and those in which some men at least were given special 
training”. The Asante fall into the former category. Although warfare might 
have been “the chief business” of the Asante state, as one colonial 
administrator once put it (PRAAD ARG 1/2/1/128a), it should not be 
assumed that the Asante (or any other Akan) society was somehow 
inherently militaristic.10 Even though ownership of a gun was a sign of 
manhood, there was no formal male initiation like among the Zulu, where a 
boy needed to become a warrior first in order to become a man (Mair 1977, 
68). There was no distinguishable “warrior class” like in some Polynesian 
societies (see Goldman 1967, 380-383). A low degree of occupational 
differentiation prevailed in the pre-colonial era, and everybody, including 
the officeholders, were involved in food production in one way or another 
                                                 
9
 Later, in the same tradition, the heart is put inside the Golden Stool. 
10
 The image of the Asante as a “warring tribe” was ideologically valuable for the colonial 
administration, since it partly legitimated the British presence in Asante. For example, in 
the 1930’s, when some of the earlier policies were critically reviewed, the necessity of 
conquest and occupation were not questioned because the Asante had been, after all, “a set 
of war-like, rather truculent natives with an overweening belief in their own powers which, 
of course, they had to unlearn” (PRO CO 96 715/3a).    
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(Arhin 1980, 28). An individual soldier went to war in order to attain wealth 
as much as status. A British correspondent who covered the Anglo-Asante 
war of 1873-1874 described the difference between the fighters on the two 
sides in the following way: “the Ashantees, though a brave people, are not 
like European soldiers; they do not love fighting for fighting’s sake. They 
receive no pay, and fight in hope of plunder” (cited in Wilks 1975, 682). 
Attitudes were not much different in the upper echelons of the society. 
Those among the pre-colonial power elite who advocated warfare did so 
usually on the grounds that the people “had multiplied and become 
prosperous” by fighting, and those who opposed it claimed that the same 
objectives could be reached by other means (ibid., 477-548). Hence warfare 
also had its survivalist dimension, connected to an ideology of 
accumulation.  
As noted before, it was the responsibility of the chief, with the 
assistance of his councillors, to make the decision on war and peace. Before 
pronouncing the final judgement the ancestral spirits as well as the deities 
protecting the state were consulted. The men in the villages were informed 
of the decision by their respective lineage heads.11 The chief could 
personally lead his men to battle or he could appoint one of his sub-chiefs to 
take the command. On the eve of war, all commanders took an oath to their 
overlord, in which they promised to achieve a specific target. For example, 
during 1892-1893, before launching one of the two punitive expeditions 
against Nkoransa, Bantamahene Amankwatia IV swore to the Asantehene 
that: 
 
I will proceed to Nkoranza or wherever the king of Nkoranza may be 
and bring him to you. I will visit Brumasi; I will take my 
breastplates from the kings of Prang and Yeji and Gwan. I will 
encamp at Atabubu where the shady trees will give shelter to my 
troops, and on my return I will bring Atabubu, Nkoranza and all the 
Brong nation with me to you as a part of your kingdom by conquest 
(PRO CO 879/39a). 
 
                                                 
11
 Among the coastal Akans, as well as the Kwawu and Akyem, the grassroot-level 
mobilization was done by the Asafo which was, and still is, an organization performing 
communal duties such as voluntary work, fire service, sea rescue, etc. In many places it is 
also a political body representing the commoners as a whole, sometimes even challenging 
the chiefly authority (e.g., Asiamah 2000). In Asante it did not have the same importance, 
and what was left of it was eradicated by the chiefs in the 1930’s (Tordoff 1965, 373-374).  
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After the oath was sworn the troops were not allowed to sleep another night 
in that same locality, they had to move on to the war camp (bosese). When 
the battle started troops were “encouraged and urged” from the rear by so-
called pushers (d]mpiafo]), who were usually minor officeholders 
belonging to the ruling lineage. The chief himself, his elders and the 
members of the ruling lineage were expected to fight to the bitter end. It was 
their responsibility to defend the sacred nucleus of the state, namely the 
blackened stools of the ancestors and the shrines of the gods, which had 
been carried to the battlefield. In the worst case, they would commit suicide 
by blowing themselves up along with the chiefly regalia. A chief who 
deserted was deposed and a subordinate chief most often executed after a 
trial, since he had not lived up to the oath he had sworn (Rattray 1929, 122-
124). In some cases he might have been able to “buy his head” by paying a 
considerable fine (Arhin 1980, 25). An individual fighter was also expected 
to show courage in combat but not to sacrifice his life when facing certain 
defeat. Retreat as such was not considered dishonourable (Rattray 1929, 
122-123). Nonetheless, desertion was a different thing altogether and those 
guilty of it did not get off without any consequences. They were captured 
behind the battle lines and their foreheads were cut with a specially made T-
shaped blade, after which they were returned to their own villages. The 
scarification in their foreheads was a sign to the other villagers, signalling to 
them that the persons in question had been caught fleeing (cf., Kwadwo 
1994, 84). 
 The deserter-chiefs who had managed to avoid the execution as well 
as the deserters from the rank and file were all humiliated publicly (ibid.). 
The message conveyed in these public displays seems to have been quite 
unambiguous. 
 
[T]he man was dressed in woman’s waist-beads (toma), his hair 
dressed in the manner called atiremmusem [still common among 
Ghanaian women], his eyebrows were shaved off (kwasea-nkome), 
and any man was at liberty to seduce the coward’s wife without the 
husband being able to claim adultery damages (Rattray 1929, 126).12 
                                                 
12
 Compensatory damages for adultery (ayeefere sika) can be seen as an indicator of power 
relations between men. The higher political status of an offended husband entitled him to a 
higher compensation, but inversely the bigger personal wealth of an offender-to-be enabled 
him to engage in liaisons with wives of high ranking officeholders without losing his life or 
freedom (McCaskie 1981b).  To be excluded from this construction meant a total loss of 
manhood and status. An offended man who had been in war at the time of the offence was 
entitled to increased damages (PRAAD ARG 8/2/55a). 
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PHOTOGRAPH 5. An elderly woman on her way to a shrine. She has decorated her 
body with white clay as a sign of a successful ending of a ritual festival. 
 
In order to fully understand what actually happened to those who refused to 
fight, the attention has to be turned to the activities of the female population 
during war, which involved an unreserved inversion of statuses. 
Unfortunately, there is not much data available on this subject, but at least in 
a few sources a certain ritual is mentioned. It was something that, in my 
opinion, has to be kept apart from so-called victory insurance rites (Turney-
High 1949, 215-219), which were already performed by the chief, when 
consulting the ancestors and gods. The main source is the journal of the two 
German Basel missionaries, F. A. Ramseyer and J. Kühne, who had been 
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captured by the Asante troops in 1869. When they were brought to the 
capital of the chiefdom of Dwaben they witnessed a scene familiar to them 
as they travelled through the Asante heartland towards Kumase. Ramseyer 
described it as follows: 
 
We had already met with some specimens of the savage female 
army, who in time of war dance twice a day through the towns of 
Ashantee, with howls and shrieks uttered for the benefit of their 
absent warriors. Our appearance in Dwaben was the signal for a 
grand flourish on their part; no sooner did we appear in sight than 
these white painted figures rushed forward to meet us leaping and 
gesticulating like maniacs, and brandishing their knives amid 
unearthly yells. One of them waved her sword full in the face of my 
wife, and then swept onward, screaming fearfully (Ramseyer & 
Kühne 1875, 52).  
 
After the missionaries had been shown to the Dwabenhene, they were given 
accommodation in a nearby village of Abankoro, where they once again 
“found a troop of women who were dancing and singing wild songs, which 
increased in vehemence on our approach”. When the women got closer to 
the prisoners, they “swung their fans in our faces with the maddest gestures” 
(ibid., 54). Some sources, although mainly pointing to the southern Akan 
groups, also maintain that the women stripped themselves naked during 
these rituals and physically abused the prisoners of war as well as the 
dissidents and deserters of their own community  (Jones 1993, 552-554). As 
the captives were settled in the village they realized that they had entered a 
community virtually occupied and ruled by women.  
 
The quarters allotted to us were close by, and our opposite neighbour 
was an Odonko negress, distinguished like the rest of her race by 
several semicircular scars, reaching from the temples to the corners 
of the mouth.13 This woman had two children whom, to our frequent 
                                                 
13
 The word ]d]nk], (pl. nn]nk]fo]) means a slave of foreign origin. Sometimes it is also 
used as a generic term for the peoples of northern Ghana, from where many of the slaves 
came (McCaskie 1995a, 280). The facial scarification, commonly known as “tribal marks”, 
is a practice shared by many of the northern peoples (see Fortes 1969b, 16). One could 
draw a connection between the forced scarification of the defectors and the slave status 
with the facial scarification as its primary external sign. Similarly, in violent popular 
outbursts against chiefs the mobs have intentionally scarred the faces of their victims. This 
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consternation, she used to summon home with piercing shrieks from 
the dangerous street. In another court lived a quiet wine dealer, who 
was almost the only male in the place, for with the exception of a 
few cripples and invalids, we had met hitherto with scarcely any 
men. The wife of the absent chief was the principal authority, and a 
stout cunning little woman who turned out to be the Fetish priestess, 
acted as her adviser (Ramseyer & Kühne 1875, 55).  
 
Earlier, before entering Asante proper, they had stopped in Kwawu Tafo 
(see Figure 9), where they were presented to “the people of influence in the 
town, who consisted chiefly of women, the wives of officials gone to the 
war, all painted white, and richly decorated with gigris and fetish charms 
worn for the sake of their husbands, for whom they made a daily procession 
through the town invoking the protection of their gods” (ibid., 35). What is 
significant here is that the women who are considered to be in positions of 
authority and influence are not the established female officeholders of the 
polity, such as the queen mother and the female lineage heads, but the wives 
of the chiefs, and at least in the case of Abankoro, a traditional priestess.14  
One other description of wartime rituals of women, which most 
probably relies on oral traditions rather then eyewitness accounts, is from 
Arhin.  
 
The main female military role, albeit played far behind the 
battlelines, was to engage in what was known as mmomomme twe, 
perform pantomime dances and sing dirges in support of the men at 
war. It is unclear whether the dances and songs were expected to 
have magico-religious effects on the enemy. But they had the 
practical effect of shaming potential war-dodgers known as 
kosaankomi into joining the war. Women were also authorised to 
compose songs which could drive confirmed war-dodgers to suicide 
(Arhin 1983, 96). 
 
                                                                                                                            
also relates to the requirement that a stool holder’s physical appearance and condition 
should always be faultless. 
14
 There are sources that could be seen to indicate the opposite. For instance, Busia (1968, 
20-21) writes that “the queen mother as head of the royal lineage superintended the rites 
and dirges of the women praying for victory and the safe return of their men (mmomme)”. 
However, these sources refer merely to “prayers” to gods and not to the “mob behaviour” 
and use of authority. 
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These rituals seemingly violate a number of laws and important 
sociocultural norms. First of all, public nudity is totally unacceptable; it is 
something that can be expected only from children and mad people 
(ab]damfo]), who “do not know how to cover themselves”, as the 
expression goes. Secondly, the adornment of bodies with white clay (hyire) 
is a sign of joy and purity. Hyire is also a sign of a favourable verdict in a 
court case, a return from captivity or a dangerous journey, and a priest 
getting possessed by a deity. In all, it could be said that white clay is 
associated with a successful transition from one condition or place to 
another. However, during preparations for war, people were expected to 
wear black clothes, and if body paint was used, it had to be black as well. It 
was only after a victorious campaign when the troops returning home were 
welcomed by sprinkling white clay on them. Even nowadays, this is evident 
in rituals where warfare is re-enacted. So, to wear white on “a black day” is 
something completely improper, it denotes “an offensive level of cultural 
incoherence”, as McCaskie (1992, 233) has put it. Thirdly, at least in the 
past, women’s opportunities for self-expression in public, especially in 
mixed gender situations, were quite limited (Yankah 1998, 16-18).15 
Moreover, in the case of slander, an insult on the part of a woman crossing 
the gender line was considered particularly grave, and a woman guilty of 
calling a man a fool (gyimi) in public could have been executed (Rattray 
1929, 310). In this light, women collectively ridiculing men, all the way to 
the verge of suicide, was something unthinkable. Finally, a physical attack 
was always a serious matter, and against officeholders and their retainers it 
could have led to the death penalty (ibid. 310-311). Affrays between 
ordinary villagers were usually reconciled by their respective lineages, so 
that the guilty party was obligated to pay an agreed amount of conciliatory 
damages (mpata) to the victim. Domestic violence was a different thing 
altogether, since from the contractual standpoint of marriage the wives were 
the property of their husbands (McCaskie 1981, 472), and thus in many 
cases husbands were entitled to practice severe physical abuse, even to the 
extent of mutilation, in order to control their wives (Bowdich 1966, 302-
303). 
In addition to this, there were radical changes in the appearance and 
behaviour of the men who went to war. Right after the war had been 
                                                 
15
 Of course, this is not to say that women were doomed to silence. According to Kwesi 
Yankah (1998, 18) “the verbal wit of women in traditional society is largely evident in all-
female forums, like courts of queen mothers, where women office holders, including 
akyeame and jury members assert their oratorical skills without inhibition”. 
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declared they let their hair and beards grow scruffy, a common 
characteristic for mad people as well as the priests, who were known as 
mediators “between the space of culture and that of hostile, impinging 
nature” (McCaskie 1995a, 108-124). A strange atmosphere of unruly speech 
prevailed in the war camps. Even the most important category of verbal 
taboos, the oaths, which are at the centre of the Akan judicial system, 
seemed to have been void: “any one might then use ‘oaths’ freely and even 
frivolously without incurring any legal penalty whatever” (Rattray 129, 
123). So, at this point, the men had left the village behind in more than one 
sense. The change was not only spatial; the familiar rules governing 
communal existence were undermined too. 
To summarize, one could say that the beginning of wartime was 
marked by a sort of “carnival”, where women, and also men, transgressed 
normative behaviour. This matter becomes even more interesting when one 
takes into consideration the strong resemblance that these events have with 
calendar festivals, like the Apo] festival described by Rattray (1955, 151-
171), as well as rites of passage, particularly divorce rituals (Rattray 1959, 
96-97). What needs to be emphasized here is that wartime is not normal 
time, and hence at that time men and women are not normal men and 
women, they become something else. To put it more explicitly, when the 
men went to war the women were transformed into men, and when the men 
returned, those among them who had not filled their obligation were 
transformed into women. So, in all, the ritual involved a complex inversion 
of statuses. Moreover, the sanctioning of military obligation was executed 
by women; it took place mostly in the ritual sphere and had surprisingly 
little to do with the politico-jural institutions of the state. 
 
 
8.3 Lawless sanctions?  
 
As mentioned earlier, Fortes claimed that in the jural custom of the Asante 
there are two kinds of offences, the “household cases” and the “tribal sins”. 
In his list of nine types of public wrongs, or “tribal sins”, he mentions 
“treason or cowardice in war” (Fortes 1969a, 155). His list is similar to the 
original prepared by Rattray (1929, 294-295). However, Rattray hesitated 
before adding this subject to the list and he did so only with certain 
conditions. He had already noted that “the punishment for cowardice in the 
presence of the enemy was generally death” (ibid., 126), but the basis for 
this was still unclear to him:   
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It would appear possible that both this offence [treason], and 
cowardice, may have been relegated to the class of capital sins 
because they would indirectly have involved the violation of an 
‘oath’ – the former, the oath of allegiance, the latter, the oath taken 
by commanders before setting out on a campaign. In that case the 
offence would then fall into another category… (ibid., 312). 
 
The capital crime then would not be the person’s reluctance to fight as such, 
but a transgression of a verbal taboo, namely the oath (ntam) (Rattray 1959, 
205-215). Hence a deserter-chief was not executed for his negligence of a 
universal obligation, lack of courage, or for being unmanly or 
dishonourable, he was put to death because by his own actions he had 
invoked a disaster upon the community as a whole. Of course, according to 
the principle of collective responsibility, the kinsmen and the subjects of a 
deserter-chief could have been held liable for his deeds, but in the most 
well-known accounts of “court marshals” in Asante there are not any 
mentions of mass executions or such activities.16 More probably, all or some 
of the land and subjects of such a chief were confiscated and redistributed to 
those officeholders favoured by the overlord.  
Conversely, there are instances where the subjects refused to follow 
their chiefs to the front or yielded only after persuasive measures by the 
state. Wilks (1975, 509) writes of enormous passive resistance in January 
1874 when “it proved extremely difficult for those responsible for the 
mobilization to collect their fighting men” (even though they were recruited 
for defensive warfare). Also in 1881 the persecutory politics of Asantehene 
Mensa Bonsu stirred the “anti-conscription” sentiment among the rural 
population, as is evident in an observation made by a British envoy:  
 
Not only did they murmur against the hardness of having to fight in 
a cause in which they took no interest, and in the mean time, having 
to give up their ordinary pursuits of husbandry and trade, but they 
moaned that they were powerless to help themselves against the 
                                                 
16
 Rattray (1929, 221) refers to Kumawuhene Kwaatrafani, who took part in the war against 
Banda during the reign of Asantehene Osei Kwadwo, but he “was a coward (adufo); he ran 
away and the Asante Hene fined him £ 1,000”. Wilks (1975, 222) mentions “one senior 
commander” called Akuoku, who “was placed on trial for dereliction of duty, condemned 
to death, and executed” in the aftermath of the coastal campaign of 1863-1864. 
 172 
murderous customs still retained by the King, notwithstanding his 
promises… (cited in Wilks 1975, 531).  
 
Similarly, in the correspondence of the Nkoransa war there are mentions of 
men “rapidly deserting from the Ashanti army” (PRO CO 879/39d) and how 
“great dissatisfaction was expressed by the Ashanti army, that they were 
tired of the prolonged wars carried out by Prempeh” (PRO CO 879/39e). 
In conclusion, the law enforced by the chiefly authorities did not 
have a lot to say about military obligation as such; the known instances are 
about the trials and punishments of the subordinate chiefs who had gone to 
war under oath. Busia (1968, 57) claimed that military obligation was “a 
lineage taboo”, although he never clarified this concept. In that case one 
would presume that non-compliance would fall into category of “household 
matters”, and thus it would be the responsibility of the lineage elders to 
control the sanctions. This was not the case either. The material currently 
available does not suggest that the carnival-like, public humiliations of 
dissidents and deserters were organized by some specific lineage or similar 
kind of authority. 
 
 
8.4 Ritual for or against the state? 
 
Adam Jones (1993, 558) has suggested that the status reversal and 
aggressive behaviour of women in war rituals did not have anything to do 
with mobilization as such, but rather with resisting the threatened 
breakdown of the society. He connects them to other rituals that are 
performed during certain crisis, for instance, breakouts of epidemics. In 
these cases the attacks and insults on men are explained by their 
powerlessness to prevent or stop the crisis. He makes a comparison with 
some rituals from other parts of Africa, also performed by women in order 
to avoid natural calamities, as described by Victor Turner: 
 
[S]tructural superiors, through their dissensions over particularistic 
or segmental interests, have brought a disaster on the local 
community. It is for structural inferiors, then – (in the Zulu case, 
young women, who are normally under the patria potestas of fathers 
or manus of husbands), representing communitas, or global 
community transcending all internal divisions – to set things right 
again. They do this by symbolically usurping for a short while the 
 173 
weapons, dress, accoutrements, and behavioural style of structural 
superiors- i.e. men (Turner 1969, 184). 
       
However, the problem in Jones’ study is that he has compiled war rituals 
from various peoples, with different ecological conditions, social and 
political organizations, etc., who have inhabited a geographical area known 
as the Gold Coast at one point in time (and elsewhere in Africa). Despite 
some formal resemblance, it is highly unlikely that all the rituals described 
could have a common function and meaning.  
In the particular case of the mmomomme twe practised by the 
Asante, the purpose of the ritual was not to question male or chiefly 
authority. The existing descriptions specifically state that the activities of 
women were done in support of men at war. This was achieved by 
weakening the enemy through magic and disgracing the dissidents and 
defectors. Most importantly, wars were not (usually) perceived by the 
Asante as a crisis that threatened the fundamentals of the society. On the 
contrary, warfare was seen as a major source of status and wealth. Directly 
the spoils of war went to men, but indirectly also to their dependants, 
women and children. Since fighting was exclusively a male activity, the 
female population, not only as dependants of their husbands, but also as 
“co-accumulators” who were in a disadvantaged position, took part in 
warfare by controlling the ritual sanctions associated with it. The women are 
not trying to undo what the men have done; they are rather ensuring that the 
men are complying with the ground norms of the society as defenders of the 
community but also as accumulators of wealth. Hence, through ritual, 
women were able to participate in warfare in its survivalist, co-operative 
dimension, meaning that they also took part in protecting the community 
and making it prosper. But, individually, none of them could rise above 
others as a war hero bestowed with gifts of offices, titles, land, subjects, and 
so forth. A linguistic detail, which supports this interpretation, is that the 
name mmomomme twe (or mmobomme) has been translated as “to pray for 
prosperity” (see Jones 1993, 551). 
However, the most interesting point is that authority is “removed” 
from the formal office-centered structure without undermining the 
categorical hierarchy of the society. Women are able to exercise authority 
over men in military matters without questioning the notion that women are 
inferior to men because they cannot fight. This is enabled by ritual 
transformations, where women are changed to men and men who are 
considered as defectors or traitors are changed to women. Hence, at the 
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same time, everything changes even though nothing really changes. The fact 
that the women’s authority is “occasional” – it is not permanently tied to 
any kind of status – shows, once again, how the idea that some statuses are 
politico-jural and some are familial can be deceiving in some situations. 
One should not expect to find certain types of relations only in certain kinds 
of social spheres, or otherwise one is likely to miss those situations, where 
authority and power take forms, which are idiosyncratic to the non-Western 
societies studied. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS: BEYOND FAMILIAL AND POLITICAL 
 
One of the central questions in this study has been how the Asante perceive 
and define power and authority. Or, what is the relationship between the 
political institutions and society? Generally, in anthropology there are two 
views on political authority that are relevant to the discussion of the Asante. 
In his essay on chieftaincy among the Nambikuara Indians of Brazil, Lévi-
Strauss deliberates upon why and how individuals and families are grouped 
together under the authority of a chief. Along with Mauss and Malinowski, 
he concluded that the chief-commoner relationship is based on reciprocity: 
the group has conceded the chief the right to certain privileges in exchange 
for what Lévi-Strauss called “collective security”, a chiefly guarantee 
against need and danger. According to him, between the chief and the 
group, “there is a perpetual balance of prestations, privileges, services and 
obligations” (Lévi-Strauss 1967, 59). This view was later repudiated by one 
of his students, Pierre Clastres (1998, 27-47), who argued that in such 
societies there existed a permanent imbalance in the exchange between the 
chief and the people. In fact, the chief was under an “eternal debt” to the 
group, which prevented him from accumulating or exercising any real 
political authority, and this also precluded the emergence of the state. 
According to Clastres, in a state things are turned upside down, and it is the 
people who are in an “eternal debt” to their ruler (ibid., 203-209). However, 
what both approaches have in common is that they understand “political 
authority as an internal growth, springing from the essence of human social 
relations and dispositions” (Sahlins 1985, 76).   
Sahlins (ibid., 76-79) maintains that the indigenous schemes 
concerning the origins of kingship often emphasize the notion that the ruler 
is above and beyond society. According to “local theories of origin they are 
strangers, just as the draconic feats by which they come to power are foreign 
to the conduct of ‘real people’ or true ‘sons of the land’”. Heusch’s (1987) 
theory of sacred kingship in Africa shares this view. Instead of a stranger 
king, “[t]he acceptance of magico-religious power of a unique and 
transcendent being over nature, is the decisive upsetting of archaic society” 
(1987, 28). These “beings”, i.e., the sacred kings, and their powers are 
considered antithetical to the prior kinship order. In fact, the sacred kings 
live in “a familial counter-order that transcends, while denying, the 
fundamental principles of the lineage society” (ibid., 24). He concludes that 
“the African kings are outside culture and are directly associated with nature 
(or divine transcendence)” (ibid., 28; italics in the original). 
 176 
The idea of two normative orders, the familial and political, was also at the 
centre of Fortes’ “Ashanti model”, although his standpoint differed from 
those of Heusch or Sahlins. He was not interested in the local theories of 
origins of the polity as reflected in the indigenous cosmology. However, he 
was concerned with investigating the structural principles that define the 
relationship between the two orders. He understood that even in a state 
society like Asante, where there are specialized political agencies with 
powerful sanctions at their disposal, the political institutions are not merely 
imposed on the society. In an interesting way this relates to Clastres’ (1998, 
36-37) idea of the nature of chiefship, which is embodied in “the set of 
prestations and counter-prestations which maintain the balance between the 
social structure and the political institution”. This aspect has to be kept 
separate from the political practises, the activity of chiefship, as Clastres 
called it. In the case of the Asante, by studying the allocation of politico-
jural status according to principles of matrilineal descent and patrilateral 
kinship, Fortes came to conclude that they form a bridge between the 
societal and political orders. To put it in a simpler way, he noticed how 
among the Asante chieftaincy is not connected to society because the chief 
can give orders to (some of) the members of the society and they must obey 
him; it is connected because the chief is related to his subjects through 
descent, bilateral, and affinal ties, and he acts as a mediator between his 
subjects and the ancestral spirits. This, I think, was the strongpoint of the 
“Ashanti model”. Its weakness was the rigid distinction between the two 
domains. Certainly, the Asante have ideas about familial and political; for 
instance, they speak of “household matters”, afisem, in contradistinction to 
“community matters”, amansem, or “chieftaincy matters”, ahinsem. But one 
cannot expect these ideas to correspond directly to analytical rules about 
familial and politico-jural domains. By identifying the indigenous ideas with 
the analytical principles Fortes could claim that the domains are facts both 
empirically and analytically. Similarly, he claimed that all statuses and 
relationships could be labelled either as familial or politico-jural. By 
clinging to ideas about authority as defining aspect of political relations in 
state societies he excluded the segmentary lineage system from his model 
and the whole idea of seniority as a defining principle of political hierarchy 
was neglected. As has been shown earlier, Asante politics cannot be 
understood properly without taking them into account.  
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9.1 Colonial and post-colonial challenges 
 
Fortes and his contemporaries are often criticized for having had little 
interest in colonial structures, their looming breakdown, and later their 
replacement with the structures of the post-colonial nation state (e.g. Hart 
1985, 247-248). This holds true for Fortes’ works on the Asante. He very 
rarely refers to the existence of the colonial or the post-colonial state that 
had been built around the kingdom he was studying.1 However, this does 
not mean that Fortes was not at all interested in or did not have anything 
important say about the impact of modern political institutions. On the 
surface, it seems that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1969, 15) agreed with the 
commonplace notion that chieftaincy loses its importance in African 
societies through the loss of independent legal authority. In state societies, 
 
the paramount ruler is prohibited, by the constraints of the colonial 
government, from using the organized force at his command on his 
own responsibility. This has everywhere resulted in diminishing his 
authority and generally in increasing the power and independence of 
his subordinates. He no longer rules in his own right, but as the agent 
of the colonial government. The pyramidal structure of the state is 
now maintained by the latter’s taking his place as the paramount. If 
he capitulates entirely, he may become a mere puppet of the colonial 
government. He loses the support of his people because the pattern 
of reciprocal rights and duties which bound him to them is 
destroyed. Alternatively, he may be able to safeguard his former 
status, to some extent, by openly or covertly leading the opposition 
which his people inevitably feel towards alien rule. Very often he is 
in the equivocal position of having to reconcile his contradictory 
roles as representative of his people against the colonial government 
and the latter against his people (ibid.; italics added). 
 
They saw that the balance of forces, which underlies political systems of all 
kinds, is permanently altered by colonialism and hence chieftaincy is 
removed from its former place. However, what they apparently did not 
                                                 
1
 Fortes’ predecessor, Rattray, was concerned with the impacts of colonialism. However, he 
has been criticized for not properly recognizing the effects that colonial rule had had on 
chieftaincy in Asante when he was studying it (McCaskie 1983). The analysis of the Asante 
political system by Fortes’ Ghanaian student, Busia, was explicitly about the colonial 
transformation (Busia 1968). 
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agree with, was the idea that chieftaincy is going to be replaced by modern 
political institutions and gradually disappear. Although chieftaincy is seen 
to be more or less at the mercy of the colonial administration, it is 
nonetheless understood that one political institution cannot just replace 
another.   
 
But the sanction of force on which a European administration 
depends lies outside the native political system. It is not used to 
maintain the values inherent in that system. In both societies of 
Group A and those of Group B European governments can impose 
their authority; in neither are they able to establish moral ties with 
the subject people. For, as we have seen, in the original native 
system force is used by a ruler with the consent of his subjects in the 
interest of social order. 
An African ruler is not to his people merely a person who 
can enforce his will on them. He is the axis of their political 
relations, the symbol of their unity and exclusiveness, and the 
embodiment of their essential values. He is more than a secular 
ruler; in that capacity the European government can to a great extent 
replace him. His credentials are mystical and derived from antiquity 
(ibid., 16; italics in the original). 
 
Based on the Asante material it is safe to say that Fortes and Evans-
Pritchard were correct in realizing that chieftaincy in Africa was a specific 
type of non-western political institution and thus it could not be replaced by 
the colonial government. In this respect, I think, their views differed 
significantly from those of the “practical anthropology” propagated by 
Malinowski and which held a dominant position in British anthropology at 
the time (see Kucklick 1991). Of course, Malinowski (1968, 52) too 
understood that the strength of the African institutions was in their 
relatedness to “all aspects of culture”. According to him, “[c]hieftainship 
shows such a great strength and endurance because it is associated with the 
local religion and magical beliefs; with the tribesmen’s acceptance of 
customary law as the only adequate expression of right and wrong” and 
hence uprooting it completely would prove very difficult (ibid.). However, 
ultimately he believed that “[o]ne institution can be replaced by another 
which fulfils a similar function” (ibid.), and consequently, chieftaincy 
would become outmoded and eventually be replaced with modern political 
institutions. Views analogous to those of Malinowski have been prevalent 
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outside the circles of academic anthropology. Many development theorists 
who have subscribed to the classical modernization theory as well as to the 
underdevelopment and dependency theories have assumed that “the 
principles of ‘modern’ formalized bureaucratic office and of functional 
differentiation would become more important than ‘traditional’ leaders” 
(Harneit-Sievers 1998, 57). More indirectly, similar notions live on in the 
views of those political writers who speak of “failed states”, where the post-
colonial administration has collapsed and the people are considered to have 
been left in the midst of chaos and anarchy. Such writers very often see 
indigenous political formations, such as clans, merely as instances of 
“tribalism” and equate their leaders with “warlords” (e.g. Kaplan 1994).  
But most importantly, such views were cultivated by the new 
political elites of the post-colonial state. For example, the first head of state 
of the independent Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah (1964, 83), recognized 
chieftaincy as one of the “traditional forces that can impede progress”, but 
he, nonetheless, understood that it could not just be abolished right away, 
since the “place of chiefs is so interwoven with Ghanaian society that their 
forcible eradication would tear gaps in the social fabric which might prove 
as painful as the retention of the other more unadaptable traditions”. Yet he 
predicted a “natural attenuation of chieftaincy under the impact social 
progress” (ibid., 84). Consequently, there were “numerous attempts to 
marginalize, control, and humiliate some chiefs” (Boafo-Arthur 2003, 127). 
The same attitude was also adopted by the military governments of J. J. 
Rawlings in the 1980’s and 1990’s. The Nkrumah administration 
concentrated on “subjugating and suppressing the economic autonomy of 
the chiefs through various laws”, while the Rawlings administration barred 
chiefs from participating in partisan politics on both grassroots and national 
levels (ibid.). Not surprisingly, one chief’s comment to me about 
government-chiefs relations was that “all governments of Ghana, from 
Nkrumah to Rawlings, have tried to destroy the Asante kingdom”.2 Yet it 
has survived all these challenges and the Ghanaian constitution (CRG 
270(1)) still guarantees the “institution of chieftaincy, together with its 
traditional councils as established in customary law and usage”. However, 
the Asante chiefs themselves do not justify the existence of their offices by 
                                                 
2
 I suppose the Asante chiefs see things differently now, since the president in office, Mr. 
John Kuffuor, is an Asante royal of the Apagya stool, which belongs to the Ankobea fekuo 
of Kumase (see Figure 8). The Apagyahene is considered to be a wife to the Asantehene 
and the stool is well known for “having a lot of gold”. During his electoral campaign in 
2000 I saw Mr. Kuffuor several times taking part in public ceremonies in the Asantehene’s 
palace. Every time the crowd cheered him enthusiastically.     
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reference to the constitution, chieftaincy acts and laws, or anything like that. 
Their strength is still the “moral tie” to the people. 
 
 
9.2 Rules of the chiefs, rules of the nation state 
 
In his recent article about chieftaincy in contemporary Ghana, Kwame 
Boafo-Arthur describes the chief as “a political and social power center (if 
even in a circumscribed sense) in the area he rules and ipso facto a 
microcosm of authority who at times rivals the central government in 
legitimacy, recognition, and loyalty by he subjects”(ibid.). To my mind, this 
definition does not capture the significant differences between the two 
political institutions that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard recognized. First, in 
terms authority backed up by physical force, the chiefly power does not 
constitute a challenge for the post-colonial administration endorsed by such 
coercive institutions as the police and the military. On that level of political 
practise, the chiefs do not rival the government. Second, however, when it 
comes to the “legitimacy, recognition, and loyalty by the subjects”, it is 
important to understand that the sources from where the modern and 
traditional institutions derive their formal justification are entirely different. 
The link between the rulers and the ruled in the post-colonial nation-state is 
contractual. The politician, elected to an office, is temporarily mandated to 
put forward the views of those he/she represent, while those represented 
retain the right of recall, if they see themselves misrepresented (Spencer 
1997, 12). The chief, however, represents his people in a different sense. 
The credentials of the chief are still to a large extent “mystical and derived 
from antiquity” and that is something that cannot be changed by orders and 
legislation supported by coercive machinery. This difference can be 
illustrated by a dispute between two traditional rulers, the Asantehene and 
the Takyimanhene, over the allegiance of certain villages. The case will 
show how the principles that legitimate chieftaincy are kept distinct from 
those that legitimate the modern government and how they are to a certain 
extent impenetrable to the latter. How do the principles or rules, according 
to which the chiefs define their relationship to the people and the land, relate 
to modern political institutions?  
The Asantehene’s control over certain villages within the Takyiman 
territory has remained a flammable political question. It has led to the 
separation of Takyiman (among some others) from the Ashanti Confederacy 
in 1951 and also to open hostilities between the “pro-Asante” and “anti-
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Asante” chiefs and their supporters in 1982 and 1996. I will here talk about 
the events that took place around February and March in 1996, when I was 
in Kumase myself. Any detailed account of the whole Takyiman conflict 
cannot be given here because it is literally hundreds of years old and also 
because it is nowadays connected to the larger issue of the relations between 
the Bono (Brong) ethnic group and the Asante (see Drah 1979). 
Furthermore, it is also closely associated with the post-colonial 
government’s decision to create a separate “Brongland” by splitting the old 
colonial Ashanti Region into two administrative areas, the Ashanti Region 
and the Brong-Ahafo Region, in 1959. This split did not have any effect on 
the traditional allegiances of the chiefs of the two regions, but it is still 
generally thought that by doing so the government sought to “break the back 
of what it considered as dangerous Asante nationalism” (ibid., 147). 
However, a short historical background of the dispute can be given as 
follows. The origins of the disagreement go all the way back to the Asante 
conquest of Takyiman in 1722-1723, which put an end to the Takyiman 
hegemony in the northwest and gave rise to the chiefdom of Nkoransa. As 
mentioned above, after the defeat of the Takyimanhene and the flight of his 
people, the Asantehene gave a large portion of the Takyiman lands to the 
Nkoransahene and trusted the rest to the hands of his ahwesofo], the 
overseers or caretakers, who are subordinate officeholder assigned to 
supervise lands and communities geographically detached from Kumase. 
Those communities that swore allegiance to Kumase through these 
overseers are often referred to as the nine villages.3 After the British 
occupation of Asante that had followed the Yaa Asantewaa war in 1900-
1901, the authority of the Asantehene and his overseers was nullified and 
the villages were returned to the Takyimanhene. However, in 1935 when the 
colonial government “restored” the Ashanti Confederacy Council, the 
villages were re-annexed to the capital and the position of certain Kumase 
officeholders as the overseers of the villages was recognized again. After 
this decision the villages remained in Kumase control, while the successive 
Takyimanhene pursued their claims to them in various colonial courts and 
lost each case. As a last effort, in 1949 and 1950, petitions were made to the 
King of England who also rejected them (PRO CO 96 8/3/12b).  
                                                 
3
 The villages and their overseers (in brackets) are: Nkyiraa (Nsumankwahene), Buoyem 
(Asantehemaa), Offuman (Adumhene and Dadiesoabahene), Nwoase (Dadiesoabahene), 
Branam (Dadiesoabahene), Tano Oboase (Omantihene), Subinso (Anantahene), Tuobodom 
(Nsumankwahene), Tanoso (Oyoko Ahenkurohene) (PRO CO 96 8/3/12b). 
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Despite these setbacks the Takyiman stool has never given up its claims to 
these villages. Consequently, in some, if not all, of these localities there are 
two chiefs, one appointed by the Asantehene and one appointed by the 
Takyiman Traditional Council. The people of the villages are also divided 
into “pro-Asante” and “anti-Asante” sections. Clashes between the chiefs 
and their sections have occurred from time to time. In 1990 the Brong-
Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs decided to establish a research committee 
to “investigate the reasons for the appointment of two chiefs” (Bening 1999, 
169). The findings of the committee favoured the Takyiman side, but in 
practise the situation did not change. On the contrary, on February 1996 
Asantehene Opoku Ware II announced that he had elevated four of the nine 
villages (Tanoso, Tano Oboase, Tuobodom, and Buoyem) to the rank of 
paramountcy, i.e., to the status of a constituent chiefdom of the kingdom 
(ibid., 168). This was interpreted by the Takyiman people as a great 
humiliation, since from their point of view an outsider had elevated four 
village-chiefs to an equal status with their overlord. This resulted in 
violence. Groups of men from Takyiman attacked the four elevated villages 
and three of the newly elevated chiefs had to seek refuge in Kumase. 
 
…when the press arrived at Techiman for a news conference by the 
Omanhene and his elders in reaction to Otumfuo’s pronouncement, 
the whole town was charged with angry young men and women in 
red and black outfit chanting war songs and firing guns into the air. 
Vehicles loaded with armed young men were seen moving to the 
troubled towns while those who could not go, besieged the 
Omanhene’s palace to give him support (Ghanaian Newsrunner Feb. 
10 – Feb. 20, 1996). 
 
When the police and the military arrived and managed to put a stop to the 
fighting in the towns, the casualties of the conflict were counted to be one 
dead and thirty wounded (including one police officer). However, it was 
reported that “many more deaths could be traced to the bush where fighting 
went on” (ibid.). There was more to come. Some men from the “pro-
Asante” section of Buoyem decided to teach “an unforgettable lesson” to 
some of their townsmen because they had “fled the area instead of staying 
behind to offer support during the unprovoked Techiman attack” (Ashanti 
Independent Mar. 11 – Mar. 17, 1996). Allegedly, hectares of tomato, 
cocoa, and food crops were destroyed in this retaliatory strike. The district 
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office of the National Mobilization Programme in Nkoransa received 600 
refugees from Buoyem and Tuobodom (ibid.).    
Meanwhile in Kumase I was surprised to hear how a lot of people 
were talking about war as a future possibility. The Asantehene had given a 
public announcement, according to which all the Asante in Kumase should 
dress in black as a sign of preparation for war. I had earlier planned a trip to 
Takyiman, which I had to cancel, because I did not want to get in the middle 
of the fighting and I was also advised not to go because it was possible that I 
would be targeted personally because “they will think you are a spy”. Later 
I was told that the Asantehene was going to speak to his people about the 
crisis in his palace at Manhyia, but also that only Asante people were 
allowed to take part in that meeting. Since I was clearly very interested in 
what was going on, a friend of mine suggested that he would put on his 
funeral clothe and go to the meeting and afterwards tell me everything that 
was said there. Unfortunately, when the day of the big meeting came, I 
could not find my friend, since he was too busy earning his livelihood at the 
Kumase central market. Although it would have been very thrilling to hear 
the news right away, missing the meeting was not such a big loss because 
the whole speech given by the Asantehene was published in the next issue of 
a local newspaper called the Ashanti Independent.  
In the statements given by both parties of the conflict there are 
numerous references to the legislation and court rulings of both the colonial 
and post-colonial eras. However, the interesting thing is that it is done 
mainly negatively; the disputants explain why the laws did not concern 
traditional allegiance or how they explicitly recognize the “customary 
rights” of the chiefs. The matter in dispute itself was about traditional 
allegiance and it could be solved by establishing what is “customary”. 
Basically, the Takyimanhene, Ameyaw Takyi II, claimed that the villages 
had always been a part of the chiefdom of Takyiman. For example, he 
claimed that the village of Buoyem was traditionally the seat of the queen 
mother of Takyiman and the Buoyemhene was his uncle and hence he could 
not see any reason why his uncle should pledge allegiance to the 
Asantehene. Because the villages belonged to Takyiman and Takyiman 
“was not an extension of the Asante Kingdom”, the Asantehene could not 
elevate them to paramountcy (Bening 1999, 169-170). The Asantehene, on 
the other hand, stated that “before 1900 all the stools and people of the 
present Brong-Ahafo owed allegiance to the Golden Stool”. The villages in 
question had been a part of Kumase for nearly 300 years, and hence “the 
Asantehene’s right to elevate them to paramountcy in accordance with 
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customary law, is unimpeachable” (Ashanti Independent Mar. 4 – Mar. 10, 
1996). 
According to Opoku Ware the whole dispute had resurrected in 
August 1995, when the Takyimanhene came with a delegation from the 
Brong-Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs to congratulate him on his 25th 
anniversary as the occupant of the Golden Stool. During that visit the 
Takyimanhene had pleaded with him to allow him to administer the nine 
villages. The Asantehene interpreted this plea as recognition of his 
overlordship. Thus Ameyaw was seen to have “expressly acknowledged the 
jurisdiction of the Golden Stool over the towns” (ibid.). Nevertheless, he 
had to be turned down because, according to the Asantehene, “granting such 
a request would not only have amounted to the abdication of my solemn 
responsibilities to my people of that area, but could also set in motion a 
process leading to the gradual disintegration of the entire Asante Kingdom” 
(ibid.). Here the Asantehene’s justification is obviously based on his status 
as the hereditary custodian of the Golden Stool, i.e., a divine king, and thus 
a symbol of the unity of the nation, who cannot let his kingdom disintegrate, 
since it would be against the core principles of his office. Roughly five 
months later, in January 1996, another delegation from the Brong-Ahafo 
Regional House of Chiefs, including the Takyimanhene, had paid him a visit 
with the intention of suggesting to the Asantehene that he would “consider 
certain arrangements whereby matters affecting chieftaincy in those areas 
may be heard by Brong-Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs”. The 
Takyimanhene addressed the Asantehene as his clansman, a grandfather, and 
begged the Asantehene that he would allow his grandson to administer the 
villages “for and on behalf of the Golden Stool” (ibid.). A reference was 
made also to patrilateral and affinal links, since the Takyimanhene’s 
“grandfather, Oheneba Kofi Ntisi, was the son of Asantehene Mensah 
Bonsu and his aunt Nana Yaa Abrafi was married to Nana Agyeman 
Prempeh” (Bening 1999, 174). Consequently, as Ameyaw himself put it, “a 
litigation over the issue in perpetuity would serve no useful purpose as that 
would always separate the two families within the same clan”.4 The 
                                                 
4
 The actual relationship between the ruling lineages of Kumase and Takyiman is very 
complicated. It is often said that the Takyimanhene belongs to Ayokoo or Oyoko clan and 
thus to the same clan as the ruling lineage of Kumase (e.g. Arhin 1979, 50). Some sources 
claim that the Takyimanhene belongs to the Anana clan, which is different from the Oyoko 
(PRO CO 785/3a). However, there are also sources indicating that Anana is only another 
local name for Oyoko or a subgroup of the Oyoko (Christensen 1954, 21-25). The present 
Takyimanhene apparently thinks they belong to the same clan. I do not know what the view 
of the royals of Kumase is on this matter. 
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Takyimanhene’s reconciliatory gesture is based on the idea that matrilineal 
relatives should not fight or litigate against each other and, at the same time, 
he is showing respect to a senior relative and asking to be granted a 
privilege by him. However, this plea was once again denied on the same 
grounds as before. On that occasion the Asantehene also revealed his plans 
to elevate the four villages to paramountcy, which eventually triggered the 
hostilities in Brong-Ahafo (Ashanti Independent Mar. 4 – Mar. 10, 1996). 
The press release, which followed the unrest condemned the violence, 
“which had been unleashed on the peace loving people” of the nine villages, 
“whose only offence is that they have chosen to serve the Golden Stool as 
their ancestors did” and it ended in a declaration: “I must state 
unequivocally that what belongs to the Golden Stool will not be ceded to 
anybody, and that acts of wanton violence and provocation will not deflect 
us from our sacred rights and responsibilities” (ibid.; italics in the original). 
The Brong-Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs, which had been caught 
in the middle of a three hundred years old dispute, took a stand, when its 
standing committee declared that the Asantehene “has no legal, customary, 
and constitutional right” to elevate the four chiefs (Ghanaian Newsrunner 
Feb. 21 – Mar. 5, 1996). However, it later became known that a significant 
part of the chiefs in the Regional House did not concur with this view 
(Bening 1999, 174-175). Also the government assigned its National 
Emergency Committee to investigate the matter and “ensure a return to a 
state of normalcy to enable all displaced persons to return to their homes 
and lead normal lives” (Ghanaian Newsrunner Feb. 21 – Mar. 5, 1996). It 
was, nonetheless, emphasized by the Minister of Information that “it is not 
the intention of government to interfere with the institution of chieftaincy” 
(ibid.). A reply from the four elevated chiefs also followed. They made a 
joint statement where they welcomed the government’s decision to 
investigate the case and hoped it will “settle the long standing dispute which 
only exists in the minds of those who want to evade history” (Bening 1999, 
169). However, they added that “most of the chiefs in Brong Ahafo owe 
their present status to the process of elevation set in motion by the occupants 
of the Golden Stool” and therefore it is “preposterous for the chiefs, 
individually or collectively to question the constitutional, legal, moral or the 
customary right of the Asantehene to carry out the exercise” (Ashanti 
Independent Mar. 11 – Mar. 17, 1996). Although the fighting had ceased, 
the situation in the Takyiman area remained difficult. 
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By June 1996 the residents of Buoyem still faced total blockade by 
Techiman and socio-economic activities in the town and the 
surrounding communities were seriously disrupted. The four 
vehicles that plied between Buoyem and Techiman were burnt and 
all the schools in the town were closed down as the teachers had fled 
since the violence. By the end of September the situation in the 
Techiman area was still tense and the people of Buoyem found it 
extremely difficult to move about freely and imminent famine in the 
area could not be ruled out. (…) More than 2,000 people had been 
internally displaced, mostly from Buoyem and Tuobodom (ibid.). 
 
According to my information, the dispute is still ongoing and no quick 
solution about the control of the villages can be expected. The relations 
between the Brong-Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs and the Asantehene 
have remained frosty. For instance, in 1999 when Opoku Ware II passed 
away, it was reported that the Brong-Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs had 
not received an invitation to his funeral, while all the other regional houses 
in Ghana had received one. However, almost all Brong-Ahafo chiefs had 
been “customarily notified to attend the funeral individually and were 
placed under various divisions in Ashanti” (Daily Graphic Apr. 29, 2000). 
Some refused to attend “on the account of the fact that they did not 
understand why they should be asked to move with some particular chiefs in 
Ashanti” (ibid.). The form of invitation and the “seating order” of the 
funeral were based on the relations of overlordship and seniority and thus 
they had become a very political matter. 
The Takyiman case directly contradicts notions that African chiefs 
have to “have recourse to foreign models of the state” in order stay 
politically relevant (Sandbrook 1985, 49). Such notions are based on the 
assumption that “African peoples and leaders cannot fall back upon the 
legitimating force of traditional institutions, because the obvious differences 
in scale and organization of the modern African state, not to mention the 
ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity of most contemporary African states 
are too significant to allow that” (Owusu 1989, 377). In fact it is the 
government, which finds itself sidelined merely as the restorer and upholder 
of peace. The legitimising principles brought up in the dispute have to do 
with ancestral obligation, clanship, patrikin, marriage, the difference 
between the indigenes and the conqueror, and divine kingship, which are 
alien concepts to the post-colonial government. The crucial relationships 
between the ruler and his subjects and land, on the one hand, and between 
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two rulers, on the other, are not defined according to laws of the post-
colonial state, but according to genealogies and histories. Consequently, the 
hierarchical aspect, who is under whom and who is senior to whom, remains 
to be politically relevant. 
 
 
9.3 Chieftaincy and the political imagination 
 
Apart from the political institutions and the rules governing term, ideas 
related to chieftaincy have a very central role in the political imagination of 
the contemporary Asante (and Ghanaians). The concept of political 
imagination is from Jonathan Spencer (1997, 4) and it refers to the “different 
way in which people have identified, created or reacted to an area of life and 
a set of practices they themselves refer to as ‘the political’” (italics in the 
original). In a similar vein a Ghanaian anthropologist, Maxwell Owusu 
(1989, 372), has argued that any African political phenomena cannot be 
understood, if “the central role of traditional beliefs and practices, 
indigenous political ideology, attitudes and outlooks” is ignored. Hence a 
due account has to be given to the “total cultural setting” (ibid.). According 
to him, for the majority of the Ghanaians terms like “capitalism”, 
“socialism”, “right”, and “left”, which have originated in the industrialized 
West, are not a part of everyday political vocabulary. They are perceived as 
abstractions or inventions created by the intelligentsia that do not apply to 
local circumstances. They are not taken for granted as chieftaincy is (Owusu 
1996, 316-317). In his own works Owusu has shown how both power 
seekers and power holders have “manipulated and exploited widely shared 
elements of the traditional political cultures (…) to provide charters for 
contemporary reform and even radical transformation of society” (1989, 
373). For instance, the military coups that followed one another in Ghana 
throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s were very often legitimated by references 
to the relationship between chiefs and their subjects. Traditionally, in Akan 
culture the chief holds his office in fiduciary capacity and can be deposed at 
any time if he has committed a definite offence or if he has become 
unpopular among his subjects. This, of course, is in sharp contrast with the 
“modern liberal democratic practice, where bad leaders are tolerated until 
the next election” (ibid., 378-379). The coups, which expressly violated the 
latter principles, were legitimated according to the former. Ousting the 
president was seen to be a part of “the oldest and most treasured tradition of 
the people of Ghana” (ibid., 378; italics in the original). According to 
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Owusu (ibid., 392), “all the different types of military regimes of Ghana 
(…) have exploited or manipulated the symbols and values of chieftaincy, 
perhaps the most powerful single source of legitimation”. For instance, after 
the overthrow of the civilian government led by K. A. Busia by General I. 
K. Acheampong in 1972,  
 
the new military rulers and chiefs and peoples in various local 
communities engaged in symbolic mutual exchanges and pledges of 
support and cooperation, amidst the ceremonial slaughtering of 
sheep and pouring of libation to ancestors, and taking of honorary 
chieftaincy titles by the rulers (ibid.).  
 
This phenomenon is by no means limited to military rule. The civilian 
administration can provide numerous examples of similar ways of seeking 
legitimation: using ceremonial swords in presidential inaugurations, writing 
chiefly praise poems and drum histories about the careers of the politicians, 
and so on.5 Even the first head of state, Nkrumah (1964, 63-64), who was 
well known for his anti-chief stances and who saw contemporary traditional 
leaders merely as clients of the colonial administration supported by the 
system of indirect rule, relied heavily on chiefly symbolism. For instance, 
he adopted a chiefly appellation, Osagyefo], “Redeemer through war”, even 
though he had never actually redeemed anybody through war as the chiefs 
and kings of pre-colonial era were considered to have done. The full title he 
most often used was “Prime Minister Osagyefuo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah”, 
which referred to his position in the government, his education, but also to 
his self assumed identity as a traditional leader.  
What Owusu’s studies show is that the ways in which the Ghanaians 
perceive such things, as “presidency”, “democracy”, and “representation”, 
are connected in a very concrete sense to chieftaincy. If the Ghanaians think 
and talk about politics in general by using concepts of the traditional 
political system, then it is also in the interest of the politicians to refer to 
similar concepts and ideas. My own experiences are in conformity with 
                                                 
5
 The chiefly symbolism can be found in very central places. Just one look at the emblems 
of the two major political parties of Ghana is very revealing. The Asante based NPP (New 
Patriotic Party), now the ruling party, has the elephant (]sono) in its emblem, which is an 
old Asante symbol of the wealth of the kingdom. The opposition party, NDC (National 
Democratic Congress), has the chief’s umbrella (akatamanso) as its symbol. It has to be 
remembered that in a country like Ghana, where a significant part of the population cannot 
read or write the official language, these symbols are far more important than the English 
names of the parties. 
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Owusu’s findings. For example, during the presidential elections I heard a 
lot of people talk about the presidency as a “stool”: “are we giving the stool 
to X?”, “should the stool be taken away from Y?”, and so on.6 Such 
instances illustrate how in people’s thoughts and speech the two kinds of 
institutions are given meanings that are not consistent with the normative 
bases of the institutions. To reformulate Malinowski’s (1968, 65) concepts, 
on the level of ideas, one can here see how “native chiefship” has a direct 
impact on its “Western counterpart”. 
One important factor is also the persistence of the ideas about the 
supernatural as the source of all power and sacrifice as a means to obtain it. 
In his study of the effects of colonial rule on Asante chieftaincy Busia 
(1968, 197) discussed the ways in which “the chief’s religious position is 
challenged by Christianity”. He noted that even though the chief performs 
his ritual duties as his predecessors have done, “the libations and sacrifices 
he offers have lost their full significance for some of his Christian subjects, 
who no longer believe that the crops will fail or that misfortune will befall 
the tribe if the sacrifices to the ancestors are not performed” (ibid). In 
Busia’s time Christianity was spreading and nowadays it can be said that it 
is the dominant religion in Asante. Although the presence and visibility of 
Christianity is very strong in southern and central Ghana, its relation to the 
traditional belief system is not unambiguous. In modern Asante one is very 
likely to meet devoted Christians who, nevertheless, believe in the existence 
of spirits, ghosts, and witches, or regular churchgoers who also consult a 
“fetish priest” from time to time. In her study of the history of Christianity 
among the Ewe of eastern Ghana, Birgit Meyer (1999, 110) observed that in 
the “Ewe’s encounter with Pietist missionaries, conversion did not bring 
about what professional theologians and social scientists tend to expect, 
namely rationalization and disenchantment”. On the contrary, the traditional 
religion was associated with the devil and through that to the evil, 
problematic, and confusing things in life. Hence, the old gods did not vanish 
from the lives of the Christian Ewes. In a very interesting way the 
missionaries proved the existence of the indigenous gods by demonising 
                                                 
6
 I once witnessed a conversation, where one party claimed that Kuffuor cannot win the 
presidential elections because Komfo Anokye had prophesized (or decreed) that no Asante 
cannot assume any office higher than the office of the Asantehene. Since Kuffuor was an 
Asante, he could not be elected. The objections of the other party were twofold. First, he 
pointed out that such military rulers as the generals A. A. Afrifa and Acheampong had 
actually been Asante. Second, he asked “who says that this [the president’s] stool is higher 
than that [the Asantehene’s] stool? After eight years the president has to step down, but 
Otumfuo has the Golden Stool and he can keep it as long as he lives!” 
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them (ibid., 110-111). This applies also in various ways to the Asante. The 
abosom and the asamanfo] have not vanished; they are still there. It is just 
that nowadays more and more people will say that they are “pagan gods” or 
“they can do so many bad things”. They are still understood to be agents of 
power, although the ideas about the nature of their powers have changed. 
Despite the fact that the values have changed, the fundamental idea that 
power transcends human agency and that it can be obtained through 
sacrifice is still valid to the Christian Asante. I have talked to royals who are 
so-called born-again Christians and who therefore refuse to become chiefs. 
On the one hand, they consider sacrificing to the ancestors and gods a 
“pagan” practise, but on the other, they cannot imagine a chief who does not 
sacrifice. When I once asked such a person whether he would like to 
become a chief, if he would not have to sacrifice, the answer was:  
 
If you are a chief, you have to sacrifice. That wouldn’t be 
chieftaincy anymore. That would be something new, something else. 
I don’t know. If such a new chieftaincy would be created, maybe I 
could think about it. But you have to understand that it would not be 
the same thing anymore.   
 
A ruler has to be powerful in order to rule and in order to get power he has 
to consult the supernatural. In case of the chiefs with their blackened 
ancestral stools and shrines of the deities this is unquestionable. Even those 
who consider sacrificing repugnant understand that it is the chief’s way 
acquiring power and thus indispensable to him.  
The interesting thing is that this idea is extended to modern rulers as 
well. They are also considered to have an enhanced spiritual backing. There 
are numerous stories about politicians obtaining “jujus” that make them 
bulletproof, knife-proof, immune to traffic accidents, rich, and so on. 
Similarly, their relationships with certain traditional priests, pastors, 
herbalists, and the like are a popular topic of gossip. Murders, suicides, 
mutilations, and other violent crimes are frequently associated with human 
sacrifices in the popular press and very often there is a link made to politics. 
Of course, one can argue that much of this is just gossip and sensationalism, 
and hence mostly products of human imagination, but what is important is 
that these stories are significant, understandable, and shareable to people 
who tell and re-tell them. And what give them vitality are the traditional 
ideas about power, leadership, and the supernatural. They are still valid to 
the contemporary Asante, although they have new emphasis and 
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connotations. Naturally, the presidents, ministers, or MPs are not divine 
kings, but some of the ways in which they are thought and talked about by 
ordinary Ghanaians have to do with the ideas about divine kingship. 
Therefore, although chiefs and politicians belong institutionally and 
normatively to entirely different categories they can both be seen on a 
higher, cosmological, level as people having power. 
Finally, the idea of political imagination connects to the question of 
how do the Asante people themselves (or Ghanaians) perceive the realm of 
power and politics. Namely, when studying the relationship between the 
familial and the political spheres, one cannot merely concentrate on explicit 
norms about institutions and relationships. One has to also pay attention to 
indigenous ideas about the origins and nature of power and leadership. That 
is the only way of finding out how the division between the familial and 
political exists empirically. The system of cultural logic that fuels the 
political imagination of the people also gives chieftaincy its vitality and 
meaning. Hence, it continues to exist despite major changes in Ghanaian 
society. Its flexibility and adaptivity, and most importantly its rootedness in 
the society, have secured it, even in those times when it has been in conflict 
with the colonial and post-colonial states. 
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